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Education and labor market outcomes are closely interlinked; the extent to which to they 
are interdependent in a developing country context, like Indonesia, is the subject of this 
dissertation. I first query the long-run effects of education on labor market and other related 
outcomes and on the intergenerational transmission of education. In 1973, Indonesia began one 
of the largest school construction programs ever. Exploiting variation across birth cohorts and 
districts in the number of schools built suggests education benefits for men and women persist 43 
years after the program. Exposed men are more likely to be formal workers, work outside 
agriculture, and migrate. Women are more likely to migrate and have fewer children. Their 
households have improved living standards and pay more government taxes. Education benefits 
are transmitted to their children, particularly from mothers to daughters. Intergenerational results 
are driven by improved marriage partner’s characteristics, including more education and secure 
employment. 
 Second, I query if the low female labor force participation in Indonesia can potentially be 
mitigated by the availability of preschools, where preschools represent one form of childcare 
services. I exploit spatial and temporal variations in the access to public preschools and age-
eligibility to implement a difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy and to infer the causal 
effect of public preschools on maternal employment. Accounting for mothers’ preferences for 
work, childrearing, and childbearing constant, I find that an additional public preschool per 1,000 
children raises the employment probability of mothers of age-eligible children by 7.4 percentage 
points, a 13.8 percent improvement from the baseline mean. Mothers are absorbed in informal 
sector occupations that do not require full-time commitments. 
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Third, I query how labor market regulations, such as minimum wage, can affect the 
incentive to invest in human capital. Between 1994 and 2009, Indonesia’s nominal minimum 
wages increased more than nine-fold. Previous empirical studies suggest that minimum wage 
hikes in Indonesia led to increases in wages and no net job losses. Could increasing minimum 
wages also increase the opportunity costs of schooling and induce a reduction in school 
enrollment? I leverage annual variations in minimum wage laws across provinces in Indonesia 
over time in a difference-in-differences framework. Using pooled annual Labor Force Surveys 
from 1994 to 2009, I find that minimum wages do not have statistically significant effects on 
school enrollment and work participation of youths. Estimates are precisely estimated; thus, I can 
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CHAPTER 1: LONG-TERM AND INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF 
EDUCATION: EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION IN INDONESIA 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Governments in developing countries spend approximately one trillion dollars annually 
on education, and households are estimated to spend hundreds of billions more on the education 
of their children (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016). Government education spending can take 
many forms, including teacher interventions, school input programs, cash transfer programs, and 
of course a common and direct form of education spending: school construction (see Burde and 
Linden, 2013 for short-term evaluations from Afghanistan and Kazianga et al., 2013 for Burkina 
Faso).  The question of which adult outcomes are affected by increases in educational attainment 
and whether these effects persists into the next generation are of great policy importance and 
broad research interest. 
While these government programs are often motivated by the belief that increases in 
education will translate to higher economic development and growth, the causal effect of 
schooling on economic growth is not uncontested and is often difficult to estimate.1 In recent 
years,  significant advancements have been made using randomized experiments, but reviewing 
111 primary school interventions in developing countries, McEwan (2015) finds that only 10 
percent had any evaluation taking place more than one month after the intervention had ended.2 
                                                 
1 An extensive literature in macroeconomics and growth has pointed to a high correlation between cross-country 
differences in per capita income and in education, but some have argued that these may reflect reverse causality of 
increased educational attainment in anticipation of high rates of economic growth (Bils and Klenow, 2000). 
Microeconomic analyses of the returns to schooling date back to Gorseline (1932) and Walsh (1935) and have long 
recognized that without (quasi) exogenous variation in educational attainment, the causal impact of education is hard 
to estimate because the choice of how much education to obtain is correlated with a large number of individual, 
household, and community characteristics . 
2 Notable exceptions include Baird, Hamory Hicks, Kremer, and Miguel (2016) who show positive labor market 
impacts 10 years after a deworming intervention in Kenya, and Gertler et al. (2014) showing higher earnings 20 
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This is unfortunate because the ultimate goal of these programs are improvements in later life 
outcomes and overall economic development, and it remains unclear whether the program effects 
persist or fade out over time.3 
In this paper, we study the long-term and intergenerational impact of one of the largest 
primary school construction programs ever completed on a wide range of outcomes, including 
education, employment, migration, living standards, taxes, marriage, health, housing and assets. 
Between 1973 and 1979, the Indonesian government constructed over 61,000 primary schools, 
averaging two schools per 1,000 children of primary school age. We use 2016 nationally 
representative Indonesian data to examine the long-term effects of additional schooling as a child 
and study whether these effects persists into the next generation. Following the seminal work by 
Duflo (2001) who studies the effects of this school construction program on men’s education and 
earnings in 1995, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variation across 
districts in the number of schools built and across birth cohorts in their exposure to the schools. 
The paper makes the following contributions. First, we estimate the causal impact of 
school construction on an extensive range of outcomes. While researchers have previously 
studied some of these outcomes, we bring them together in a comprehensive analysis in a unique 
setting. Second, we do so at a time that those exposed to the program are in their forties and 
fifties, allowing us to study the effects’ persistence over time. This type of long-term analysis is 
important for policy evaluation, but is less common and existing evidence on the persistence of 
education interventions is mixed. Third, the long time horizon and detailed household-level data 
                                                 
years after an early child stimulation program in Jamaica. Evidence from the U.S. indicates preschool and 
kindergarten programs lead to improved adult outcomes (Garces, Thomas, and Currie, 2002; Heckman et al., 2010; 
Chetty et al., 2011) as do health interventions (Bhalotra and Venkataramani, 2018). 
3 For example, Evans and Ngatia (2018) find that positive outcomes from a free school uniform program are no 
longer observable eight years after the intervention. Andrabi et al. (2011) using data from Pakistan find that only 
one-fifth to one-half of student learning persists between grades. Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims (2010) find low 
persistence of teacher learning in the U.S. with three-quarters or more fading out within one year. 
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allow us to observe intergenerational effects on children whose parents are exposed to the 
program and study impacts on the children’s educational attainment and well-being.4 Fourth, we 
extend the focus on working-age men in Duflo (2001) to study the impact of school construction 
on women and observe gender differences for both first and second-generation outcomes. This 
extension allows us to explore marriage market outcomes that appear to play a crucial role in the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital. Finally, for this program that has large up-front 
costs and benefits dispersed over time, we perform a detailed cost-benefit analysis. In addition to 
calculating benefits based on improvements in living standards, we use tax data to show school 
construction pays for itself in terms of higher future government tax revenues. 
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of our findings. Due to the data’s richness and the large 
number of outcomes, we want to be careful not to overemphasize any single significant result 
and so we take two approaches. First, following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), we create an 
index for each family of outcomes where we aggregate all individual outcomes in that family 
together. As described further in Section 1.3, we then estimate standardized effects from 
exposure to school construction on these outcome indexes (Banerjee et al., 2015). Second, since 
we examine multiple outcomes, we correct for the potential issue of simultaneous inference 
using multiple hypothesis testing. We calculate q-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up 
method to control for the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). 
                                                 
4 Black and Devereux (2011) review the large literature on the intergenerational transmission of human capital that 
measures the persistence between parents’ and children’s educational attainment, while Currie (2011) and Almond 
and Currie (2011) provide a review of the long-term effect on education of negative shocks while in utero or early 
childhood. In addition to the focus on the estimation of correlations between parent and child educational outcomes, 
recently there is an increased emphasis on estimating causal relationships. Researchers have used changes in school 
compulsory laws (see Chevalier, 2004 for U.K; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005 for Norway; Oreopoulos, 
Page, and Stevens, 2008 for U.S.), other educational policies (Currie and Moretti, 2003; Maurin and McNally, 
2008), and environmental shocks (Black et al., forthcoming) to estimate these effects. There is however limited 
evidence from developing countries. 
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The consistent pattern seen in Figure 1.1 is that exposure to school construction improves 
most outcomes we are able to explore in the data.5 School construction, not surprisingly, leads to 
improved educational outcomes. Duflo (2001) previously showed this for men, and we confirm it 
also improves women’s education.6 The education effects for women are concentrated in primary 
school only, while men also see significant increases in lower and upper secondary education. As 
adults, men who are exposed to the program are more likely to be employed, to work in the 
formal sector, to work in the non-agricultural sector and to migrate. Women are more likely to 
migrate and have fewer children. Households in which either parent is exposed to the program 
have higher living standards, better housing, more assets, and pay more government taxes. While 
nutrition and health investments increase, we do not observe any improvements in health 
outcomes. School construction leads to improved marriage market outcomes with spouses being 
more educated, more likely to be literate, and more likely to have migrated. 
Parents transmit these effects to the next generation, who have more education, with 
larger impacts in secondary and tertiary education. Mother’s exposure to school construction has 
a larger intergenerational education effect than father’s exposure. We perform a mediation 
analysis indicating that the intergenerational transmission of human capital appears to be driven 
by changes in parents’ marriage outcomes, especially whether the spouse completed primary 
school, is literate, and works in the formal sector and outside of agriculture. 
To quantify the policy implications, we conduct a cost-benefit analysis in which we 
create an accounting model to calculate the discounted costs of school construction and 
                                                 
5 An increase of one additional school built per 1,000 children would increase these indexes for those exposed to the 
school construction by 0.02 to 0.07 standard deviations relative to the control group. 
6 This finding is consistent with Breierova and Duflo (2004) who find similar point estimates for female education. 
In addition to the work by Duflo focusing on Indonesia, studies evaluating school construction projects have been 
carried out in Mozambique (Handa, 2002), Pakistan (Alderman, Kim, and Orazem, 2003), Afghanistan (Burde and 
Linden, 2013) and Burkina Faso (Kazianga et al., 2013). These studies focus on improvements in enrollment rates, 
as opposed to later-life outcomes, and all confirm large increases in school enrollment. 
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subsequent benefits for the government in terms of increased tax revenues and overall improved 
living standards for the Indonesian population. Across a range of different parameter estimates, 
we find that school construction leads to increased government tax revenues that directly offset 
construction costs in most cases within 40 years. Furthermore, accounting for improved living 
standards of the Indonesian population reveals high internal rates of return ranging from 13-21 
percent and benefits surpassing costs within 17-30 years after the schools were built. These 
results provide strong support for the cost-effectiveness of school construction interventions.7 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the institutional 
context and school construction program in Indonesia. Section 1.3 describes the empirical 
identification strategy and the data. Section 1.4 presents the results examining the effects of 
exposure to school construction on a range of long-term outcomes and Section 1.5 discusses the 
intergenerational effects. Section 1.6 shows results of a number of robustness checks. Section 1.7 
presents the cost-benefit analysis and Section 1.8 concludes. 
 
1.2. Institutional Context 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and the seventh largest 
economy in terms of total GDP at purchasing power parity. The country has experienced over 40 
years of high economic growth. Beginning from Soeharto’s rise to power in 1967, Indonesia’s 
                                                 
7 Most recent education research, in contrast, has focused on evaluating demand-side interventions that include 
either information-based interventions (see Jensen, 2010 for the first study of this type that provided information to 
parents about the returns to schooling), cash transfer programs (see Fiszbein et al. 2009 for an overview; Behrman, 
Parker, Todd, 2011 for evidence on the five-year impacts of the Mexican conditional cash transfer program 
Progresa; and Parker and Vogl, 2017 for evidence on Progresa’s longer-term impacts; Baird et al., 2011, Akresh, de 
Walque, and Kazianga, 2013, 2016, and Benhassine et al., 2015 for research that explores the role of conditionality 
in these cash transfer programs), scholarship programs (see Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton, 2009 for one of the first 
studies to examine the impact of merit-based scholarships), or other household level interventions (see Oster and 
Thornton, 2011 for evidence on providing female sanitary products to secondary school girls; and Muralidharan and 
Prakash, 2017 for evidence from providing bicycles to families). 
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Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas) outlined their plans for national 
development and the reduction of poverty in a series of Five-Year Development Plans (Repelita). 
One important part of these plans included the establishment of the “presidential instructions” 
(INPRES) program, which set up a system for distributing revenues from the central government 
to lower administrative levels. Starting with the oil boom in 1973, the central government 
emphasized the explicit goal of reducing regional disparities (Ravallion, 1988). 
As part of this redistribution goal, the government began a nationwide school 
construction program, the Sekolah Dasar INPRES, which was one of the first and largest 
INPRES programs. Between 1973 and 1979, around 61,800 primary schools were constructed. 
Enrollment rates in 1972 before the start of school construction were 71 percent among primary 
school-age children. By 1978, enrollment rates among this age group reached 85 percent.8 Prior 
to this program in 1973, capital expenditures in education were low and enrollment rates in the 
few years before school construction began were stagnant (World Bank, 1989). 
School construction nearly doubled the stock of primary schools from a baseline of 
around 63,000 primary schools. On average, the program added over 200 schools per district or 2 
schools for every 1,000 children of primary school age. There was large heterogeneity across 
districts in how many schools the government built as the government designed the school 
construction program to target districts in which enrollment was initially lower.9 The government 
designed each school for 120 students, and they recruited teachers and paid their salaries for 
these newly constructed schools. During the same period, the government attempted to train new 
                                                 
8 World Bank Databank. 2018. “Adjusted Net Enrollment Rate, Primary (% of Primary School Age Children)” 
(Accessed on October 17, 2018: databank.worldbank.org) 
9 Appendix Figure A.1 presents a map of Indonesia indicating the geographical distribution of the number of schools 
constructed in each district. 
7 
 
teachers, and the percentage of teachers who met the minimum qualification of having an upper 
secondary school degree did not change over this period (World Bank, 1989). 
 
1.3. Empirical Strategy and Data 
1.3.1 Difference-in-differences 
Following Duflo (2001), we estimate a difference-in-differences specification in which 
an individual’s district of birth and date of birth jointly determine their exposure to the INPRES 
school construction program. Children in Indonesia typically attend primary school between age 
seven and twelve. INPRES school construction started during the 1973-1974 school year, so 
children who were born in or before 1962 were at least 12 years of age in 1974 and would not 
have benefited from the school construction.10 Children younger than seven in 1974 would have 
been exposed to the full potential benefits of the newly constructed schools. Children who were 
of primary school age in 1974 might partially benefit from the new INPRES schools as some of 
them were induced to enroll, and their propensity to enroll likely decreased with the child’s age. 
Besides variation across birth cohorts, there is considerable variation across geographical 
districts in the intensity of the school construction program. This is because the number of 
schools constructed was linked to the districts’ primary school enrollment rate in 1972 (prior to 
the school construction), and areas with low prior enrollment rates had more schools built. 
Exploiting these two sources of variation (birth cohort and geographical), we estimate the 
effect of school construction in the following regression: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 ⋅ 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + (𝑿𝑗𝑩𝑡
′ ) 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1.1) 
                                                 
10 The 1993 Indonesian Family Life survey indicates that less than 3 percent of individuals born between 1950 and 
1962 were still in primary school in 1974. As a further check, we use the 1976 Intercensal Survey and find that only 
4.3 percent of individuals born between 1950 and 1962 were still in primary school in 1976. 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the outcome of individual i born in district j in year t, 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 measures the number 
of schools constructed by the INPRES program between 1973 and 1979 per 1,000 children in the 
individual’s birth district j. We use an individual’s birth district instead of current residence 
because the latter may be endogenous to program placement if households move to access 
schools for their children.11 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable for being born between 1968-1972 
(ages 2-6 in 1974) and thus being young enough to benefit from the program. Individuals born 
between 1957 and 1962 (ages 12-17 in 1974) represent older cohorts who are not exposed to the 
program. Following Duflo (2001), we exclude individuals born between 1963 and 1967 (ages 7-
11 in 1974) as they might have only partially benefited from school construction. We perform 
several robustness checks to confirm results are consistent across various definitions of exposed 
and unexposed cohorts.12 𝜇𝑗 are time-invariant district of birth fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are cohort of 
birth fixed effects, and 𝑿𝑗𝑩𝑡
′  controls for district-specific time-varying trends that might 
influence outcomes. Following Duflo (2001), we do this by interacting birth cohort indicators 
with district enrollment in 1971 and with the presence of water and sanitation programs in the 
district.13 Note that we closely follow Duflo (2001) with the only exceptions that, unlike Duflo, 
we cluster our standard errors, and we do so at the district level, and that our data allows us to 
                                                 
11 In the African context, child fostering, where the biological parents send their own child to live with another 
family, is quite common and often done to send the child to school (Akresh, 2004, 2009). In the Indonesian context, 
child fostering is much less common (Marazyan, 2012). 
12 One of the reasons for Duflo (2001) to restrict the young cohort to those born before 1972 is so that these cohorts 
would have completed schooling and begun participating in the labor market by 1995, the survey year of the data 
she uses. The 1972 cohorts turned 23 in 1995, which is old enough to have completed tertiary education. With our 
2016 data, cohorts born after 1972 would have also been exposed to the school construction and had sufficient time 
to complete school and join the labor market. In the robustness checks discussed in Section 1.6, we explore the 
robustness of the results to alternative cohort definitions. In particular, we show that results are robust to adding in 
younger cohorts (born 1973-1980), older cohorts (born 1950-1956), and partially exposed cohorts (born 1963-1967). 
13 We use district enrollment in 1971 because program intensity was tied to 1972 district enrollment and not 
controlling for pre-program enrollment might bias the results as there could be mean reversion even in the absence 
of the program. In addition, the oil boom, which provided financial resources for school construction, could have 
also provided resources for other government programs that were correlated with INPRES school placement. Water 
and sanitation programs were the second largest set of INPRES programs delivered by the central government. 
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estimate the effects of school construction on both men and women. To allow for gender 
heterogeneity, we estimate Equation (1.1) separately for men and women. 
Given the program targeted less developed areas, we want to show that our effects are not 
explained by general catching up (or mean reversion) from those areas, as this would violate the 
parallel trends assumption. To test this identification assumption, we estimate placebo 
regressions in which we compare the old cohort (ages 12-17 in 1974) with an even older cohort 
(ages 18-24 in 1974). We discuss results in Section 1.6 and show there are no differential time 
trends in outcomes prior to the school construction. Further, in Appendix Figure A.2, we 
estimate a regression where we interact the number of INPRES schools constructed in one’s birth 
district with an indicator for age in 1974. We omit the age group 19-24 in 1974 from the 
regression so that we are comparing each age against this older cohort. For both men and 
women, we do not observe any differential trend effects for non-exposed ages.14 
We explore individual and household-level outcomes to measure impacts of school 
construction. For household level data, such as expenditures, we use the household head or 
spouse’s birth cohort and district of birth and present results separately for men and women.15 In 
Equation (1.1), j refers to the man or woman’s birth district, while t refers to birth year.16 
The duration between school construction that started in 1973 and data collection in 2016 
allows us to study not only the long-term effects of exposure to the program but also the effects 
                                                 
14 In our main specifications, we prefer to show results using the regression specified in Equation (1.1) over figures 
such as Appendix Figure A.2 because this allows us to pool together all ages that belong to the young cohort and all 
those that belong to the old cohort, given that within cohort, everyone has the same exposure status. 
15 Female household heads represent 13.8 percent of the sample and are included in the regressions for women. 
Results are robust to estimating the regressions separately for household heads and spouses, irrespective of gender. 
Note that in the household level regressions the analysis for men does not condition on the women’s exposure to 
school construction. Likewise, for women, the analysis does not condition on the men’s exposure.  
16 This assignment is arguably the most natural way to define exposure for household-level outcomes as there could 
be multiple individuals living in a household and these individuals could be in the old, young, and intermediate birth 
cohorts. Robustness checks in Section 1.6 show that this assignment decision does not influence results. 
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of school construction on the next generation’s outcomes. Specifically, we estimate the impact 
on children’s schooling and other child outcomes based on whether their mother or father (or 
both) are exposed to school construction. We estimate reduced-form relationships between 
second-generation outcomes and schools construction in the following regression: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑐𝑎 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 ⋅ 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + (𝑿𝑗𝑩𝑡
′ ) 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑐𝑎 (1.2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑐𝑎 denotes the outcome of child c who is age a, born to a parent i who was born in 
district j in year t, 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑗 is the number of schools constructed in the father’s or mother’s birth 
district, 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 indicates if the father or mother belongs to the young cohort, and 𝜃𝑎 is child c’s 
age fixed effect.17 Standard errors are clustered at the father’s or mother’s birth district.18 
 
1.3.2 Strategies to address the large number of outcomes 
We adopt two strategies to address the large number of outcomes that we examine to 
avoid overemphasizing any single significant result. First, as mentioned in the introduction, we 
create indexes for each family of outcomes following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). These 
indexes combine all of the outcomes in each family of outcomes. To construct the indexes, we 
define each outcome so that higher values correspond with better outcomes. Then we standardize 
each outcome into a Z-score by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of 
the older cohort born in low intensity districts. We then average all of the Z-scores and 
                                                 
17 We include child age fixed effects because old cohort parents mechanically have older children on average than 
young cohort parents and older children have more time to complete additional schooling. Therefore, the marginal 
benefit to children’s years of schooling is estimated across different households but among children of the same age. 
18 As in most household surveys, Susenas 2016 identifies household relationships with respect to the household 
head. If a child is not the biological or adopted child of the household head and spouse, the child is recorded as 
‘other household member’. Therefore, we restrict our intergenerational analysis to children of the household head 
and spouse. With further assumptions, we can include grandchildren and parents of the household head in multi-
generational households. These add less than 3,000 additional observations and results are robust to their inclusion. 
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standardize the average relative to the older cohort born in the low intensity districts.19 We then 
estimate the effect of exposure to school construction on these standardized outcome indexes. 
Second, we correct for the potential issue of simultaneous inference using multiple 
hypothesis testing. Following Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), we use the concept of a false 
discovery rate (FDR) to allow inference when conducting many tests. Intuitively, FDR allows a 
researcher to tolerate a certain number of tests to be incorrectly discovered. An FDR adjusted q-
value of 0.05 implies that 5 percent of significant tests result in false positives compared with an 
unadjusted p-value of 0.05 that implies 5 percent of all tests result in false positives. In all 
regression tables, we show standard errors based on unadjusted p-values and FDR adjusted q-
values that address the multiple hypotheses being tested in a given family of outcomes. 
 
1.3.3 Data 
To measure the impact of this school construction program, we use Duflo’s data of the 
Sekolah Dasar INPRES program that reports the number of schools constructed in each district 
between 1973 and 1979.20 We combine the school construction data with the National 
Socioeconomic Survey conducted in 2016, henceforth Susenas 2016, administered by 
Indonesia’s Central Statistics Bureau, Badan Pusat Statistik. Susenas 2016 is a nationally 
representative household survey covering all 34 provinces and 511 districts of Indonesia.21 The 
data combines a large sample size of 291,414 households and 1,048,575 individuals with a wide 
range of variables on education, employment, migration, living standards, taxes, assets, nutrition, 
                                                 
19 Banerjee et al. (2015) also use this approach to evaluate the effect of poverty graduation programs in six countries 
on a range of outcomes. Ajayi and Ross (2017) modify this standardization approach to use with a difference-in-
differences empirical strategy when there is not a randomly assigned control group. 
20 We are grateful to Esther Duflo for sharing these data. 
21 The smallest geographical unit in the Susenas 2016 is the Indonesian ‘kabupaten’, loosely translated as district. 
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health, marriage and demographics, welfare program participation, and the next generation’s 
educational outcomes.22 
We present summary statistics for each family of outcomes in Tables 1.1 to 1.7 and 
Appendix Tables A.1 to A.5, which we discuss in the next section together with the impacts of 
school construction. For the birth cohorts that our analysis focuses on (1957-1962 and 1968-
1972), households have on average over four members and the sample is evenly split between 
men and women. Average completed years of schooling for individuals in these cohorts is 8.0 
years for men and 7.1 years for women. Approximately 81 percent of men and 73 percent of 
women complete primary school. These individuals have lower rates of lower and upper 
secondary school completion (39 and 34 percent for men respectively and 31 and 26 percent 
respectively for women). Tertiary completion rates are 9.5 and 7.7 percent for men and women. 
These individuals are ages 44 to 48 (young cohort) and 54 to 59 (old cohort) at the time 
of the survey in 2016. Most men are working (95 percent), while women have lower labor force 
attachment (64 percent). Conditional on working, only 33 percent of men and 24 percent of 
women are in the formal sector. Just over half of men and women work in non-agricultural 
sectors and around one-quarter have migrated from their birth district. 
 
1.4. First Generation Effects of School Construction 
This section describes the impact of school construction on first generation outcomes. 
Following the estimation strategy previously outlined, the main explanatory variable is an 
                                                 
22 Susenas 2016 is particularly suitable to study the effects of this program because it includes information on the 
individual’s district of birth and the sample is sufficiently large to precisely estimate the observed relationships. 
Appendix B provides further rationale for the choice of data, in particular showing that the sample for the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey (IFLS) is not large enough to detect the effects of school construction. Furthermore, Bharati, 
Chin, and Jung (2018) use the most recent round of the IFLS to examine the combined impacts of rainfall at birth 
and school construction. They find strong effects of rainfall in the expected direction, but the IFLS is underpowered 
to estimate the main effect of school construction on education or the interaction effect of construction and rainfall. 
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interaction of the number of schools constructed per 1,000 children in a person’s birth district 
with an indicator for being young enough to benefit from the program. As discussed in the 
introduction, Figure 1.1 reveals positive impacts of school construction across indexes of 
outcomes for first generation individuals exposed to the program and for their children. In the 
following sections, we discuss the family of outcomes that these indexes are based on in more 
detail. 
 
1.4.1. Impact on educational attainment 
Table 1.1 studies the relationship between school construction and educational 
attainment.23 On average, the program increases years of education for men by 0.27 years and for 
women by 0.23 years. The analysis by Duflo (2001) is restricted to men, and the comparable 
point estimate in her study is slightly lower at 0.19 years.24 Note that both estimates are modest 
in size given that the number of primary schools almost doubled. At the mean number of schools 
built per 1,000 children (1.98), our estimates imply an increase in years of schooling of 0.53 and 
0.46 for men and women, respectively. 
The next four rows examine completed levels of education and show considerable gender 
differences. For men, the program increases the likelihood of completing primary school by 2.6 
                                                 
23 The survey records educational outcomes for household members aged five and older and is missing otherwise. 
24 If we restrict our sample to only wage earners, our point estimate for men is 0.18, while for this subgroup, Duflo’s 
estimate is higher than ours at 0.26. The comparable estimate we obtain for female wage earners is higher at 0.28, 
perhaps because it is less common for women to be engaged in wage work so they are less representative of women 
in general. While it is hard to pin down the exact reason for differences between Duflo’s and our estimates given 
that we use different surveys (Intercensal survey versus Susenas) in different years (1995 versus 2016), two natural 
reasons for differential attrition come to mind. First, there may be differential mortality. In particular, if higher 
educated people live longer and are therefore more likely to still be in our 2016 dataset, then an increase in 
education caused by the program would lead us to find larger estimates in 2016 than in 1995. Conversely, if higher 
educated people are more likely to migrate internationally outside our sample, and therefore not be present during 
the 2016 data collection that would lead us to find smaller estimates in 2016. While we cannot directly test for these 
opposing trends, one way to reconcile the differences between our estimates and those of Duflo is that differential 
mortality may play a large role for the general population, while differential migration could be more prevalent 
amongst wage earners. 
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percentage points. Even though the program only targeted primary schools, we see effects for 
men in lower and upper secondary education at 2.3 and 2.6 percentage points. These represent 
larger percentage increases than for primary school because average completion rates at these 
levels are lower. On the other hand, the results for women are concentrated in primary school 
only, which they are 4.1 percentage points more likely to complete, and we are able to reject the 
equality of this coefficient with the male effect. The effects on lower and upper secondary 
completion rates are considerably smaller and indistinguishable from zero. For both men and 
women, school construction did not affect tertiary education completion rates. As shown in row 
6, literacy rates are high on average at 95 percent for men and 91 percent for women, and the 
program raises these by 1.5 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. The FDR q-values (shown in 
square brackets) that correct for multiple hypothesis testing across all of the outcomes in the 
education table reveal that the coefficients remain statistically significant. 
In the last row, we create an index using all other rows combined, following Kling et al. 
(2007) as discussed previously. The point estimates correspond with those shown in Figure 1.1 
and confirm broad increases in educational attainment for men and women. Building two 
additional schools in an individual’s birth district increases the educational outcomes for those 
exposed to the school construction by approximately 0.13 standard deviations relative to the 
control group. 
We explore the gender dynamics and patterns by grade in further detail in Figure 1.2 
showing the impact of school construction on the likelihood of completing at least a certain 
number of years of education. For example, it shows that the program increased the likelihood of 
completing at least one year of school by 0.95 percentage points for men and 2.3 percentage 
points for women. For men and women, effects are significantly different from zero throughout 
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all primary school years and show an increasing pattern by grade. Consistent with Table 1.1, 
effects for men continue throughout lower and upper secondary school and seem stable across 
grades. While positive, the secondary school effects for women are not distinguishable from 
zero, nor are the effects on tertiary education for either gender.25 
 
1.4.2. Long-run labor market impacts 
Having observed large increases in education in response to school construction, Table 
1.2 studies subsequent labor market and migration outcomes.26, 27 As shown in row 1, 95 percent 
of men are working and the program raises this by 0.6 percentage points. The effect for women 
is half as large and insignificant, but allows for an economically meaningful increase within its 
confidence bounds, especially considering a lower average employment rate of 64 percent. In 
row 2, we explore the intensive margin of employment, namely number of hours worked 
conditional on working. Estimates indicate increases of 0.26 hours for men and 0.16 for women, 
but neither are significant. In response to school construction, men move to jobs that are 
generally deemed more desirable: they are 1.1 percentage points more likely to work in the 
formal sector that tends to offer higher quality and more stable jobs (Kleemans and Magruder, 
2018). Given an average formal sector employment rate of 33 percent for men, increasing the 
                                                 
25 While we could use the school construction program as an instrument for years of education, we prefer to study 
later-life outcomes using OLS in order to capture broad impacts and because the exclusion restriction could be 
violated if the program caused community-level changes that affect long-term outcomes in ways other than through 
increased schooling. There is a strong first stage relationship with an F-statistic of 32.3 for men and 31.8 for women. 
That said, for scaling purposes, the coefficients on long-term outcomes could be multiplied by four to calculate the 
effect of an extra year of education, given that the program increased schooling by approximately 0.25 years. 
26 Employment outcomes are recorded for household members aged ten and older and are missing otherwise. 
27 Heckman, Humphries, and Veramendi (2018) provide a recent overview of the extensive literature examining the 
relationship between education and labor market outcomes. Wydick, Glewwe and Rutledge (2013) find that child 
sponsorship leads to increased probability and quality of employment in six developing countries. Duflo, Dupas, and 
Kremer (2017) focuses on Ghana and is one of the few randomized control trials in education that follows 
individuals over eight years and finds that secondary school scholarships improves labor market outcomes. 
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number of schools in an individual’s birth district by the sample mean raises the likelihood of 
men being in the formal sector by almost 7 percent. Men furthermore move away from 
agricultural work, which they are 1.2 percentage points less likely to hold, compared to 44 
percent on average, and shift towards service sectors. We do not find any evidence of 
occupational shifts for women.28 
Most research on the relationship between education and migration generally focuses on 
the selection into migration in terms of educational attainment.29 We extend this work by 
studying the causal relationship of increases in education on the likelihood of migration. On 
average, 27 percent of men and 25 percent of women migrate away from their birth district. 
School construction increases migration rates by 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points respectively. At 
the mean level of school construction, this represents an economically meaningful increase of 5.1 
and 6.5 percent for men and women, respectively. Row 7 indicates that the increase in migration 
is concentrated in shorter distance moves within—rather than between—provinces. 
Correcting for multiple hypothesis testing across all of the outcomes in the 
work/migration table shows that the FDR q-values are somewhat larger but coefficients generally 
remain statistically significant. Finally, aggregating the seven outcomes into an index following 
Kling et al. (2007) shows a positive and significant impact for men with an increase of 0.076 
standard deviations due to an increase of two additional schools built in the district. 
 
 
                                                 
28 The only occupation-related variable that shows up as statistically significant for women is whether they are self-
employed in their own micro-enterprise, which almost a quarter of women are. They are 1.1 percentage points more 
likely to do so. Given the large number of outcomes variables, we decided not to report all subcategories separately, 
but instead combine them into the ‘formal worker’ variable, which is not statistically significant. 
29 Empirical evidence for Indonesia (Hicks et al., 2018) and for developing countries in general (Young, 2013) 
shows positive selection from rural to urban areas and negative selection from urban to rural. 
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1.4.3. Long-term impacts on living standards, taxes, housing, and assets 
Susenas 2016 collects detailed data on household expenditures, which we use as a proxy 
for living standards.30 Table 1.3 shows the effects of exposure to school construction on five 
aggregated living standard measures. Row 1 shows that total expenditure increases by 2.1 or 3.2 
percent in households in which either males or females are exposed. The increase is larger for 
non-food than food expenditure (rows 2 and 3) and, as a result, the ratio of non-food to total 
increases (row 4). Households where the head or spouse is exposed spend 16 to 19 percent more 
on education in 2016 (row 5). All results remain statistically significant after correcting for 
multiple hypothesis testing. The last row combines the expenditure data from rows 1, 2, and 5 
into a living standards index, showing an overall increase of 0.03 and 0.05 standard deviations 
for men and women, respectively, for each additional school built in one’s birth district.31 
Given that income is generally correlated with expenditure, we expect improvements in 
labor market outcomes to go hand in hand with increases in expenditure. While this is true for 
men, we observe increased expenditure in the absence of labor market improvements for women. 
We explore this apparent puzzle in Appendix Table A.6. Note that labor market outcomes are 
observed for each individual while expenditure is measured at the household level, so household 
dynamics and spouse characteristics can interact with the direct effect of program exposure. 
                                                 
30 Susenas 2016 does not include information on income, unlike the 1995 Intercensal survey that Duflo (2001) used 
to measure the returns to education. After the 1995 round, the earnings question was discontinued so we do not have 
access to more recent income data. That said, in a developing country setting with substantial home production, 
informal employment, unemployment and underemployment, expenditure data may suffer less from under-reporting 
and more closely resemble living standards (Rizky, Suryadarma, and Suryahadi, 2018). All expenditure values refer 
to average monthly expenditure measured in 10,000 Indonesian rupiah (IDR). In 2016, the exchange rate was 1 
USD=13,308 IDR. We convert expenditure categories reported in weekly or annual amounts to monthly 
expenditure. In regression analyses, we apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to the nominal values since 
expenditure data tends to be skewed and a log transformation would not be defined for zero expenditures. The 
inverse hyperbolic sine is approximately equal to log (2y) or log (2) + log (y), so in most cases it can be interpreted 
the same way as a standard logarithmic dependent variable. 
31 The variables shown in rows 3 and 4 of Table 3 can be derived from those shown in rows 1 and 2, so to avoid 
double counting these are excluded from the living standards index. 
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Column 1 repeats the total expenditure regression and the other columns add spouse 
characteristics as mediating variables. Controlling for spouse characteristics changes the direct 
effect of program exposure on expenditure: the effect of men’s exposure drops significantly 
when controlling for his spouse’s education-related variables but not when controlling for the 
wife’s labor market outcomes. This is not surprising, as we did not observe labor market effects 
for women. The effect for exposed women drops 30 to 50 percent not only when controlling for 
her husband’s education but when controlling for his labor market outcomes. When controlling 
for all mediating variables in the last column, the direct effect falls by about 60 percent for both 
men and women. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that household dynamics and marriage 
market outcomes play an important role; an issue we return to in Section 1.4.5. 
In addition to expenditures, we study tax payments, which are important for the cost-
benefit analyses in Section 1.7 and allow us to study if the program pays for itself from increased 
taxes over time. Table 1.4 shows broad increases in total taxes and the three tax sub-components 
that Susenas 2016 collects data on. Total taxes increase by 7.8 percent in households where 
males are exposed to school construction and 12.3 percent if women are exposed. In rows 2, 3, 
and 4, we analyze the three main sub-components of taxes, revealing increases in land and 
building taxes, taxes on motorized and non-motorized vehicles, and local community taxes.32,33 
                                                 
32 Appendix Table A.1 explores effects on housing and assets. On average 43 percent of the sample lives in urban 
areas and even though exposure increases migration, school construction does not increase the likelihood of living in 
urban areas. They do appear to move to more valuable and larger housing. Row 2 shows an increase of 2.8 percent 
in the monthly rent equivalent payments if women are exposed, and a smaller and insignificant effect if males are 
exposed. Exposure increases floor area by 1.2-1.5 square meters (row 3) and utility usage by 5.1 to 8.5 percent (row 
4). To approximate for household wealth, row 5 studies the impact of school construction on an asset index that is a 
principal component analysis of household ownership of the following durable goods: ownership of motorcycle, car, 
home phone, computer/laptop, television, gold/jewelry, refrigerator, water heater, LPG gas tube, boat, motorized 
boat, and air conditioner. The program leads to a 3-4 percent increase in the index if men or women are exposed. 
Aggregating all five housing and asset outcomes into an index confirms broad increases for men and women. 
33 We also explore the effects of exposure to school construction on the first generation’s utilization of government 
welfare programs. Susenas 2016 collects data on four national programs that aim to reduce poverty and inequality. 
Ex-ante it is unclear if increased take-up of welfare programs reflects higher needs due to increased poverty or 
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1.4.4. Long-run impacts on nutrition and health 
There exists a strong correlation between education and health, although research 
estimating a causal relationship finds mixed evidence.34 Table 1.5 (health outcomes) and 
Appendix Tables A.2 (nutrition) and A.3 (health investment) show three components of health 
impacts in response to school construction. Appendix Table A.2 shows overall calories increase 
by 1.8 percent for women exposed to the program while the effect for men is smaller and not 
significant. Patterns are similar for consumption of protein, fats, and carbohydrates with 
respective increases of 1.8, 2.3, and 1.7 percent when women are exposed to the program and 
smaller increases for men. We are unable to answer definitively (although Table 1.5 examines 
self-reported health outcomes) whether these nutrition changes for women are health improving 
as additional protein is likely beneficial for individuals in developing countries, but additional 
fats can indicate a worse diet.35 
A natural follow-up question is whether increases in nutrition and health investments 
result in improved health. Table 1.5 reveals that overall we do not observe such improvements. 
While we see increases in not reporting a health complaint in the last month (row 1) and the 
number of days uninterrupted by health complaints (row 2), neither are statistically significant. 
                                                 
whether it is indicative of increased awareness of existing programs. As shown in Appendix Table A.4, we see few 
changes to any of the individual government programs or to the welfare program index in the last row. 
34 Lleras-Muney (2005) finds positive effects of education on mortality in the U.S., while Clark and Royer (2013), 
Malamud, Mitrut, and Pop-Eleches (2018), and Meghir, Palme, and Simeonova (2018) find no effects of education 
on mortality in the U.K., Romania, and Sweden, respectively. Baird at al. (2016) show that improved health from 
deworming treatment at primary schools in Kenya increases education, as well as later-life labor market outcomes. 
35 Appendix Table A.3 shows health expenditures increase by 5.5 and 7.1 percent for exposed women and men, but 
only the men’s coefficient is significant. Preventative health investments that include medical check-ups, family 
planning, and immunizations increase by 19-24 percent if the woman or man is exposed to school construction. We 
see large increases in expenditures for family planning, including contraceptives and consultations, of 23 and 32 
percent for women and men, respectively. On the curative side, households with either the man or woman exposed 
are 4.8-7.5 percent more likely to use a private instead of public hospital, which generally provide higher quality and 
more expensive health care. Health insurance expenditures rise 14 percent for exposed women. Taken together, the 
health investment index shows broad increases for exposed men and women, with an improvement in health 
investments of 0.13 standard deviations when an additional two schools are built in the individual’s birth district. 
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Considering severe health complaints only, we observe a 0.5 percentage point decrease in reports 
from exposed men. The aggregated health index in row 4 shows an improvement in health 
outcomes for men exposed to school construction but is insignificant for exposed women. 
 
1.4.5. Long-run marriage and fertility effects 
Evidence estimating the causal relationship between education and demographic 
outcomes has generally been mixed and nuanced, and this is true in our setting.36 Table 1.6 
explores marriage and fertility outcomes for those exposed to the program.37 On average, women 
marry four years younger than men (row 1), but there is no effect of school construction 
exposure on the age of first marriage. Coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. In 
rows 2 to 9, we explore if program exposure changed the types of spouses that men and women 
marry. Rows 2, 3 and 4 reveal that both men and women marry partners with higher levels of 
education and literacy. Results remain statistically significant after correcting for multiple 
hypothesis testing. The results are perhaps unsurprising given that average education levels 
improved in districts with additional schools, but important nonetheless because education 
increases for exposed individuals as well as their spouses. In Appendix Table A.7, we examine 
further if this education increase is only a level effect (everyone has more education) or whether 
there is a distributional effect (husbands marry women from higher in the education distribution). 
                                                 
36 Osili and Long (2008) find evidence of education reducing fertility in Nigeria. On the other hand, McCrary and 
Royer (2011) find only a small fertility effect but a larger effect on the quality of the marriage partner in the U.S. In 
the Kenyan context, education subsidies reduce women’s likelihood of teenage marriage and pregnancy (Duflo, 
Dupas, and Kremer, 2015). Looking at a wider age range, Geruso and Royer (2018) find increased education lowers 
teen fertility and increases the education of the spouse but has no impact on total completed fertility. Research by 
Breierova and Duflo (2004) examining this same Indonesian school construction program find that women exposed 
to the program have lower fertility, consistent with our results discussed below. 
37 Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) also examine the INPRES school construction program and the relationship between 
education and marriage. They find that marriage market customs, in particular the practice of bride price, strongly 
influences how much education women receive. School construction has large positive effects on education for 
women but only among ethnic groups that practice bride price. 
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There is weak evidence that spouses come from higher in the education distribution, although the 
results do not survive multiple hypothesis testing (row 2). We see stronger evidence that women 
exposed to school construction reduce the education gap (in levels and percentiles) with their 
husbands (rows 3 and 4). This highlights the increased average education in the household, 
which may play an important role for the intergenerational transmission of education, which we 
explore in Section 1.5. As shown in rows 5, 6, and 7, we do not observe any changes in the labor 
market outcomes of spouses, but we do see that men and women are 0.7-0.8 percentage points 
more likely to have a spouse who migrated (row 8).38 We do not observe changes in spouse’s 
health (row 9). 
We do not have complete birth histories for each woman that would allow us to measure 
the relationship between education and total fertility. However, we can measure impacts on the 
number of children aged 0-14 living in the household at the time of the survey. Exposure to 
school construction reduces the number of children for women. The combined marriage and 
fertility index (row 10) shows broad improvements for both genders: two additional schools built 
in a district lead to increases of 0.13 and 0.10 standard deviations for exposed men and women. 
 
1.5. Second-generation Effects of School Construction 
Having observed large long-term effects of Indonesia’s school construction program on a 
wide range of outcomes, including education, employment, migration, living standards, and 
marriage, we now investigate whether the effects extend to the next generation and affect the 
children of those exposed to the program. To guide our analyses, we develop a simple conceptual 
framework building on Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) who study and compare the effects of 
                                                 
38 We define migration relative to the individual’s birth district, and it may have occurred anytime between birth and 
2016, so spouses may have migrated together. 
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mother’s and father’s schooling on their children’s schooling. In its most general form, consider 
a linear reduced-form equation of the schooling of child 𝑖 in family 𝑗: 








𝑐                                         (1.3) 
where superscript 𝑐 denotes that individual 𝑖 is a child in family 𝑗; 𝑆𝑗
𝑓
 is schooling of the father, 
and 𝑆𝑗
𝑚 is schooling of the mother. 𝑋𝑗
𝑓
 refers to father characteristics other than schooling that 
may affect 𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑐 , including labor market conditions, migration status, and health outcomes. 𝑋𝑗
𝑚 
refers to such characteristics of the mother and 𝑐 is a child specific term. 
As Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) discuss, Equation 1.3 is a general and reduced-form 
model of household resource allocations that is consistent with many models, both dynamic and 
static. It emphasizes the interrelationship of parent characteristics affecting child schooling. In 
particular, the characteristics of the parents will be correlated with each other due to nonrandom 
matching in the marriage market. Dropping subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑗 for convenience, this is illustrated 
in the following assortative matching relationships: 
𝑆𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑚, 𝑋𝑚) 
𝑋𝑓 = 𝑔(𝑆𝑚, 𝑋𝑚) 
Combined with Equation 1.3, these relationships highlight that any empirical association 
between parent and child schooling need not reflect a direct relationship only, but may also 
manifest itself through positive assortative matching.39 Indeed, Table 1.6 and Appendix Table 
A.7 (discussed later in this section) show that individuals exposed to school construction match 
                                                 
39 Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) caution that studying intergenerational schooling externalities is also 
challenging due to ability bias, which points to parent ability as an omitted variable determining both their own 
schooling and their child’s ability and through that, the child’s schooling. Studying effects in response to school 
construction helps eliminate this concern and obtain causal estimates of second-generation effects. 
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with higher educated spouses, both in absolute terms and relative to others on the marriage 
market.40 
We explore these interrelationships in the remainder of this section. In Section 1.5.1 and 
1.5.2, we study the impact of parental exposure to school construction on their children’s 
schooling. In Section 1.5.3, we perform a mediation analysis using the rich data we have 
available to see how controlling for the additional terms of Equation 1.3 changes the effect of 
parental exposure on their children’s’ schooling. We perform this analysis first for a person’s 
own characteristics, other than schooling, to see if the effect of parental exposure on child 
education manifests itself through characteristics such as labor market outcomes, living 
standards, and nutrition. Then, we repeat this exercise by controlling for the spouse’s schooling 
and characteristics. Following the conceptual framework we laid out above, this helps shed light 
on the mechanisms through which parental exposure affects child’s schooling. 
 
1.5.1. Second-generation effects on education and wellbeing 
As explained in Section 1.3, we measure second-generation impacts using the same 
difference-in-differences framework as first generation effects. The main explanatory variable is 
an interaction of school construction intensity in a parent’s birth district with an indicator for 
being young enough to benefit from the program. We consider outcomes for all children living in 
the parent’s household and include age fixed effects to ensure comparisons are across same-aged 
children. 
                                                 
40 On average, the correlation in years of education between spouses is high at 0.63. 
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Table 1.7 shows the effect of parental exposure to school construction on their children’s 
educational attainment.41 Row 1 confirms that program effects persist into the next generation.42 
Children with fathers exposed to the program obtain an additional 0.10 years of school, while 
children with exposed mothers obtain 0.17 years more. We can reject the equality of these 
coefficients. The magnitudes decrease compared to the first generation results of 0.27 and 0.23 
years for men and women, but are still economically meaningful. In the next section, we explore 
potential channels through which the effects persist into the next generation. 
Unlike the first generation education results, we observe no effects on children for 
primary school completion rates (row 2) because by 2016 primary school has become nearly 
universal.43 There are large effects on completing lower and upper secondary for children whose 
parents are exposed to school construction, with the effect for exposed mothers being statistically 
larger than for exposed fathers. In addition, unlike the first generation education results, 
increases in educational attainment now extend to tertiary education completion rates. Children 
with exposed mothers are 0.8 percentage points more likely to complete tertiary education, 
compared to a 0.4 percentage point increase for children with exposed fathers. An increase of the 
mean number of schools in a mother’s birth district leads to a 25 percent increase in the 
likelihood her child completes tertiary education relative to average tertiary education levels. 
To account for the fact that some second-generation children may still be attending 
school, we study the effects on age-for-grade (row 6), defined as an indicator variable for 
                                                 
41 Even though school construction may affect both father’s and mother’s exposure, they enter each regression 
separately in Table 7. We return to this issue in Section 1.5.2 and in Table 8 where we control for exposure of both 
parents simultaneously. 
42 Related research explores the production function for children’s human capital (Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix, 2017) 
as well as focuses on how parents or teachers respond to inequalities across children (Akresh et al., 2012, Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). 
43 UNICEF statistics (accessed November 19, 2018: unicef.org/infobycountry/indonesia_statistics) indicate primary 
school net enrollment rates in Indonesia from 2008-2012 are 98 and 100 percent for boys and girls, respectively. 
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whether the child is on track to complete the appropriate grades on time.44 Results confirm that 
having parents exposed to school construction increases the likelihood of being on track by 1.1 
percentage points if the father is exposed and 1.8 percentage points if the mother is exposed. 
All of the education results for mothers remain statistically significant after correcting for 
multiple hypothesis testing, while lower secondary and tertiary completion rates for children 
when the father is exposed are no longer statistically significant. We aggregate the six outcomes 
into a second-generation education index, and it shows broad increases for children with parents 
exposed to school construction. An increase of two additional schools built in the father or 
mother’s birth district increases their children’s educational attainment by 0.04 or 0.07 standard 
deviations, respectively, relative to parents who are not exposed to the program.45 
 
1.5.2. Heterogeneity of second-generation results by gender and grade 
We next explore two dimensions of heterogeneity in the second-generation education 
results. First, we examine if school construction had different second-generation effects at 
different grade levels. Second, we examine, within a household, if paternal or maternal exposure 
to school construction had differential impacts on their children and if those impacts differed by 
whether the child is a son or daughter. 
                                                 
44 The indicator variable is zero for those who did not start school by age 7 or had to repeat one or more grades 
before completing upper secondary education, which is compulsory in Indonesia. The indicator variable is one for 
those who have already completed upper secondary school or are on track to do so in a timely manner. 
45 Having observed educational attainment increases for children with parents exposed to the program, Appendix 
Table A.5 explores effects on children’s employment and self-reported health. Rows 1 and 2 examine the number of 
days and hours not engaged in work. We see slight reductions in days and hours worked if the father is exposed but 
no effect if the mother is exposed. Results are not statistically significant after correcting for multiple hypothesis 
testing. Rows 3, 4, and 5 study second-generation health effects. Mother’s exposure does not affect children’s 
health. Children whose fathers were exposed report worse health outcomes. We cannot determine if these children 
are less healthy or if their better-educated parents have an understanding of health that makes them more likely to 
report their child as ill. Aggregating these employment and health indicators into a second-generation wellbeing 
index shows no effect for children whose fathers are exposed and a positive impact if the child’s mother is exposed. 
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In Figure 1.3, we estimate the likelihood of a second-generation child completing at least 
a certain number of years of school. We explore the effects depending on whether the father or 
mother is exposed to school construction and whether their child is a son or daughter. Results 
highlight that effects are small and indistinguishable from zero during primary school. Consistent 
with Table 1.7, for all other grades, exposure to school construction by mothers has a larger 
effect than fathers on their children’s education. For grades in lower secondary, upper secondary, 
and tertiary, we observe effects that are significantly different from zero for daughters when 
either their mother or father is exposed to school construction. Effect sizes for second-generation 
daughters are approximately of the same magnitude as those of the first generation’s men 
exposed to the program (see Figure 1.2 for this comparison). Effect sizes are largest for 
daughters when the mother is exposed to the program and lowest for sons when the father is 
exposed. When examining each grade separately, we cannot statistically distinguish the results 
by gender of the parent or child, but in Table 1.8, we investigate this issue in more detail. 
Table 1.8 examines the intergenerational education effects when controlling for the 
partner’s exposure to school construction, and we explore if the effects differ by child gender. 
We face several challenges with our identification strategy that focuses on young (born 1968-
1972) and old (born 1957-1962) cohorts. For a household to be included in the regression, we 
need both the father and mother to be in these specific birth cohorts.46 Given this selected 
sample, we observe that for these households the impact of mother’s exposure to school 
construction has a much larger effect on the child than the father’s exposure. An additional 
school built in the mother’s birth district raises her child’s education by 0.16 years; there is no 
effect if the father is exposed. In column 2, we address this selection issue by expanding the 
                                                 
46 With this additional sample restriction, there are only 44,105 second-generation children in the regression, a loss 
of almost two-thirds of the sample from the 120,838 children in the regressions in Table 7.  
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range of birth cohorts included in the regressions, now including all individuals born between 
1950 and 1980. All birth cohorts born after 1968 could be exposed to the school construction that 
began in 1973. Both parents no longer need to be part of the young and old cohorts as previously 
defined. The sample size expands to 246,466 second-generation children with parents in this 
extended cohort range. Results are consistent, with mother’s exposure to school construction 
increasing her child’s education more than father’s exposure. We can reject the equality of 
coefficients in both the restricted (column 1) and extended birth cohort samples (column 2).47 
We explore if parental exposure has different effects for sons and daughters. Panel A 
studies all children, Panel B sons, and Panel C daughters. Results for sons and daughters show 
consistently larger education effects for the second-generation child if the mother is exposed to 
school construction, and in all cases, mother exposure is statistically significant. Focusing on the 
extended cohort sample (column 2), we can reject the equality of the mother and father exposure 
coefficients in the case of daughters but not sons. The benefit to daughters is three times larger if 
their mother rather than their father is exposed to school construction. 
 
1.5.3. Channels for intergenerational persistence of education 
In line with the conceptual framework we laid out at the start of this section, we perform 
mediation analyses to understand the mechanisms linking first and second-generation outcomes. 
Results are shown in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. Column 1 in each table repeats the effects of parent 
exposure on children’s years of schooling. Subsequent Table 1.9 columns add indexes from 
Figure 1.1 as control variables that may be mediators through which parental exposure manifests 
                                                 
47 We examine if there is an additional benefit when the father and mother are both exposed to school construction 
but do not find a significantly larger effect in those households (results not shown), highlighting that the 
intergenerational education effect is primarily driven by mother’s exposure. 
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itself. Subsequent Table 1.10 columns add characteristics about the spouse as potential mediating 
factors. 
Column 2 in Table 1.9 shows that adding the father’s work and migration index leads to 
an 18 percent reduction of the effect of father’s exposure, but the effect remains large at 0.08 
additional years of school. Controlling for the mother’s work and migration index barely affects 
the coefficient on mother’s exposure. This is not surprising as we find few labor market effects 
for women in response to school construction. A 23 percent drop occurs for women when we 
control for their living standards index (column 3), in line with Section 1.4.3 showing large 
increases in expenditure for women exposed to school construction. Despite this drop, children 
still get an additional 0.13 years of education even if we hold expenditure constant. Columns 4 
and 5 control for the index of taxes and housing/assets. Point estimates remain the same as when 
we control for living standards. In columns 6, 7, and 8, we include controls for the parent’s 
nutrition, health investments, and health outcomes. We do not find support for these factors as 
potential mechanisms mediating the effect of parent’s exposure to school construction. 
In column 9, we control for the individual’s marriage index, which includes spouse 
characteristics as well as age of first marriage and household size. For fathers, this leads to a 42 
percent drop in the direct effect of exposure on their children’s education. This is consistent with 
our conceptual framework and the previous section’s finding that mothers, whose characteristics 
are now partly controlled for, have a large impact on the intergenerational transmission of 
education. On the contrary, when we control for the marriage market index for exposed mothers, 
the drop is only 19 percent, and the direct effect of exposure on children’s schooling remains. 
In the last column, we include all indexes as control variables. The exposure coefficients 
drop to 0.055 for fathers exposed and 0.111 for mothers exposed. Holding constant many of the 
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variables that are affected by school construction explains 43 and 34 percent of the effect on 
second-generation’s years of schooling and the rest appears to be a more direct effect. We do not 
observe many channels in the data through which these effects could manifest themselves, for 
example through increased encouragement to attend school or study. We cannot distinguish 
between these channels, but based on this table, we conclude there remains a direct effect from 
parents to their children that is not explained by changes in own characteristics. 
As highlighted in our conceptual framework, as well as by the marriage index’s role as a 
mediating variable in Table 1.9, marriage plays a key role in explaining the intergenerational 
transfer of education. We explore this further in Table 1.10 by controlling for the spouse’s 
schooling and other characteristics. The effect of father’s exposure on second-generation’s years 
of schooling drops significantly if we control for the mother’s education. Controlling for whether 
she completes primary school reduces the estimate by half and makes it statistically insignificant. 
Controlling for the wife’s years of schooling or literacy leads to reductions of 29 and 49 percent, 
respectively. This reaffirms the importance of mother’s education for her children’s education, as 
we saw in Section 1.5.2 and Table 1.8. When the mother is exposed, controlling for the father’s 
education variables leads to a smaller but still sizable drop of 25–32 percent of the main effect. 
Spouse’s labor market outcomes explain part of the effect of exposure on children’s years 
of schooling, especially whether the spouse has a formal sector job or works in a non-agricultural 
sector. The coefficient for father’s exposure falls by 28–30 percent when controlling for the 
mother’s sectoral choice, and the mother’s coefficient drops by 23–25 percent. Controlling for 
spouse’s migration status or health does not significantly alter the program exposure coefficients. 
Finally, in column 10, we control for all spouse characteristics, and the main effect for 
fathers falls to 0.020–almost an 80 percent drop–and becomes statistically insignificant. This 
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reveals that for fathers most of the effect of exposure works through his spouse’s characteristics. 
For mothers, the coefficient drops by almost half, but remains statistically significant and 
economically meaningful at 0.091 additional years of schooling. Overall, these analyses provide 
evidence that especially for men, marriage market outcomes and spouse characteristics are an 
important channel through which exposure to school construction increases children’s schooling. 
 
1.5.4 Selection of second-generation individuals 
Two data issues are relevant for the second-generation analysis and the selection of 
individuals in the regressions. First, there is a tradeoff between the selection of who remains in a 
household, and is therefore in the survey, and what age they finish higher levels of school. 
Focusing only on younger children ages 0-15 reduces the selection bias as few of them leave the 
household by that age, but they are not old enough to complete higher levels of schooling, which 
are important to study since primary school is nearly universal in 2016. As we include older 
children, they have time to complete higher schooling levels but a larger percentage of them have 
left the household. In the second-generation analyses thus far, we include all children who still 
live with their parents, regardless of age. We, of course, include child age fixed effects. We 
illustrate the rationale for not imposing age restrictions in Appendix Figure A.3. In the top panel, 
we show the exposure coefficient for second-generation children’s years of schooling if we limit 
the analysis to individuals under a certain age, and on the x-axis, we vary the upper bound of 
included ages. Given that lower levels of education are universal in 2016, we find no effect if we 
restrict to children age 0-15. As we include older ages, we show the sample size increase shown 




Second, Susenas 2016, like most household surveys, only includes information on 
individuals currently residing in a given household but not on family members living elsewhere. 
For second-generation children who are no longer living with their parents, perhaps because they 
started a new household, we cannot link them to their biological parents, and we do not know if 
the parents of these children are exposed to the program. For this reason, we based all second-
generation analyses thus far on those still living with their parents. We next explore robustness of 
the results under various assumptions about the children who have left the household. 
To do this, we conduct three bounding analyses. First, we estimate extreme bounds in 
which we assume all non-co-resident children have parents who are or are not exposed (Manski, 
1990). The intuition behind this is to re-assign individuals living apart from their parents back 
into the sample.48 In Appendix Table A.8, we compare our baseline estimate for the second-
generation’s years of schooling (Table 1.7, row 1) to the first bounding strategy. Including all 
individuals in the survey under age 40 in the second-generation regression increases the sample 
from 120,838 and 105,523 in the father’s and mother’s regressions to 644,675 observations. In 
regressions measuring the effect of father’s exposure on his child’s years of schooling, results are 
no longer statistically significant with these extreme bounds in which we assume all non-co-
resident children are born to non-exposed fathers (column 2) and then all non-co-resident 
children are born to exposed fathers (column 3). The education effects for second-generation 
children whose mothers are exposed to school construction remain statistically significant 
                                                 
48 For children living away from their parents, we must assume the parent’s birth district and birth year to determine 
the parent’s exposure. As we have no other information, we assume the parent’s and child’s birth district are the 
same. To test this assumption’s robustness, we estimate Table 7 using a child’s instead of parent’s birth district, and 
results are consistent. In the main regressions, we include birth year fixed effects, but it is harder to predict parent’s 
birth year given only a child’s age, so we now include an indicator variable for whether the parent is in the young 
cohort. Estimating Table 7 replacing birth year dummies with a young cohort dummy yield consistent results. 
Further, to minimize the probability of including individuals who are unlikely to be children of a parent in our young 
or old cohorts, we impose an age restriction of 40 that would imply parents in the old cohort were at least 14-19 
years old at the time of birth. We maintain the exposure status of children who still live with their parents. 
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despite these extreme assumptions. Assuming all non-co-resident children are born to mothers 
who are not exposed yields an effect of 0.05 more years of school, while assuming all non-co-
resident children are born to mothers who are exposed yields an effect of 0.03.49 
Aside from the extreme assumption that parents of non-co-resident children are either all 
exposed or all not exposed, we also likely add too many individuals to the regression. The 
second bounding exercise attempts to address these issues. The bounding regressions for second-
generation children should only include children born to parents in the old (1957-1962) or young 
(1968-1972) cohorts. To improve our bounds, we use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 
that does well in tracking individuals over time and matching parents to children who moved 
away.50 We use these data to obtain the fraction of children at each age born to old and young 
cohort parents among all children no longer living with their parents. We use these IFLS-based 
fractions to randomly assign at each age non-co-resident children in the Susenas data to either 
old or young cohort parents and exclude the rest from the regression.51 We simulate this 
randomization assignment procedure 1,000 times and estimate the second-generation years of 
schooling regression. Appendix Figure A.4 shows the distribution of coefficients from these 
1,000 repetitions for father’s and mother’s exposure to school construction. Effect sizes for 
father’s exposure on their children’s years of schooling range from 0.011 to 0.047 at the 5th and 
                                                 
49 The effects using these extreme bounds are smaller than our Table 7 estimates. This is to be expected if parental 
exposure to school construction leads to an increase in their children’s years of schooling. The reason for this is that 
the children we add to our sample are a combination of children whose parents are and are not exposed. In the case 
we assume all parents are exposed, some of these children actually had non-exposed parents and thus no increased 
educational attainment due to their parent’s exposure, but we incorrectly assign them to the group of exposed 
parents, which biases the estimates downwards. Similarly, if we assume no parents are exposed, some of these 
children actually had exposed parents so increased educational attainment, but we incorrectly assign them to the 
group of unexposed parents, which again leads to a downward bias of the estimates. 
50 87.8 percent of individuals surveyed in the 1993 first wave were tracked or deceased by the last wave in 2014/5. 
We match 91 percent of children in the last wave’s household roster to their co-resident or non-co-resident parents. 
51 Results are consistent if we use the fraction of non-co-resident children at each age and gender who are born to 
old and young cohort parents and use these age-gender based fractions to draw random samples in the Susenas data. 
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95th percentiles with a median coefficient of 0.028. Effect sizes for mother’s exposure are larger, 
ranging between 0.018 and 0.065 with a median coefficient of 0.043.52 
Third, we repeat the second-generation analysis directly using the IFLS. The last three 
columns in Appendix Table A.8 show estimates for all children, only those living with their 
parents, and those who moved away. Those living with their parents provides the closest 
comparison to our Susenas sample. Across all three samples, we find no statistically significant 
effect for fathers exposed to school construction. The estimated effect of mother’s exposure is 
0.539 in the sample of children still living with their parents compared to 0.300 in the sample of 
all children. This suggests an effect only 56 percent as large if we are unable to include non-co-
resident children in the analysis. Scaling down our estimate of mother’s exposure in column 1 by 
this magnitude yields an estimated effect of 0.094 additional years of schooling, which is still 
economically meaningful and substantially higher than the coefficients in Appendix Figure A.4. 
 
1.6. Threats to Identification and Robustness Checks 
1.6.1 Possible general equilibrium effects 
The analysis presented so far exploits variation across districts and cohorts to identify 
partial equilibrium school construction effects. This raises the concern that general equilibrium 
effects might undo direct program effects (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1998). If school 
construction increases the young cohort’s education in high intensity districts, this could affect 
non-exposed individuals (either older cohorts or young cohorts in low intensity districts). 
Depending on how these general equilibrium effects work and whether they have a negative or 
                                                 
52 Coefficients for father’s exposure are statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels in 47, 27, and 5 
percent of the regressions. Coefficients for mother’s exposure are statistically significant more often. In 63, 42, and 
13 percent of the regressions, the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
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positive effect depends on the substitutability or complementarity between old and young 
cohorts. 
School construction leads to more educated young workers. If those workers are 
substitutes for the older cohorts in the labor market, then this increase could drive down wages 
for the older cohorts who are competing with them for jobs in those locations. If that happens, 
then the effects we observe in our specification for improved living standards for the young 
relative to the old cohort would be over-estimating the true effect of the program. Duflo (2004) 
provides evidence that these general equilibrium effects might have occurred in Indonesia, 
although the magnitudes of the bias appear to be rather small. Focusing on the instrumental 
variables specification she estimates, she finds that an increase of 10 percentage points in the 
share of primary school graduates leads to a 2.9-3.8 percent decrease in wages for the old 
cohorts. Given we observe an increase of only 2.6 percentage points in the likelihood of 
completing primary school for men, the subsequent old cohort wage decreases would be less 
than 1 percent. Adjusting our estimates by that magnitude does not significantly alter our results. 
In addition, if we adjust by this magnitude the cost-benefit calculations discussed in Section 1.7, 
it would not affect our overall interpretation of the benefits of school construction.53 
Alternatively, if the young cohorts are complements for the old cohorts (for instance, 
because they start more businesses and hire older cohort individuals or because they spend more 
money on goods and services produced by the older cohorts), then the older cohorts benefit by 
                                                 
53 Recent research on large-scale government education investments in India finds that the general equilibrium 
effects could be larger, with these effects working to depress the returns to education by 32 percent (Khanna, 2018). 
However, the analysis of the Indian policy highlights that skilled workers are worse off while unskilled workers 
benefit. In the Indonesian context, this evidence about unskilled workers benefiting implies older cohorts who were 
more likely to be lower educated and unskilled would have benefited from these general equilibrium effects, which 
would lead us to underestimates the true effect. 
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having more educated younger cohorts in their location. If these effects dominate the general 
equilibrium impact, we would underestimate the true effect. 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to distinguish between these competing stories of 
complementarity and substitutability among old and young cohorts. Furthermore, the evidence 
on general equilibrium effects from developed countries (Angrist, 1995; Crepon et al., 2013; 
Bianchi, 2018) is unlikely to be helpful in understanding the developing country, Indonesian 
context over the past four decades. In our case, we can show there are no systematic trend breaks 
when comparing the old cohort with an even older cohort. While this is certainly not definitive, 
the results for household expenditures in Appendix Figure A.5 highlight that there is not a 
differential trend when comparing the old cohort (ages 12-17 in 1974) with an even older cohort 
(ages 18-24 in 1974). If general equilibrium effects negatively impact older cohorts, we would 
expect to see the oldest cohorts be the worst off but that is not what we observe.54 
 
1.6.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, we present a set of specification checks highlighting the robustness of the 
main results. Our identification assumption is that the change in outcomes across birth cohorts in 
districts that built many schools would have been the same in the absence of the program as the 
change across birth cohorts in districts that built fewer schools. However, educational patterns 
between birth cohorts could vary systematically across districts because of issues such as mean 
reversion. To test this assumption, we estimate placebo regressions comparing old cohorts (ages 
                                                 
54 General equilibrium effects may be prevalent for other outcome variables as well. For example, part of the 
observed increase in taxes may be due to higher tax rates resulting from increased preference for redistribution, or 
greater demand for public goods by higher-educated people. Martinez-Bravo (2017) shows that the INPRES school 
construction program led to increases in the provision of public goods and suggests this is driven by increased 
education of village heads. We observe overall increases in tax payments but our data does not allow us to 
disentangle between these interpretations. 
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12-17 in 1974) and even older cohorts (ages 18-24 in 1974). If the assumption is correct, then 
any change in outcomes between cohorts in these groups, both of whom were not exposed to the 
program, should not differ across districts. Appendix Figure A.6 presents the results from 
estimating placebo regressions for each of the indexes for every family of outcomes (similar to 
Figure 1.1). Across the first generation outcomes for females and males, the placebo regressions 
show no statistically significant effects, which is suggestive evidence that the main difference-in-
differences results are not driven by a failure of the identification assumption. We do observe a 
statistically significant effect in the placebo regressions for second-generation education. This 
implies there may have been a time trend across districts that could have influenced educational 
outcomes for second-generation children. However, if children whose parents born 1957-1962 
are experiencing more education compared with children whose parents are born 1950-1956, 
then that likely means we are underestimating the true effect. 
In the main results, we follow Duflo (2001) by using a conservative definition of school 
exposure. Individuals in the young cohort (born 1968-1972) benefit from full exposure to the 
program, while those in the old cohort (born 1957-1962) did not benefit from school construction 
at all. However, there are other birth cohorts, partly exposed and not exposed, that could be 
included in the analysis. Appendix Table A.9 examines how the regression for first generation 
years of schooling in Table 1.1 changes with alternative birth cohort definitions. Column 1 
repeats the original results and columns 2-5 add additional birth cohorts. In column 2, we add 
older cohorts born between 1950 and 1956 who were not exposed to school construction. 
Column 3 adds individuals born between 1963 and 1967 who would have been primary school 
aged in 1974 (ages 7-11) when the schools were built. To be conservative, we assume none of 
these cohorts was exposed, although in Appendix Figure A.2, it appears children ages 7-8 
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probably did benefit from the program. Column 4 includes children born between 1973 and 
1980. They were born during and just after the schools were built, and so they would have 
received full exposure to the program.55 Finally, in column 5, we include all individuals born 
between 1950 and 1980. Results using the different sample definitions are consistent, showing 
that exposure to school construction increased years of schooling for men and women. In 
Appendix Figure A.7, we use the extended cohort definition (all individuals born between 1950 
and 1980) and re-estimate the effect of school construction on indexes for families of outcomes 
(as in Figure 1.1). Results are consistent, showing large positive benefits for men and women 
exposed to school construction. 
We estimate all regressions using expenditure data with an inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation (IHS). While this is typical to analyze expenditures, in Appendix Table A.10, we 
show robustness checks using alternative transformations. Columns 1-4 show total expenditures, 
columns 5-8 education expenditures. Columns 1 and 5 repeat the results from rows 1 and 5 of 
Table 1.3 using an IHS transformation. Column 2 uses the log of nominal expenditures; column 
3 uses nominal expenditures. Results are similar in both cases. In column 4, we estimate 
household per capita instead of total expenditure (using an IHS transformation) to capture 
potential changes in household structure that could be correlated with exposure. Effects are 
smaller, but results show that male and female exposure still increases household expenditures. 
Results for education expenditures using a log transformation (column 6) or nominal values 
(column 7) leads to different results due to the large number of zeroes for education expenditures 
(over 20,000 observations are dropped) and because education data are heavily skewed. 
                                                 
55 These Indonesian primary schools were initially expected to last for 20 years so the last cohort that could have 
gained the full six years of primary school education and completed primary schooling by 1993 would have been 
born in 1980. Note that with these 1973-1980 cohorts, parents could potentially have moved to give their children 
access to these schools, although results are consistent with the earlier ones. 
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Finally, we re-estimate the results measuring the effect of school construction on 
outcome indexes (as in Figure 1.1) using alternative control variables. Appendix Figure A.8 
shows results excluding the interaction of birth year dummies and water and sanitation programs. 
The magnitudes and levels of statistical significance are consistent in this case. 
 
1.7. Rate of Return and Fiscal Impacts of School Construction 
Regression results highlight the various beneficial impacts for individuals exposed to 
school construction and for the intergenerational transmission of those benefits. We conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis to evaluate whether school construction was cost efficient for the 
Indonesian government.56 Most analyses compare a program’s costs and overall welfare benefits 
of that program for the affected population. We do this as well, but what is unique in our case is 
our ability to also use detailed data on tax revenues collected by the government to measure if 
these increases in government taxes collected offset the government’s costs of building the 
schools. 
We start by measuring the costs of school construction. Total costs include the initial 
investment to build the schools and train the teachers plus recurring commitments to pay teacher 
salaries each year. The key point for the costs is that there were large and upfront costs at the 
beginning of the program in 1973 and then subsequent smaller, but annual costs every year for 
teacher salaries. School construction cost approximately 782 million 2016 US dollars, around 1.5 
percent of the 1973 Indonesian GDP (Duflo, 2001). Schools were expected to recruit three 
                                                 
56 Appendix C discusses in more detail the assumptions made in our cost-benefit analysis and the specific 
parameters we include in the model. 
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teachers and accommodate 120 students. Using estimates by Daroesman (1971), training three 
teachers across 61,800 schools would have cost the government 11.7 million in 2016 dollars.57 
We focus on two main benefits. The first are taxes paid directly to the government. We 
have information on taxes each household paid and information on household expenditures that 
we use to estimate the ten percent Value-Added-Tax (VAT) the government would have 
collected on those purchases. The second benefit is improvements in the first generation’s overall 
living standards. As shown previously, second-generation individuals also receive more 
education due to school construction, which could lead to further increases in future taxes and 
improved living standards. We do not include these second-generation effects in our cost-benefit 
analysis, so our estimates of the benefits and the internal rate of return are conservative. The key 
issue for the benefits is that the government or individual earns the benefits each year and they 
accrue over many years, but these benefits do not start until long after the schools are built.58 
We develop a cost-benefit model to include these costs and benefits in the specific years 
they would have been realized and then trace out the arc of when discounted benefits and costs 
offset. Table 1.11 summarizes results and highlights how different assumptions about parameters 
influence the level of costs and benefits, impact the year when benefits outweigh costs, and 
affect the internal rate of return (IRR). Column 1 is a less conservative approach.59 Using these 
parameters yields a total cost (school building, teacher training, and recurrent teacher salaries) of 
                                                 
57 On the cost side, we adjust a number of relevant parameters in our model to see how the cost-benefit calculations 
respond, including the discount rate, the number of years the school is expected to last, the number of teachers and 
students per school, whether there is real growth in a teacher’s salary, and the level of recurrent school 
administrative costs in addition to teachers’ salaries. 
58 On the benefit side, we adjust various parameters to test the sensitivity of our results. These include the discount 
rate, the number of years the school is expected to last, the age individuals start paying taxes, an individual’s life 
expectancy, the Indonesian economy’s growth rate, and the lifetime curvature in mean taxes paid at each age. 
59 In this column, we assume a 5 percent discount rate, no real growth in teachers’ salary, no adjustment for the 
lifetime curvature of an individual’s earnings (and subsequent taxes), no real growth in GDP per capita, 120 students 
per classroom, schools last 20 years, individuals start paying taxes after age 18, school administration costs 1.25 
times teachers’ salaries, 3 teachers per school, and an individual’s life expectancy is 60. 
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2.55 billion in 2016 USD and a total tax benefit (direct taxes paid plus VAT taxes collected) of 
9.00 billion in 2016 USD. This gives a net benefit of 6.56 billion, a 1998 breakeven year, and an 
IRR of 10.5 percent. Moving beyond government taxes and focusing on the program’s impact on 
improving living standards raises net benefits to 59.24 billion with an IRR of 20.7 percent. 
From this baseline, we modify parameters and trace how those changes impact costs and 
benefits. Column 2 includes real salary growth for teachers and costs are higher and net benefits 
smaller. Column 3 adjusts for the lifetime curvature in an individual’s tax payments that peak 
around ages 40-50. Tax and living standards benefits are smaller. Column 4 adjusts for real GDP 
per capita growth of 3.25 percent. Taxes and living standards are measured in 2016, but those 
had real growth prior to 2016 and this adjustment reduces net benefits. Column 5 represents what 
we believe is a reasonable baseline case. We maintain previous parameter values but increase the 
mean number of students per school from 120 to 180 (30 per grade), which is closer to what 
happened when these schools were built. Tax benefits are higher than costs with an IRR of 8.1 
percent, while living standards are substantially larger than costs with an IRR of 16.8 percent. 
Column 6 assumes schools last 40 years. Original government plans called for schools to 
last 20 years, but since most schools still operate now, this is a reasonable assumption. Benefits 
increase as there are more cohorts exposed to the program, but there are more years to pay 
teacher salaries so costs also increases. Net benefits are higher, but the IRR only rises slightly 
because of the timing of when extra costs are incurred. Column 7 increases the age individuals 
start paying taxes; column 8 raises the recurrent cost multiplier from 1.25 to 1.5. Both changes 
have minor impacts on net benefits. Column 9 raises the number of teachers per school from 
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three to six, and this raises costs. Lastly, column 10 adjusts life expectancy, which increased 
significantly over this period. Tax and living standards benefits substantially outweigh costs.60 
Appendix Figure A.9 graphs the discounted net tax and living standards benefits over 
time and highlights the breakeven years for when benefits outweigh school construction costs. 
Using the parameters from columns 5 and 10 in Table 1.11, we show two highly realistic 
scenarios that the government would have faced. Overall net tax benefits are not that different 
across the two scenarios (5.42 and 7.76 billion), but the breakeven year in the scenario with more 
teachers, higher recurrent costs, and a longer school lifetime is later. The net benefit to improved 
living standards is also much higher the longer the schools last (133.5 billion) and the 
improvement to the population’s welfare offsets the program costs by 2003. 
Across a range of different parameter estimates, school construction leads to increased 
government tax revenues that offset school construction costs in most cases within 40 years. We 
observe even larger net benefits when we include the population’s improved living standards 
with net benefits ranging from 40 to 136 billion USD. Internal rates of return range from 13-21 
percent and benefits outweigh costs within 17-30 years after the schools are built. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This paper studies the long-term and intergenerational effects of one of the largest school 
construction programs in history. We use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy 
exploiting variation across birth cohorts and districts in the number of schools built. We combine 
this with nationally representative data from Indonesia that contain information on a wide range 
                                                 
60 To have a situation in which tax benefits do not outweigh costs using the column 10 parameters, it is necessary to 
adjust parameters so that recurrent costs must be greater than 1.9, the number of students must be less than 145, or 
the discount rate must be larger than 5.7 percent. However, still net living standards benefits remain positive until 
the following more drastic parameter adjustment of increasing the discount rate to larger than 12 percent is made. 
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of outcomes related to education, employment, migration, living standards, taxes, and marriage 
outcomes. We find that men and women exposed to the program attain more education, with 
men’s education effects continuing beyond primary school. As adults, men exposed to school 
construction are more likely to be formal workers and work in a non-agricultural sector. Both 
men and women exposed to the program are more likely to have migrated from their birth 
district, although evidence points to increases in local migration within the province. Households 
in which either parent is exposed to school construction have higher living standards, more 
assets, and pay more government taxes. Exposure to school construction substantially alters 
marriage market outcomes with spouses being more educated and more likely to have migrated. 
These benefits are transmitted to the next generation. Children with fathers or mothers 
who are exposed to the school construction program obtain more education. We observe 
significant effects at all levels of schooling beyond primary school, but we see the largest 
impacts in tertiary education with effect sizes indicating a 20 to 25 percent increase in the 
likelihood of the second-generation child completing university. These second-generation effects 
are significantly larger if the mother, as opposed to the father, is exposed to the program, with 
additional benefits accruing to daughters. We perform a detailed mediation analysis to explore 
the mechanisms that drive the intergenerational transmission of schooling. Marriage market 
outcomes appear to a play a crucial role, particularly whether the spouse has completed primary 
school, is literate, works in the formal sector, or works outside of agriculture. 
Our cost benefit analysis highlights that under all reasonable assumptions school 
construction pays for itself in terms of additional expected government tax revenues, not to 
mention the additional benefits of improved living standards. Furthermore, given the observed 
intergenerational transmission of education, the likely long-run benefits are vast. To gain 
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additional insight into the intergenerational transmission of education, we perform an exploratory 
analysis calculating the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of education between children and 
parents. In policy circles, especially in developing countries, there is considerable debate about 
the optimal amount of intergenerational mobility. High mobility suggests equality of opportunity 
whereby a parent’s outcome does not mechanically determine the child’s, but it is critical to 
understand the mechanisms driving that intergenerational correlation (see Black and Devereux, 
2011 and Mazumder, 2015 for a discussion of this literature). Low mobility that is due to 
differential access to schooling suggests that public policy can play a role in equalizing 
opportunities. Comparing the IGE across high and low program intensity areas and between 
young and old cohorts in our Indonesian data, we find there is an increase in mobility for 
children whose parents are exposed to school construction, highlighting the realized benefits of 
this government education policy. The broader societal impacts and changes in intergenerational 






Figure 1.1. Effect of school construction on indexes of long-run outcomes 
Notes: Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), we define indexes for families of outcomes by defining a Z-score for each outcome 
relative to the control group (defined in this case as the old cohort in low program intensity districts). Then, we average the Z-scores 
across all outcomes in the same family to get an index, such as “Marriage Market”. Following Banerjee et al. (2015) to get standardized 
treatment effects, we then standardize the Kling indexes relative to the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Each dot in 
the figure represents the coefficient of the interaction of the number of INPRES schools built between 1973 and 1979 in one’s birth 
district and a dummy for being born between 1968 and 1972. Solid lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The individual outcomes 
















































Figure 1.2. Effect of school construction on the probability of first generation individual attending at least n-years of schooling 
Notes: Effect size measures the impact of one additional school constructed per 1,000 children on the probability of completing at 
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Figure 1.3. Effect of school construction on the probability of second-generation individual attending at least n-years of 
schooling 
Notes: Effect size measures the impact of one additional school constructed per 1,000 children in the mother’s or father’s birth district 
on the probability of a second-generation individual (daughter or son) attending at least n-years of schooling in percentage points. 
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Table 1.1. Effect of school construction on first generation’s education   
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 





Based on highest education level and grade attended. 
Standard durations of study are assumed; grade 












Indicator defined as 1 if highest diploma completed is 












Indictor defined as 1 if highest diploma completed is 












Indicator defined as 1 if highest diploma completed is 












Indicator defined as 1 if highest diploma completed is 










Literate  Literacy is a binary outcome and is self-reported 0.953 0.909 
 







Education index Aggregates all 6 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. 
Effects are interpreted as standard deviation changes 




    (0.012) (0.011) 
Notes: Effects of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools constructed 
in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971, 
and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered 
at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-
values are computed over all 6 outcomes and are shown in square brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among 
significant tests. There are 72,367 and 71,423 observations in the men’s and women’s regressions, respectively. 
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Table 1.2. Effect of school construction on first generation’s work and migration 
  
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
Work Indicator defined as 1 if individual worked in the past week or 











Work hours Hours worked in the past week conditional on working, i.e. 










Formal worker Indicator defined as 1 if individual reported working as an 
employee as opposed to being self-employed, family/unpaid 












Indicator defined as 1 for working in a sector outside of 










Service sector Indicator for working in trade, hotel, restaurant, transportation; 
warehousing, information, communication; finance and 
insurance, and service sectors, conditional on working 
0.364 0.459 
 







Migrant Indicator defined as 1 if the current district of residence is not 
the same as the individual’s birth district 
0.273 0.245 
 







Local migration  Indicator defined as 1 if migration occurred within the 












Aggregates all 7 outcomes and standardizes it to the mean of 
the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects are interpreted 
as standard deviation changes from the mean. 
   0.038*** 0.011 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools constructed in district of birth. 
All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971 , and water and sanitation program 
intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 7 outcomes and are shown in square 
brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 72,367 observations for men and 68,574 conditional on 
working. There are 71,423 observations for women and 45,560 conditional on working. 
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Table 1.3. Effect of school construction on first generation’s living standards 
  
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
       
Total (Rp10k) Household’s average monthly expenditure; means are 
reported in 10,000 Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) increments. 
Total expenditures are made up of food and non-food 
expenditures. 
391.65 375.62  0.021*** 0.032*** 




Food (Rp10k) 194.44 184.22  0.014** 0.028*** 






197.21 191.39  0.027*** 0.039*** 




Non-food/Total Share of non-food over total expenditures. 44.59 45.14  0.287*** 0.237*** 






Education expenditures fall under non-food expenditures 
and include admission, tuition, extracurricular fees, 












Aggregates total, food, and education expenditures and 
excludes non-food expenditure and non-food/total ratio to 
avoid collinearity in the regression. Standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects are 




   (0.010) (0.009) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population 
and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 
5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in square 
brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 68,687 and 66,249 
observations in the men’s and women’s regressions, respectively. We apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to all 
monetary values. Estimates can be interpreted as percentage changes. 
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Table 1.4. Effect of school construction on first generation’s taxes 
  
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
       
Total (Rp10k) Self-reported tax expenditures include the following 










       
Land & building 
(Rp10k)  
Taxes on land and/or building ownership 0.465 0.506 
 
0.041* 0.075***  






       
Vehicle (Rp10k) Motorized and non-motorized vehicle license fees 3.610 3.398 
 
0.154*** 0.267***  






       
Local (Rp10k) Levies/retributions; examples include: 
neighborhood/citizen associations, garbage, security, 










       
Tax index Aggregates all 4 outcomes and standardizes it to the mean of 
the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects are 




    (0.009) (0.010) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population 
and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 
5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 4 outcomes and are shown in square 
brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Total taxes includes land and building, 
vehicle, local, and other taxes. Other taxes include vehicle citations and income taxes, which are largely voluntary and represent 
a small contribution to government budget. “Other” taxes represent less than 5% of household tax expenditures. There are 68,687 
and 66,249 observations in the men’s and women’s regressions, respectively. We apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation 
to all monetary values. Estimates can be interpreted as percentage changes. 
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Table 1.5. Effect of school construction on first generation’s health outcomes 
  
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
       
No health 
complaint 
Self-reported indicator defined as 1 if did not experience 










       
Non-disrupted 
days 
Self-reported number of days in the past month 
(maximum of 30 days) that a health complaint did not 










       
No severe health 
complaint 
Self-reported indicator defined as 1 if did not experience 










       
Health outcomes 
index 
Aggregates all 3 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects 





   (0.007) (0.007) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of 
schools constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s 
population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with 
birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 3 outcomes and are 
shown in square brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 72,367 
and 71,423 observations in the men’s and women’s regressions, respectively. 
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Table 1.6. Effect of school construction on first generation’s marriage market 
     Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description  Men Women 
 
Men Women 
        
Age of first 
marriage 
Age of first marriage for ever-married 
household members 
 25.219 20.888 
 
0.058 0.050 






        
Spouse’s characteristics:        
Years of 
schooling 
Based on highest education level and grade 
attended. Standard durations of study are 











        
Completed 
Primary 
Indicator defined as 1 if highest diploma 











        












        
Work Indicator defined as 1 if individual worked in 
the past week or has an occupation but was 












        
Formal worker Indicator defined as 1 if individual reported 
working as an employee as opposed to being 
self-employed, family/unpaid work or 











        
Non-agriculture 
sector 
Indicator defined as 1 for working in a sector 














Table 1.6 (cont.)  
Migrant Indicator defined as 1 if the current district 
of residence is not the same as the 











        
No health 
complaint 
Self-reported indicator defined as 1 if did not 












        
Own characteristics:       
Children 0-14 Number of children aged 0-14 living in the 
household 
 0.910 0.559 
 
-0.012 -0.035** 






        
Marriage market 
index 
Aggregates all 10 outcomes and standardizes 
it to the mean of the old cohort in low-
program districts. Effects are interpreted as 
standard deviation changes from the mean. 
For the index, we reverse the sign for 
children 0-14 to indicate a positive outcome. 
    0.066*** 0.050*** 
    (0.015) (0.013) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of 
schools constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s 
population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with 
birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 10 outcomes and 
are shown in square brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Spouse’s 
characteristics are defined for household heads and spouses in the sample. The spouse’s years of schooling, completed 
primary, literacy, work, no health complaint regressions have 64,422 and 55,468 observations for men and women, 
respectively, because it is set to missing if the spouse does not currently live in the household (divorced, widowed). The 
spouse’s formal worker and non-agriculture sector regressions have 39,550 and 50,892 observations because it is set to 
missing if the spouse does not currently live in the household and/or does not work. The age of first marriage regression 
has 70,571 and 69,623 observations because it is set to missing if the individual is never married. The children 0-14 




Table 1.7. Effect of school construction on second-generation’s education 
    Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure by: 








Child’s years of school based on highest education 
level and grade attended. Standard durations of 












Indicator defined as 1 if child’s highest diploma 












Indictor defined as 1 if child’s highest diploma 













Indicator defined as 1 if child’s highest diploma 













Indicator defined as 1 if child’s highest diploma 










Age-for-grade Indicator for child starting primary school by age 7 
and never repeating school up to Upper Secondary 
0.835 0.789 
 











Aggregates all 6 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. 
Effects are interpreted as standard deviation 




   (0.009) (0.012) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of father or mother’s young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in father or mother’s district of birth. All regressions control for parent’s district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, child age fixed 
effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district  of birth interacted with birth year 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at parent’s district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels 
based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 6 outcomes and are shown in square brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability 
of false positives among significant tests. The survey restricts questions on educational attainment to individuals aged 5 and older. There are 120,838 and 
105,523 observations in the father’s and mother’s regressions, respectively. 
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Table 1.8. Effect of school construction on second-generation’s education, by parent and 
child gender 
 Years of schooling 
 (1)  (2) 
Parents born between: 1957-1962 and 1968-1972  1950-1980 
Panel A: Sons and Daughters    








Father = Mother (p-value) 0.046  0.050 
Mean 8.674  7.827 
Observations 44,105  246,466 
Panel B: Sons Only    








Father = Mother (p-value) 0.076  0.267 
Mean 8.575  7.787 
Observations 24,366  133,896 
Panel C: Daughters Only    








Father = Mother (p-value) 0.134  0.026 
Mean 8.796  7.875 
Observations 19,739  112,570 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered 
at the father and mother’s birth district level using the multiway clustering method of 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011). Father exposed indicates an interaction of the 
number of INPRES primary schools constructed in the father’s birth district and an 
indicator that the father is in the young cohort. Mother exposed is defined similarly. Father 
= Mother indicates the p-value testing the equality of coefficients of father exposed and 
mother exposed within each panel. The sample in Panel A consists of both sons and 
daughters, Panel B sons only, and Panel C daughters only. 
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Table 1.9. Mediators of the effect of school construction on second-generation’s years of schooling 
 Dependent Variable: Second-generation’s years of schooling 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 








Health Marriage All 




0.097*** 0.080** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.056* 0.055** 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.026) 
Mediator 
 




(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) 
 
Observations 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 120,838 
Mean 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 7.967 




0.169*** 0.166*** 0.130*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.168*** 0.137*** 0.111*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.039) 
Mediator 
 




(0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) 
 
Observations 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 105,523 
Mean 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 8.854 
Notes: Each column shows a regression of the years of schooling for a second-generation child on parent’s exposure to the school construction 
program and includes a potential mediator variable. These mediator variables (as indicated by the column heading) are the indexes reported 
in Figure 1.1. Regressions are as in Table 1.7. Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of father or mother’s young cohort 
dummy interacted with the number of schools constructed in father or mother’s district of birth. All regressions control for parent’s district of 
birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, child age fixed effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program 
intensities that vary by region of birth interacted with birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at parent’s district of birth are 
shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. 
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Table 1.10. Spouse’s characteristics as mediators of the effect of school construction on second-generation’s years of schooling 
 Dependent Variable: Second-generation’s years of schooling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 



















0.097*** 0.069** 0.044 0.049* 0.093*** 0.068* 0.070** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.020 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Mediator  0.146*** 1.381*** 1.798*** -0.054** 0.627*** 0.940*** 0.330*** -0.037*  
  (0.004) (0.042) (0.087) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.020)  
Observations 120,838 116,550 116,550 116,550 116,550 70,861 70,861 116,550 116,550 70,861 
Mean 7.967 7.942 7.942 7.942 7.942 7.799 7.799 7.942 7.942 7.799 





0.169*** 0.126*** 0.115*** 0.125*** 0.153*** 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.152*** 0.155*** 0.091** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) 
Mediator  0.176*** 1.567*** 1.906*** -0.456*** 0.677*** 1.007*** 0.452*** -0.092***  
  (0.004) (0.040) (0.079) (0.063) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.027)  
Observations 105,523 91,384 91,384 91,384 91,384 85,036 85,036 91,384 91,384 85,036 
Mean 8.854 8.780 8.780 8.780 8.780 8.659 8.659 8.780 8.780 8.659 
Notes: Each column shows a regression of the years of schooling for a second-generation child on parent’s exposure to the school 
construction program and includes a potential mediator variable. These mediator variables (as indicated by the column heading) are 
spouse’s characteristics from Table 1.6. Regressions are as in Table 1.7. Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of 
father or mother’s young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools constructed in father or mother’s district of birth. All 
regressions control for parent’s district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, child age fixed effects, children’s population and 
enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year dummies. Robust 
standard errors clustered at parent’s district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels 




Table 1.11. Cost-benefit analysis of school construction 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Parameters           
 Discount rate (%) 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
 Teachers salary growth (Y/N) N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Lifetime curvature (Y/N) N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 GDP/capita growth (%) 0 0 0 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 
 Students/schools 120 120 120 120 180 180 180 180 180 180 
 School lifetime (years) 20 20 20 20 20 40 40 40 40 40 
 Start paying taxes after age: 18 18 18 18 18 18 22 22 22 22 
 Recurrent costs/salaries multiplier 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.5 1.5 1.5 
 Teachers/schools 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 
 Life expectancy 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 70             
Costs           
 Schools construction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.78 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 Teachers training - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 Teachers' salaries 1.65 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 5.08 5.08 6.10 12.19 12.19             
Benefits           
 Paid by cohorts born in - - - - - - - - - - 1968-1980 - - - - - - - -  1968-2000 - - - - - - - - - - - 1968-2000 - - - - - - - - - - 
 Collected between years - - - - - - - - - - 1987-2040 - - - - - - - -  1987-2060 - - - - - - 1991-2060 - - - - -  1991-2070             
 Tax receipts 9.00 9.00 7.32 6.11 9.16 19.87 18.14 18.14 18.14 20.74 
 Net Benefit (Benefits - Costs) 6.56 5.26 3.58 2.37 5.42 14.00 12.27 11.25 5.15 7.76 
 Breakeven year 1998 2001 2007 2017 2009 2013 2016 2018 2031 2031             
 Living standards 61.69 61.69 53.18 43.64 65.46 142.00 128.34 128.34 128.34 146.49 
 Net Benefit (Benefits - Costs) 59.24 57.95 49.44 39.90 61.72 136.12 122.47 121.45 115.36 133.50 
 Breakeven year 1990 1991 1992 1995 1994 1994 1998 1999 2003 2003             
Internal Rate of Return (%)           
 Tax receipts 10.48 8.87 7.68 6.64 8.10 9.11 8.53 8.05 6.05 6.37 
  Living standards 20.68 19.38 17.69 14.83 16.84 17.57 15.77 15.26 13.08 13.15 




Table 1.11 (cont.) 
salaries multiplier, and school lifetime follow Duflo (2001). Schools construction costs are obtained from Duflo (2001), teachers training 
from Daroesman (1972), and teachers’ salaries from various sources (see Appendix C for more details). Benefits are paid by cohorts that 
could attend the full 6 years of primary education until their death. Breakeven year is the first year when the present discounted value of 
benefits exceeds that of costs. Tax receipts consist of direct tax expenditures plus 10% VAT on total expenditures. Living standards is 
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CHAPTER 2: PRESCHOOL AVAILABILITY AND FEMALE LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The provision of early-childhood education services has become a central policy debate in 
many countries. Massive long-term socio-economic benefits from early-childhood interventions 
coupled with the potential to encourage maternal employment suggest that expanding access to 
preschools may kill two birds with one stone: increasing intergenerational mobility and closing 
gender inequality (Blau and Currie 2006). While the benefits for children enrolled in an early-
childhood program is well-documented (see Garcia et al. 2016 for a review of this literature), the 
causal evidence of preschool expansion on maternal employment is more of a mixed bag.  
The effect varies across contexts; particularly over two dimensions: (1) current rate of 
preschool utilization and (2) current rate of maternal employment. When both rates are high, 
preschool expansion may no longer be effective at the extensive margin of pushing women to enter 
the workforce and enrolling their children in preschools (Lundin et al. 2008, Bauernschuster and 
Schlotter 2015). It may not induce greater preschool enrollment if the public expansion of 
preschools simply crowds-out private provisions (Baker et al. 2008). Furthermore, it may not 
induce maternal employment if it re-allocates children from informal non-parental childcare to 
formal childcare services (Havnes and Mogstad 2011b, Havnes and Mogstad 2011a). In the United 
States, past evidence (Gelbach 2002, Cascio 2009) may no longer apply today, because female 
labor supply is not as elastic as it once was (Fitzpatrick 2010). 
We contribute to this literature by studying preschool expansion and maternal employment 
in a context that might yet be relevant in policy discussions. We study an emerging economy where 
67 
 
preschool attendance and maternal employment are low, there is a large informal labor market, 
and individuals have a large network of kin who can, presumably, provide informal childcare 
services in the absence of formal providers. Indonesia is the fourth most populous country and is 
one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. However, in 2016, female labor force 
participation (FLFP) in Indonesia stood at 50.9 percent, lagging other countries in East Asia and 
the Pacific where the average FLFP is 60.8 percent, and stagnating from 50.2 percent participation 
in 1990. Prior to the recognition of pre-primary education in the national education system in 2003, 
only a quarter of children were enrolled in preschools, lagging behind the world’s average of 32.1 
percent, the regional average of 43.3 percent, and the OECD average of 73.3 percent (World 
Development Indicators). We complement the growing body of research on low and middle-
income countries (see Mateo Diaz and Rodriguez-Chamussy 2016 for a survey of studies in Latin 
America, Du and Dong 2013 in China, Jain 2016 in India, and Clark et al. 2017 in Kenya) by 
exploring the relationship between preschool expansion and FLFP in a region with little evidence 
to date. 
After the passing of The National Education System Act (NSEA) in 2003, the Government 
of Indonesia accelerated efforts to expand preschool education with a medium-term plan to 
increase enrollment between 2004 and 2009. Block-grants were set up to incentivize private 
provision, while district-level governments were responsible for the public provision of 
preschools. By 2016, the gross pre-primary enrollment rate had increased to 60.3 percent (World 
Development Indicators). We exploit the spatial and temporal variations in preschool access and 
the exogenous overlap with the time when mothers have a preschool-aged eligible child to infer 
the causal effect of preschool access on maternal employment in a difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) framework. Our constructed panel tracks the same mothers on average for 22 
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years and allows us to include an individual fixed effect that accounts for unobserved individual 
career and family preferences, biological dispositions, and cultural traits. 
We find that mothers of preschool-aged eligible children increase their work participation 
by 7.4 percentage points, or 13.8 percent from the mean, if they are exposed to an additional public 
preschool per 1,000 children. We further find that private preschools do not have a statistically 
significant effect on work participation, but eligible mothers are more likely to hold a second job. 
The results further indicate that public preschools increase the likelihood of mothers being unpaid 
family workers and agricultural workers, while private preschools induce mothers to become 
artisanal production workers. We do not find any effects on earnings or hours worked. An increase 
in informal sector employment that does not require a full-time commitment is compatible with 
the fact that preschools typically only operate 3 hours per day during typical working days. We 
note that public preschools are likely substitutes to private preschools, although the extent of 
substitution is likely limited because they cater to different sub-populations (Chang et al. 2006). 
Contrary to other studies that use the eligibility of the youngest child,61 we offer some evidence 
that preschool access may be more meaningful for the first two children. Our results are robust to 
defining eligibility pertaining to the oldest child and restrict the comparison group to mothers 
whose oldest child is aged 0-2 and not yet eligible for preschool. 
Our estimated effect of a 7.4 percentage point increase in women’s work participation is in 
the ballpark of other studies of childcare provision on maternal employment. Berlinski and 
Galianski (2007) study the effect of preschool expansion in Argentina and find an increase of 7 to 
14 percentage points in maternal employment. In the follow-up study, Berlinski et al. (2011) find 
that women are 19 percentage points more likely to work full-time. Meanwhile, Schlosser (2011) 
                                                 
61 See Gelbach (2002), Cascio (2009), Contreras and Sepulveda (2017), Berlinski et al. (2011), and Baker et al. (2008) 
for some examples. 
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examines the introduction of free compulsory preschools in Israel and finds a 7-percentage point 
employment increase. The introduction of subsidized childcare raises the mother’s labor force 
participation by 8 percentage points in Quebec (Baker et al. 2008, Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008) 
and by 6 percentage points in Italy (Carta and Rizzica 2018). In India, government-sponsored 
childcare raises mothers’ employment by 15 percent (Jain 2016). Martinez and Perticara (2017), 
in a randomized-controlled trial in Chile, suggest that afterschool care leads to a 4.3 percentage 
point increase in mother’s work participation. In the United States, using quarter-of-birth as an 
instrument for kindergarten enrollment, Gelbach (2002) finds a 6-24 percent increase in mother’s 
labor supply. Meanwhile, Herbst (2017) estimates the effect of universal childcare under the U.S. 
Lanham Act of 1940 and finds that maternal employment increased by 4.4 percentage points. 
While the magnitude of impacts is aligned with other studies, our findings are surprising 
in three ways. First, public preschools do, in fact, have a substantial positive effect on FLFP despite 
the presumed reliance on communal childcare. This suggests that childcare responsibilities 
constrain women in Indonesia from fully participating in the workforce and that informal childcare 
services are not sufficient alternatives to parental or formal childcare services. Second, public 
preschools could affect employment at the extensive margin despite operating for only 3 hours 
daily. However, this finding is consistent with the case in Argentina where public preschools also 
operate for half-days daily (Berlinski and Galiani 2007, Berlinski et al. 2011) and in India where 
daycare services are provided to children aged 3-6 for 3 hours daily (Jain 2015). Third, preschool 
access facilitates women’s access to the informal sector work that supposedly still allows women 
to self-provide childcare. A recent cross-country and cross-year comparison by Aaronson et al. 
(2018) finds that the negative gradient between fertility and mother’s work participation holds in 
developed but not in developing economies. They argue that agricultural and self-employment, 
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common in developing economies, are more compatible for childcare. Negative fertility effects 
start to kick in as women transition to wage work and the substitution effect dominates (Goldin 
1995). We hope to reconcile this difference by showing that our public preschool effect is most 
pronounced for the first and second children, while their instruments of twins and genders of the 
first two children, by construction, do not allow inference on the first birth. 
In the next section, we elaborate on the context of preschools in Indonesia in more detail. 
In Section 2.3 and 2.4, we discuss our data and empirical strategy respectively. We discuss our 
results in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 contains discussions on the potential complementarity and 
substitutability of public and private provisions of preschools, heterogeneity, and the robustness 
of findings. Section 2.7 concludes our paper. 
 
2.2. Preschools in Indonesia 
There are various forms of early childhood education and development (ECED) services 
in Indonesia, mainly distinguished by formal and non-formal streams and the age ranges to which 
they cater. Preschools (TK/RA62) are non-mandatory, formal ECED intended for children between 
the ages of 4 and 6. They offer academic preparation for primary education. Preschools typically 
operate daily (5-6 times per week) for 3 hours per day. Government regulation stipulates that a 
preschool should have at most 20 students per teacher. In reality, however, the age-groupings are 
often ignored, and quality varies across regions and facilities (Brinkman et al. 2017). 
 The majority of preschools are privately owned and managed, with only around 2 percent 
of preschools being publicly provided (Chang et al. 2006). As such, preschools are mostly located 
                                                 
62 TK stands for Taman Kanak-kanak and RA for Raudhatul Afthal. Both facilities are pre-primary education with the 




in urban areas targeting better-off families. In 2004, less than a quarter of children aged 3 to 6 ever 
attended preschools, and Indonesia’s gross preschool enrollment rate lagged behind the average 
rate in low-income countries. In addition, the availability of preschools varied across regions in 
Indonesia.  
Costs of attendance play a role in hindering uptake. Private preschools are funded by 
charging fees. As an alternative, parents enroll their children earlier than the recommended age of 
7 in the free-of-charge public primary schools (Jung and Hasan 2014). Appendix Table D.10 
tabulates the average annual cost of attending private and public preschools in 2000. Means and 
standard deviations are significantly higher in private compared to public preschools, which might 
signify both higher quality and the higher variability of quality among private preschools. 
 Recognizing the importance of ECED, the Government of Indonesia adopted it into the 
national education system in 2003. The medium-term plan between 2004 and 2009 envisioned an 
increase in ECED enrollment. The Ministry of Education and Culture offer a block-grant subsidy 
to encourage the private provision of ECED services: funds are directly channeled to the providers 
from the central government. Public expansions are harder to achieve. Following decentralization 
reform in 2001, districts are responsible for financing, implementing, and supervising ECED 
services, while the central government is responsible for developing quality assurance mechanisms 
(Chang et al. 2006). 
 Other ECED services, such as daycares and nurseries (PAUD63), may also affect mothers’ 
work participation. We focus on preschools due to limited data availability. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
illustrate the geographical variation of public and private preschool access across the country. 
Figure 2.3 shows the upward trend in both public and private preschool access over the years, 
                                                 
63 PAUD stands for Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini. It is a non-formal ECED service catering children aged 2 to 6. 
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notably since the passing of the National Education System Act (NSEA) in 2003. In the next 
section, we elaborate how we exploit spatial and temporal variations in public and private 
preschool access to estimate the elasticity of maternal employment to preschool access. 
 
2.3. Data 
The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) is a longitudinal household survey, first 
conducted in 1993, with subsequent tracking of the original and split households in 1997, 2000, 
2007, and 2014. It was first fielded in 13 (out of 2764) provinces back in 1993, which represented 
83 percent of the national population (Frankenberg et al. 1995). It has notably high re-contact rates, 
with 87.8 percent of households surveyed in 1993 being successfully tracked or confirmed dead in 
2014 (Strauss, Witoelar and Sikoki 2016). 
In the first round, more than 14,000 individual respondents were selected to provide 
detailed accounts of their employment, current and historical—going back five years to 1988. 
Target respondents expanded further in subsequent rounds65. By the fifth round in 2014, more than 
34,000 individuals were interviewed in detail. Combining the current and recall employment 
survey modules enables us to construct an annual employment history from 1988 to 2015 for 
individuals who were successfully tracked in all five waves. 
IFLS also includes a module for ever married women between the age of 15-49, which 
includes detailed questions about all their pregnancy incidences—still in womb, resulting in 
livebirth, stillbirth, and miscarriage. In the first round, close to 5,000 women were interviewed. 
Tracking the same women over time allowed us to add in subsequent pregnancies that occurred 
after the first wave. For each livebirth, respondents were interviewed at about the year of (or age 
                                                 
64 At the time, Timor Leste, now an independent country, was one of the Indonesian provinces. 
65 For more details, see: Frankenberg and Thomas (2000), Strauss et al. (2004), and Strauss et al. (2009). 
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at) childbirth. We can, therefore, complement our annual employment data with information on 
children’s age at each year, and thus their preschool eligibility. To implement the fixed effect 
model discussed in Section 2.4.3, we further restricted our sample to women who were found to 
be between the age of 19 and 45 in at least two waves66. In the remaining text, we refer to this as 
our “constructed panel.” 
We define preschool access as the number of preschools per 1,000 preschool-aged children, 
aged 3-6, in each district (henceforth, referred to as preschool density). The number of preschools 
is obtained from pooling Village Census (PODES) cross-sections from 1990 to 2014. PODES is 
fielded, roughly, once every three years.67 The population of preschool-aged children comes from 
the annual68 National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) cross-sections of respective PODES 
years.  
Following decentralization reform in 1999, regional governments have been entrusted with 
more policy-making decisions. Province, district, and village-level governments have legislative 
power69 to make policies and to allocate public goods, in this case, pertaining to preschool access. 
We aggregate preschool access at the district-level because, apart from PODES, the other two 
datasets do not include village-level identifiers and, thus, district is the smallest policy-relevant 
geographical boundary possible. Since decentralization, districts have also often split over time. 
In 1993, there were 290 districts; by 2014, there were 511 districts. To ensure equal comparisons 
                                                 
66 For each individual mother, we need at least two observations. Some of our analyses, such as on main activity, are 
not available in the historical employment module. Hence, we have to ensure that individuals are observed in at least 
two rounds. 
67 Specifically, between 1990 and 2014 Podes was administered in 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 
and 2014. 
68 SUSENAS are sometimes fielded more than once per year. In such cases, we use the round with the biggest sample. 
69 Sub-district is an administrative level between district and village. It serves to demarcate geographic boundaries, 
but it does not have any legislative power. 
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across time, we harmonize district boundaries as they existed in 1993. We then match our 
constructed panel with preschool access at the consistent district boundaries circa 1993.  
PODES is not available annually. We employ three strategies to account for the missing 
years. First, we simply restrict our constructed panel to PODES years. Second, we infer preschool 
data from in-between PODES years using the closest upper year available. For instance, year 1992 
is sandwiched between PODES 1990 and 1993, so we infer preschool data from the 1993 round70. 
Third, we predict preschool density for the missing years using linear projection with the closest 
two data points available. For year 1992, we fit a linear projection using preschool density data in 
PODES 1990 and 1993. In the subsequent empirical strategy, we discuss the results from each 
strategy. 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics from our constructed panel. We have 227,579 
female-year observations, with an average age of 31.5 and a 30 percent probability of having a 
preschool-aged child in any year. They have a 52 percent work participation rate and 51 percent 
live in urban areas. They are subjected to an average of 0.15-0.16 public and 4.45-4.60 private 
preschool density in their district of residence. There are 10,340 distinct females, who are surveyed 
on average in 3.54 rounds representing an average of 22 years of observations and 7.5 years 
coinciding with PODES years.71 The average age of first marriage and first birth is 20.23 and 
22.13, respectively. On average, each mother has 2.74 children and 7.75 years of education, or the 
equivalent of halfway through lower secondary education. There are multiple observations of 
preschool access per district, ideally equal to the multiple of 9 PODES rounds between 1990-2014; 
however, some districts in West Sumatra province are not included in the 2011 PODES and 
                                                 
70 In other instances, years 1988-1990 of constructed panel are matched to 1990 PODES, years 1991-1993 to 1993 
PODES, and years 2012-2015 to 2014 PODES. 
71 IFLS surveys span over 21 years. However, the employment history which extends as far back as 1988 allows a 
maximum of 27 years observations between 1988 and 2015. 
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SUSENAS because probability sampling does not always cover all the districts. Ultimately, there 
are 2,559 district-year observations of preschool access with an average of 0.24 public and 4.18 
private preschool density. 
 
2.4. Empirical Strategy 
2.4.1 Difference-in-differences (DD) 
The adoption of preschools into the National System Education Act (NSEA) in 2003 and 
the subsequent increases in public and private preschool access provide a quasi-natural experiment 
to study its effect on the work participation of mothers with preschool-aged children. It is tempting 
to exploit the spatial and temporal variations in preschool access in a difference-in-differences 
(DD) setup. As such, we estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜓 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the employment outcome of preschooler-mother i in district j in year t and 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 is the 
number of preschools per 1,000 children in district j in year t. Pre-existing regional disparities—
such as natural resources, local labor market, and regional dispositions toward working women—
and nationwide year-specific characteristics such as the business cycle and changes in attitudes 
toward working women over time—and that affect female work participation are accounted for by 
𝜇𝑗 and 𝜙𝑡: district and year fixed effects. 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 is a vector of time-variant individual characteristics, 
such as urban residence and female i’s age. We cluster our standard errors at district-level to 
account for correlations within district. 
 The strategy, however, requires a fairly strong assumption that absent variations in 
preschool access, be it across time or regions, preschooler-mothers would observe similar 
employment trends. This may not be the case if preschool expansion is correlated with FLFP. 
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Privately-provided preschools driven by profits are likely positively correlated with the demand 
for preschools, which in turn is likely positively correlated with FLFP. Publicly-provided 
preschools may similarly be positively correlated with the demand for preschools if government 
is concerned with facilities’ utilizations to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the investment, as 
was the case with family planning clinics (Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons 1993). Alternatively, the 
allocation of preschools may be negatively correlated with FLFP. The government may invest in 
public preschools, specifically, to drive up maternal employment. As such, they would target areas 
with low FLFP to begin with, similar to the INPRES primary schools targeting rule (Duflo 2001). 
 We test the plausibility of the common trend assumption by plotting the average 
employment of mothers with a preschool-aged child over time across districts that experience high 
and low growth in preschool density. We define high growth districts as districts that more than 
doubled72 their preschool density between 2003 (when the NSEA was passed) and 2014. Panel A 
in Figure 2.4 shows that average employment of preschooler-mothers in high public preschool 
growth areas tracks well to that in low-growth areas up until 2003 when average employment in 
high-growth areas starts to grow larger than that in low-growth areas; this gap persists until 201473. 
Panel B shows the parallel for private preschools. Employment trends before 2003 in high and 
low-growth areas do not coincide as well as those in Panel A; notably, average work participation 
in high-growth areas in 1996 is lower than that in low-growth areas by about 5 percentage points. 
We also note that average work participation in high-growth areas is not higher than that in low-
                                                 
72 The cutoff of 100 percent growth to indicate high growth districts is reasonable given that median growth in public 
and private preschools density are 85 percent and 92 percent, respectively. The trends look similar if “high” preschool 
investment districts are instead defined as districts with higher than average or median growth. 
73 Work participation rates among eligible mothers increased between 1990 and 1993 and, apart from the spike in 
2000, stayed flat until 2003. The spike in work participation rates in 2003 may be caused by the East Asian Crisis in 
1998/99. Thomas, Beegle, and Frankenberg (2000) indeed show that women were pushed to work to mitigate the 
financial impact of the crisis. 
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growth areas after 2003, which suggests that private preschools may not have the same positive 
effect on maternal employment. 
 While Figure 2.4 shows plausible common pre-trends with regards to public preschools, 
we still have to assume that the similarity in employment trends continue after the preschool 
expansion in 2003. In other words, the post-trends would mimic the commonality of the pre-trends 
had it not been due to the preschool expansion and any differences in the post-trends would be 
solely attributed to differences in preschool density. This may not be true if preschool availability 
is correlated with FLFP, as discussed earlier. The observed positive correlation between childcare 
services availability and FLFP in Canada (Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008) suggests the inclusion of 
region-specific trends in the DD specification. As we show in Section 2.5.1, district trends prove 
to be driving our DD estimates, which suggests that the parallel post-trends assumption may not 
hold well in our context. We proceed to the next empirical strategy to address this identification 
challenge. 
 
2.4.2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
Our data allows us to know if a mother has any preschool-age child at any given year. We 
could also exploit the exogenous overlap in the time when mothers have an eligible child with the 
spatial and temporal variations in preschool access to estimate the preschool effect on maternal 
employment in a DDD setup. This affords us additional variation that we can difference within-
year and within-district. Specifically, we estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜓 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.2) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡, 𝜇𝑗, 𝜙𝑡, and 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 are as described above. 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the dummy indicating if 
mother i in year t has any preschool-aged eligible children (age 3-6). The coefficient interacting 
preschool density and eligibility, 𝛽, is our DDD estimate.  
Some studies studying the effect of childcare on maternal employment have used the age 
of the youngest child to define treatment category74; we opt to define a more general treatment 
category pertaining to any child in the preschool age because, in Indonesia, the incidence of first 
birth has a more substantial negative effect on maternal employment than subsequent births 
(Halim, Johnson, and Perova 2017). Moreover, with detailed fertility history, we can infer the age 
of all children born to the mother at any given year and assign a treatment status to all mothers 
who might have benefitted from preschool access75. We can take a more naïve stance and we do 
not have to assume that mothers do not have the incentive to return to the workforce until the 
youngest child enters preschool.  
Similar to Brodeur and Connolly (2013) and Herbst (2017), our non-eligible “comparison” 
group is the group of women without any preschool-aged children, which includes non-mothers 
and mothers with all children younger than or older than preschool ages. While employment trends 
of non-mothers may not be similar to that of preschooler-mothers, the identifying assumption in 
DDD is less stringent than that in DD. It requires that absent differences in preschool access (be it 
across regions or over time), employment gap between mothers with preschool-aged children and 
mothers without preschool-aged children observe similar trends. Therefore, the common trends 
                                                 
74 See for example: Gelbach (2002), Baker et al (2008), Cascio (2009), Berlinski et al. (2011), Brodeur and Connolly 
(2013), Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas (2015), Herbst (2017), and Contreras and Sepulveda (2017). 
75 In most cross-sectional data without detailed fertility history, e.g. Labor Force Survey or Census, we have to 
define treatment pertaining to the youngest child because the first child might have moved out of the household and, 
thus, is no longer observed. The youngest child, on the other hand, has a very small likelihood of living apart from 




assumption would be satisfied as long as the difference in employment trends of eligible mothers 
and non-eligible mothers are not systematically different across high and low-growth areas. 
Figure 2.5 shows the employment trends for the four groups of comparison: (1) eligible 
mothers in high-growth districts, (2) eligible mothers in low-growth districts, (3) non-eligible 
mothers in high-growth districts, and (4) non-eligible mothers in low-growth districts. Panel A 
shows that pre-trends in high and low public preschool growth districts among eligible and non-
eligible mothers coincide with one another well, respectively. Common trends for non-eligible 
mothers in high and low-growth areas persist after 2003, while the average work participation for 
preschooler-mothers in high-growth districts is consistently larger than that in low-growth districts 
since 2003. Panel B shows the parallel for private preschools. Eligible mothers in high and low 
private preschool growth districts seem to show similar pre- and post-trends. Average employment 
of non-eligible mothers in high-growth districts coincides with those in low-growth districts from 
1990 to 1993. However, non-eligible mothers in low-growth districts seem to work more than non-
eligible mothers in 1996 and the gap persists until 2014. The gap in employment trends between 
eligible and non-eligible mothers does not seem to be as systematically different across high- and 
low-growth districts. Common trends assumption in the DDD setting hold reasonably better than 
the one in DD setting. As a precaution, we also show results with and without district-specific 
trends. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that non-mothers and mothers with children of non-
preschool ages are a poor comparison group to mothers of young children eligible for preschools. 
Non-mothers may observe lower work participation rates because the median age of first birth is 
22, which might imply that many young women do not have the opportunity to work after school 
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and before starting a family76. On the other hand, non-mothers may have higher work participation 
rates because they do not face the childcare burden. In our sample, we note that the first effect 
dominates; work participation rates for non-mothers is lower than that of mothers at 32.9 and 57.5 
percent, respectively. Mothers of primary school-aged children (age 7-12) may also have higher 
work participation rates because public primary schools are free and more abundantly available, 
thus, they may serve as a better childcare alternative. Meanwhile, mothers of older children may 
no longer need childcare services because older children can take care of themselves. 
Mothers of children aged 0-2 may be the ideal comparison group to mothers of preschool-
aged children. However, if we define an eligible group as mothers with any child aged 3-6 and a 
non-eligible group as mothers with any child aged 0-2, then the two groups overlap over mothers 
with two children: a 3-6 year old child and a 0-2 year old child77. Therefore, we need to explore 
other uncontaminated ways to define ‘eligibility.’ As noted earlier, many previous studies have 
defined eligibility with regards to the youngest child, but the first childbirth may in fact introduce 
the largest negative shock to maternal employment, especially in the Indonesian context. 
Moreover, if we compare across mothers whose youngest child is aged 0-2 and aged 3-6, then we 
would still expect a contaminated comparison group because mothers whose youngest child is 
aged 0-2 may have an older child aged 3-6, who could benefit from preschools. As such, the 
estimated treatment effect may be biased downwards. The cleanest identification may be to 
compare mothers whose oldest child is not yet of preschool-aged and mothers whose oldest child 
is of preschool age. Section 2.5.2 discusses these results. 
                                                 
76 A quarter of women in our sample first gave birth when they were 19. Meanwhile, high school is ideally completed 
at age 18. 
77 This is a very likely scenario. Appendix Figure D.9 shows the distribution of gap years between childbirths. The 
mode is a 2 year gap between childbirths for all birth orders. 
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Figure 2.6 shows a similar comparison across eligible and non-eligible mothers in high and 
low preschool growth areas. However, eligibility is instead defined for the oldest child being of 
preschool age and the comparison group is defined for the oldest child being aged 0-2. Panel A 
similarly shows that mothers whose oldest child is not yet of preschool age have similar 
employment trends across high and low preschool growth areas, before and after the passing of 
the NSEA in 2003. Eligible mothers show similar pre-trends but mothers in high preschool areas 
have diverged on a higher trajectory since 2003; the gap persists until 2014. Panel B shows that 
eligible and non-eligible mothers in high and low preschool areas coincide with each other before 
2003. However, non-eligible mothers have grown to have higher work participation rates than 
eligible mothers since 2003. Employment trends are nonetheless similar across high and low 
preschool areas among non-eligible and eligible mothers, respectively. 
 
2.4.3 Difference-in-difference-in-differences with an individual fixed effect (DDD-FE) 
It is difficult, however, to account for women’s unobserved preferences for work and 
leisure, abilities, family circumstances, fertilities, and fecundities that certainly affect their 
decision to enter the workforce. A myriad of covariates can be introduced to approximately control 
these unobservables. For instance, we may consider pre-birth work hours as a proxy for career 
preference, educational attainment for abilities, household income for family circumstances, 
number of children for fertility, and number of healthy eggs for fecundity. The proximity of these 
measures may vary across contexts and, even so, it may be difficult to accurately measure these 
proxies. We argue that using an individual fixed effect in a longitudinal data that follows the same 
individual over time is a better approach, since we are not necessarily interested in estimating the 
effect of, say, fecundity on work participation; instead, we are interested in accounting for 
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unobserved individual dispositions toward work. However, it is important to note that we can only 
control for time-invariant individual characteristics and preferences. We need to assume, for 
example, that fertility, career, and family preferences do not change over time. 
 We can estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜓 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.3) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡, 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑗, 𝜙𝑡, and 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 are as described earlier. The inclusion of an individual 
fixed effect, 𝜃𝑖, helps account for important omitted variables such as career and family 
preferences, which thereby minimizes the estimates’ biases. It may also potentially relax the 
identifying assumption in the DDD setting. In Section 2.4.2, we have to assume that the 
employment gap of different mothers with and without any preschool-aged child in high- and low-
growth districts are not systematically different from one another. In DDD-FE, we compare within-
mothers and we assume that in the absence of differences in preschool access, the employment 
gap of the same mother with and without any preschool-aged child would have been the same. In 
other words, as the child ages from 2 to 3 and becomes eligible for preschools, if the mother is 
exposed to the same preschool density, then the difference in her likelihood to work (when the 
child was of age 2 and when the child was of age 3) would not be systematically different. Note 
that since it is a special case of DDD setup, the internal validity of DDD strategy naturally lends 
itself to the DDD-FE strategy. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 similarly serve as justifications to the common 
trends assumption in DDD-FE. 
 Individual fixed effects, however, force comparisons within mothers. To leverage 
variations in preschool availability, we need frequent observations of the same mother across time. 
Identification, first, comes from variation in age eligibility—we compare mother’s work 
participation when her child is aged 2 and not eligible for preschools and the next year when her 
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child is aged 3 and starts to be eligible for preschools. Second, identification comes from variations 
in preschool availability during eligible ages—suppose that there few preschools when the child 
is aged 3 and the government builds more preschools when the child is aged 4.  
Our annual panel affords us sufficiently frequent observations of mothers; however, our 
preschool data is only available roughly once in three years. Restricting our analysis to PODES 
years only could be problematic because we can only leverage variations as mothers transition in 
and out of eligibility with an older child growing out of, and a younger child reaching, preschool 
ages. Suppose that in year 2000, the mother only has one young child and in 2003, she has two 
young children. Her labor force participation calculus likely changes with the additional child. We 
must assume that individual preferences for work do not change over time and that variations in 
work participation are attributable only to variations in preschool availability. We must also 
assume that preschool availability does not affect individual preferences for children. Suppose that 
no preschools were available when a mother has a preschool-aged child and she decides not to 
have another child, so she can work. Since we only observe her three years later, we can only 
identify off changes in preschool eligibility and not variations in preschool availability during 
eligible ages. We do not have to make these additional assumptions in DDD because we can 
compare across eligible mothers subjected to different preschool availabilities. We explore the 
validity and present the results of each strategy in the next section. 
 
2.5. Results 
This section describes the effect of public and private preschool availability on female 
employment outcomes in Indonesia. We first begin by examining the extensive margin of 
employment: work participation. Do preschools serve as an adequate alternative to childcare, 
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enabling women to partake in employment? We describe the results across different empirical 
strategies and different treatment of missing years, without preschool data in in PODES. 
Subsequently, we explore the intensive margins, such as the types of occupations and sectors that 
women go into. Given that preschool only provides 3 hours of childcare per day on average, can 
it enable women to work in the formal sector with rigid hours? 
 
2.5.1 Work participation 
Table 2.2 reports the regression results of our three empirical strategies with and without 
district-specific trends in the most conservative PODES-restricted years. Columns 1-2 estimate the 
work participation of mothers with preschool-aged children on public (Panel A) and private (Panel 
B) preschool densities. Column 1, which does not include district-specific trends, suggests a 
negative effect of preschool density on preschooler-mothers’ employment. The effect on public 
preschool is not statistically significant, while the effect on private preschool suggests a 1.0 
percentage point reduction in maternal employment. District trends, however, substantially affect 
our estimates of public preschool; the DD estimate with district-trend on public preschool is 
positive but still not statistically significant. This suggests that there are important district-specific 
employment trends that are correlated with public preschool availability and that are not properly 
accounted for in the DD setup. The estimate for private preschool is also slightly affected, 
becoming less negative at 0.8 percentage points.  
 In column 3-4, we implement a DDD model, adding the exogenous variation in the timing 
when mothers have a preschool-aged child to better account for differential employment trends 
across districts over time. The interaction term of preschool density and a dummy for having a 
preschool-eligible child is our estimate of interest. In Panel A, we show that having an additional 
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public preschool per 1,000 preschool-aged children increases the likelihood of eligible mothers 
working by 4.8 to 5.0 percentage points. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. Public preschool density itself has no statistically significant effect on non-eligible 
mothers. Expectedly, having a young preschool-aged child has a negative effect on women’s work 
participation. The negative effect of having a preschooler is almost compensated by having another 
public preschool per 1,000 children. In Panel B, we find that private preschools do not increase 
the likelihood of eligible mothers working. The estimated effects are precisely 0 with 0.002 
standard errors. Better private preschool access has a small negative and marginally statistically 
significant effect on non-eligible mothers, in particular when the DDD regression also controls for 
district trends. Similarly, we find a negative effect of having a preschooler. 
 Column 5 and 6 build on the DDD setup and add an individual fixed effect to allow 
comparison within-mother and better control for omitted variable bias, such as individual 
preferences for career and family. The results suggest that unobserved individual preferences and 
biological dispositions may meaningfully affect the estimated effects. An additional public 
preschool per 1,000 children increases the likelihood of preschooler-mothers to work by 7.9-8.0 
percentage points. Similar to the DDD setup, district trends no longer affect the estimates. Both 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Private preschools still yield a precisely 
0 effect on maternal employment. Public preschools do not have any effect on non-eligible 
mothers, but private preschools have a small and statistically significant effect if we control for 
district trends. The presence of any preschool-aged child still negatively affects maternal 
employment, albeit with smaller magnitudes: -0.034 compared to -0.051 for public preschools in 
DDD and -0.025 to -0.042 for private preschools. This suggests that some of the reduction in the 
likelihood of working when taking care of a young child is attributable to individual career and 
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familial preferences. It seems puzzling that eligible mothers with access to an additional public 
preschool per 1,000 children would have worked more than non-eligible mothers. This may 
suggest that, controlling for individual preferences, mothers with a young child have greater 
financial needs and would have been more motivated to work had they been afforded alternative 
childcare services. 
 
2.5.2 Alternative specifications 
Our preschool data is obtained from PODES that is only available in 9 years out of 28 years 
in our constructed panel. The most conservative approach is to restrict the analysis to PODES years 
only, as in Table 2.2. Our second approach is to infer preschool data in-between PODES years 
using the closest upper year available. Lastly, we can fit a linear projection between non-missing 
PODES years. Table 2.3 reports the estimates of the three empirical strategies with the three 
treatments of missing PODES years. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed 
effects and an urban residence dummy; and do not include district-specific trends. Columns 1-3 
repeats estimates from Table 2.2 without district trends. Column 4-6 reports estimates when we 
infer in-between PODES years and column 7-9 reports estimates when we fit a linear projection 
between non-missing PODES years. Across the board, we note that the general story and overall 
statistical significance do not change whichever preschool data we use. In the restrictive approach 
of using only PODES years, we introduce identification issues in the DDD-FE strategy, as we can 
only leverage variations as mothers transition in and out of eligibility over time, potentially giving 
up the statistical power to detect small effect sizes in subsequent analyses78. In fitting a linear 
                                                 
78 In results not shown, we find that women are 2.2 percentage points more likely to become agricultural workers if 
exposed to better public preschool access. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level but the 
statistical significance no longer holds after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing. Inferring preschool data in-
between PODES years substantially increases the sample size needed to detect the effect. We note that women are 
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projection, we can either use preschool densities directly or we can separately fit linear projections 
for preschool counts and children populations. We opt to project preschool densities directly. 
However, this assumes divisibility in the number of preschools and children. In subsequent 
analyses, we infer in-between PODES years because it requires fewer assumptions. Appendix 
Table D.2 reports the parallel of Table 2.2 with inferred in-between preschool data. 
 Table 2.4 reports the effect of preschool availability on maternal employment when we 
change the definition of preschool eligibility with regards to any child, the oldest child, and the 
youngest child. Columns 1 and 2 are repeated from Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2.3; when the eligible 
group is defined as mothers with any child of preschool age. Columns 3 and 4 re-define eligibility 
with regards to the first child using DDD and DDD-FE strategies, respectively. In Panel A, the 
interaction coefficient for public preschools has a slightly smaller effect size, 0.041 compared to 
0.057, and becomes less statistically significant with the DDD strategy, but stays the same in size 
and statistical significance with the DDD-FE strategy. The care burden of having an eligible child 
becomes less pronounced in DDD and more pronounced in DDD-FE. An additional public 
preschool per 1,000 children does not have a statistically significant effect on mothers whose 
youngest child is of preschool age in DDD strategy (but the effect is still positive) and has a slightly 
smaller effect in the DDD-FE strategy. Mothers do not face reduced work participation if their 
youngest child is of preschool age. Panel B repeats the same analysis for private preschools. The 
interaction coefficients stay non-statistically significant across all three definitions of eligibility. 
The overall story for both public and private preschools stays relatively similar across definitions, 
although the effects are expectedly less pronounced for the youngest child. 
                                                 
2.9 percentage points more likely to become agricultural workers. The effect is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level and stays significant after multiple hypothesis testing adjustment. 
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 Table 2.5 explores different choices of comparison ages. Columns 1-4 define preschool 
eligibility with regards to the oldest child and columns 5-8 with regards to the youngest child. 
Column 1 compares mothers whose oldest child is of preschool age (3-6) to mothers whose oldest 
child is aged 0-2, while Column 2 changes the comparison group with mothers whose youngest 
child is of primary school age (7-12), column 3 in secondary school ages (13-18), and column 4 
includes mothers whose youngest child is of the wrong age and non-mothers. Columns 5-8 repeat 
the same pattern. Panel A shows interaction coefficients of eligibility and public preschool density 
with DDD and DDD-FE strategies, while Panel B shows that of private preschool density. 
Column 1 suggests that an additional public preschool per 1,000 children increases the 
work participation of eligible mothers by 6.3 percentage points with the DDD strategy and 7.5 
percentage points with the DDD-FE strategy, relative to mothers whose youngest child is aged 0-
2. Private preschools lead to a 0.4 percentage point increase in work participation with both DDD 
and DDD-FE strategies, which are statistically significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. Column 
2 shows that preschools do not have a statistically significant effect on the work participation of 
eligible mothers relative to mothers with a youngest child of primary school age. This is likely the 
case because public primary schools are free of charge and are more abundantly available than 
preschools; thus, they arguably provide a better childcare alternative than preschools. Column 3 
combines mothers whose youngest child is aged 0-2, 7-12, older than 13, and non-mothers in the 
comparison group. Column 3 repeats columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4. 
Column 4 suggests that public preschools do not help to increase the work participation of 
mothers whose youngest child is of preschool age relative to mothers with a younger youngest 
child, but private preschools increase work participation by 0.6 and 0.4 percentages points, which 
are statistically significant at 10 and 5 percent using DDD and DDD-FE, respectively. Compared 
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to mothers with a youngest child in primary school, public preschools do not have a statistically 
significant effect on work participation in both DDD and DDD-FE, while private preschools have 
a non-statistically significant effect on DDD-FE but a negative and statistically significant effect 
on work participation in DDD. Column 6 repeats Table 2.4 columns 5 and 6. 
Taken together, the results suggest that the overall story is robust to different empirical 
strategies, choice of ways to define eligible ages, and choice of comparison group, despite 
requiring different identifying assumptions. Additional public preschool density leads to an 
increase in maternal employment in virtually all sensible specifications. Additional private 
preschool density may also have a positive, small, and statistically significant effect on work 
participation, in particular when we compare preschool ages to younger than preschool ages. 
 
2.5.3 Sectoral changes 
The finding that public preschools boost women’s work participation may be surprising 
given that preschools only liberate an average of 3 hours of mother’s time per day. It is unlikely 
that mothers could take up a formal sector job with rigid hours. Table 2.6 examines the effect of 
preschool availability on female’s work status. Our DD estimates suggest that eligible mothers 
exposed to higher public preschool density are not more likely to hold a second job or to be self-
employed, but are slightly more likely to be a government worker at 0.6 increased percentage 
points—the estimate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Eligible mothers are not 
more likely to be a private worker but are significantly more likely to be an unpaid family worker. 
An additional public preschool per 1,000 children increases the likelihood of being an unpaid 
family worker by 4.1 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. On 
the other hand, we find that an additional private preschool per 1,000 children increases both the 
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probability of holding a second job and being self-employed by 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points, 
respectively. 
To account for multiple hypotheses testing, we employ the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up 
method to control for the false discovery rate (FDR) (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). A regular 
p-value of 0.05 suggests that 5 percent of all tests result in false positives. An FDR adjusted q-
value of 0.05 instead suggests that 5 percent of significant tests result in false positives. We note 
that government worker outcome is not robust to the simultaneous inference correction, but unpaid 
family worker is—it is still significant at the 1 percent level. None of the statistically significant 
effects of private preschool are still statistically significant with the FDR adjusted q-value.  
We turn to Table 2.7 for occupational changes. We find that higher public preschool access 
leads to a 2.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of being employed as an agricultural 
worker79. Being the only statistically significant outcome in seven tests, we find that it is almost 
robust to the Benjamini-Hochberg correction, with an adjusted q-value of 0.108. Meanwhile, 
higher private preschool access suggestively leads to the higher probability of being employed as 
a manager and a production worker. The first, however, does not stand the test of false discovery, 
while the latter does. 
Table 2.8 lists the top 3 occupations per occupation category80. Agricultural and animal 
husbandry workers, planters and farmers, and forestry workers make up a 97.74 percent share of 
agricultural workers. Tailors, food and beverage processors, and spinners make up a 84.7 percent 
share of production workers. These occupations represent traditional occupations in the informal 
sector that do not require a full-time commitment from preschool-aged eligible mothers. Better 
                                                 
79 Agricultural workers do not have to be paid. In fact, 49.39 percent of females working as agricultural workers are 
unpaid family workers. 
80 IFLS collects open-ended description of occupation and categorizes them in 2-digit occupation codes. We aggregate 
them to the 1-digit occupation headings to reduce the number of tests. 
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preschool access helps alleviate mothers’ childcare burden, albeit for only a few hours a day. 
Figure 2.7 summarizes the occupational changes resulting from better public and private access. It 
plots the DDD-FE estimates in standardized z-scores to allow for a visual comparison of different 
occupations with different baseline employment shares. 
Similarly, we investigate whether preschool availability affects the sectors that women 
enter. Figure 2.8 summarizes the sectoral changes resulting from better preschool access. Visually, 
we observe that higher public preschool density leads to a lower likelihood of working in the utility 
sector and a higher likelihood of working in the social services sector. Higher private preschool 
density does not have any effect on women’s choice of industry. If anything, private preschool 
may have a marginally positive effect on women’s likelihood to work in the manufacturing sector. 
Table 2.9 suggests, however, that none of these sectoral changes hold under the false discovery 
rate correction. 
 
2.5.4 Other margins 
Other employment margins, such as salary and work hours, are certainly of interest. 
Unfortunately, they are not collected in the historical employment module in all IFLS rounds81, 
resulting in a largely unbalanced panel. We provide suggestive evidence with the available data. 
We do not find any effect of higher public and private preschool density on monthly salary, net 
profit, and income, or on work hours per week (Appendix Table D.5). This suggestive evidence 
seem reasonable given the fact that preschools only operate 3 hours a day and likely would not 
substantially contribute to these intensive margins of employment. 
                                                 
81 Earnings and work hours are asked pertaining to current and historical employment in round 1-3 but are limited to 
current employment in round 4-5. Main activities are limited to current employment in all rounds. 
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Appendix Table D.6 suggests that higher access to public and private preschool does not 
increase the likelihood of mothers reporting working and job searching as their main activity in 
lieu of housekeeping. If anything, we find that higher private preschool density leads to a reduction 




2.6.1 Complementarity and substitutability of public and private preschools 
Public and private preschools appear to help women’s employment outcomes. However, 
they seem to cater to different subsets of the population and separately push women into different 
types of occupations. To make more informed policy recommendations, we would like to 
understand whether public and private preschools serve as complements or substitutes to one 
another. Can we reject equality between the public and private preschool effects? 
 Table 2.11 summarizes our exploration. Column 1 and 2 present the same estimates as in 
Table 2.3 Column 6, separately for public and private preschools. Column 3 includes both public 
and private preschool densities and the interaction with the child’s preschool age eligibility and 
tests the equality of public and private preschools DDD-FE coefficients. An additional public 
preschool per 1,000 children leads to a 7.1 percentage point increase in women’s work 
participation, but a private preschool has virtually a zero effect on women’s work participation. 
We formally test the equality of the two DDD-FE coefficients and we can reject equality at the 1 
percent significance level.  
Column 4 adds in the triple interaction of public and private preschool densities and the 
preschool age eligibility dummy. The negative and statistically significant triple interaction 
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coefficient suggests that public and private preschools are likely substitutes to one another, 
although they might be poor substitutes given the small magnitude of -0.003 and marginal 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level. Building more public preschools may not crowd-out 
private preschools enrollment at the current level of preschool availability and the current level of 
preschool enrollment. 
 
2.6.2 Heterogenous effects by child’s age 
We are also interested to know whether preschools could have spillover effects on other 
non-eligible mothers. Mothers could anticipate the rollout of preschools and increase their work 
participation even before their children are of preschool age. On the other hand, preschools may 
allow mothers to work when their children are age-eligible, accumulate longer work experience, 
and command higher wage rates when their children get older and graduate from preschools 
(Lefebvre et al. 2009). Longer work tenure and higher wage rates presumably push FLFP upward 
later in the life cycle. While Table 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that preschools do not benefit non-eligible 
mothers in general, the effects may be washed out among the large group of non-eligible mothers—
those without children and those with all younger or older children. 
 In this section, we aim to estimate the heterogeneous effect of preschool access on mother’s 
employment by their child’s age and relative to the omitted group of non-mothers and mothers of 
children older than 18. Specifically, we estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑎 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎)
18
𝑎=0




+ 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜓 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.4) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡, 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑗, 𝜙𝑡, 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕, 𝜃𝑖 are as described earlier. 1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎) is an indicator 
if mother i has a child of age a in year t. Hence, 𝛽𝑎 and 𝛿𝑎 are estimated for each child’s age. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
 Figure 2.9 plots the estimates for public preschools. First, we note that mothers of 
preschool-aged children have positive and statistically significant effects relative to the omitted 
group. We also note that there is no positive anticipation effect between a child’s age of 0-2. There 
are some spurious positive effects following preschool ages, specifically between a child’s age of 
7-9. However, the spillover on older ages may be caused by the way we define our eligibility 
dummies. For instance, a dummy for age 8 is equal to 1 for mothers who have at least 1 child of 
age 8. However, the same mother may also have a younger child of age 6 who might benefit from 
preschool. Since mothers in our sample have on average 2.74 children, mothers of a preschool-
aged child are likely to have another child slightly older and/or younger than the preschool age 
range. 
 Figure 2.10 plots the parallel for private preschools. We confirm that having better 
preschool access does not benefit mothers of preschool-aged children. The null effects persist to 
age 18. It is interesting to note, however, that private preschools have negative and statistically 
significant anticipatory effects on maternal employment. Notably, mothers of children aged 0-2 
are negatively affected. This may suggest that mothers reduce their work participation in 
anticipation of being able to utilize preschools when their children are of preschool age. 
 Alternatively, we may also be interested in the mother’s transition in and out of workforce 
relative to the year when their child first becomes eligible for preschool. We can conduct an “event 




𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑎 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎)
1
𝑎=−6
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑎 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎)
18
𝑎=3




+ ∑ 𝛿𝑎 1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎)
18
𝑎=3
+ 𝛾 𝑇𝐾𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜓 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡  (2.5) 
which is very similar to equation 2.4, with the following exceptions. First, treatment is defined 
relative to the firstborn only. Second, we trim observations at the tails—aggregating average work 
participation 6 and more years before and 18 and more years after the first child is born. Therefore, 
we interpret the regression coefficients relative to the omitted group of mothers whose first child 
was of age 2, one year before the child is eligible for preschool. 
 Figure 2.11 shows the results for public preschools. We first note that relative to the year 
before preschool eligibility, mothers’ work participation only benefits from better public preschool 
access starting from age 4. This is consistent with the official age of entry into preschools (age 4) 
and when the majority of children first enter preschools (Appendix Figure D.6). The effects 
increase up to age 7 and decline after that. The effects are no longer statistically significant from 
age 10 onward. This either suggest some evidence for the dynamic labor supply effect (Lefebvre 
et al. 2009) or that mothers whose firstborn are of age 7 are also likely to have a younger child 
who is eligible for preschool. The effects prior to childbirth are more spurious, with some negative 
statistically significant effects 2 and 5 years before the first childbirth. 
 Figure 2.12 shows the parallel for private preschools. We do not find that mothers of 
preschool-aged children have a better likelihood of entering the workforce once their firstborn is 
of preschool-age. There is a slightly positive and statistically significant effect for mothers whose 
firstborn is age 3. However, the effects at subsequent ages are virtually never statistically 
significant, with some spurious findings at age 7. There are no statistically significant effects at 
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any of the younger ages. Appendix Figures D.4 and D.5 show similar event study analyses 
surrounding the first child’s birth event. The overall stories are largely the same. 
 
2.6.3 Heterogeneous effects by child’s birth order 
We are also interested in knowing if a similar effect can be expected of subsequent children. 
If there is an economy of scale in childrearing, women’s work participation is particularly hurt 
with one child, but the marginal time-cost of an additional child might be minimal. As such, 
mothers with many children may not benefit as much from better public preschool access. 
 Table 2.12 re-estimates equation 2.3 but narrows down the way we define eligibility. 
Eligibility is no longer defined for any child being of preschool age, but it is defined for each 
child’s birth order. Therefore, column 1 defines eligibility relative to the first child, column 2 to 
the second child, and so on. If a mother only has 2 children, preschool eligibility status will only 
be defined for the first two columns pertaining to her first two children. Hence, the number of 
observations will fall as we go across the columns because the number of mothers with three 
children is fewer than the number of mothers with just one child. 
Additional public preschool density has positive and statistically significant effects on the 
work participation of mothers with preschool-aged eligible first, second, and third children. The 
statistical significance of the third child is still robust to simultaneous inference with an FDR q-
value of 0.095. The effects on the fourth child are positive but not statistically significant; on the 
fifth and sixth child they are negative and not statistically significant. Having better access to a 
private preschool does not seem to matter for work participation. We find a spurious positive and 
statistically significant effect for the second child; but the indicated positive effect does not stand 
the false discovery test. 
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2.6.4 Heterogeneous effects by preschool enrollment level 
Previous studies suggest that the effect of childcare services on maternal employment may 
depend on utilization rates; if the rate is already high then additional childcare services may no 
longer have an important effect on employment. It is important to note, however, that null findings 
in other contexts have 90 percent (Bauernschuster and Schlotter 2015) and 80 percent childcare 
utilization rates (Lundin et al. 2008). Meanwhile, average preschool enrollment rates among 
children aged 3-6 per district between 2003 and 2014 in Indonesia is 15.6 percent; the 99th 
percentile is 49.8 percent82. As such, we may not expect preschools in Indonesia to have reached 
the saturation point yet. 
 Table 2.13 provides suggestive evidence on the heterogenous effects of preschool 
availability on maternal employment by preschool enrollment rates using DDD and DDD-FE 
strategies. The sample is restricted to PODES years with preschool enrollment data83, which leads 
to a total of 37,547 individual-year observations (less than half of the sample in Table 2.2). Each 
strategy divides the sample into three groups: those subjected to less than 20 percent (N = 23,076), 
between 20-40 percent (N = 11,982), and beyond 40 percent (N = 2,489) preschool enrollment rate 
in the district. First, we note that public preschools are most effective in districts with low 
preschool enrollment rates, at 0.117-0.125 effect sizes compared to 0.048-0.080 on average. This 
magnitude reduces with higher utilization rates; turning less statistically significant in column 2 
and negative but not statistically significant in column 3. On the other hand, private preschools 
have the opposite trend: not statistically significant effects for low utilization rates up to 40 percent, 
which become more positive beyond 40 percent preschool enrollment rates. These may suggest 
that affordable public preschools may help mothers catch up and join the workforce in low 
                                                 
82 Data obtained from National Socioeconomic Surveys (SUSENAS) in 2003, 2005, 2011, and 2014. 
83 Preschool enrollment data coincides with PODES years in 2003, 2005, 2011, and 2014. 
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preschool penetration areas. On the other hand, the quality of private preschools may be better in 
high preschool penetration areas, which results in more mothers opting to enroll their children in 
preschools and joining the workforce. 
 
2.6.5 Heterogeneous effects by mother’s education level 
Our results seem to suggest a segmented market between public and private preschools, 
whereby public preschools cater to lower-income groups of the population and private preschools 
are utilized by mothers who can afford their costs. We proxy income generating ability with 
mothers’ highest educational attainment. Table 2.14 summarizes the effects of preschool 
availability on maternal employment by their level of education. Public preschools have positive 
and statistically significant effects for mothers with primary and less than primary education and 
for mothers with at least upper secondary education. Private preschools have no statistically 
significant effects on the lower educated mothers and a positive and statistically significant effect 
for mothers with at least upper secondary education. These results suggest that public preschools 
may help those who may have greater financial needs and that preschools in general benefit higher 
educated mothers who better understand the benefits of preschools. 
 
2.6.6 Robustness checks 
The previous analysis focuses on an indicator if mothers have at least one eligible child. 
We may think that there is linearity to having multiple eligible children. Appendix Table D.3 
presents a parallel to our Table 2.2, but instead interacts the continuous preschool density with the 
continuous number of eligible children. We still find a strongly positive effect on work 
participation with public preschools, but not private preschools. Column 5 suggests that an 
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additional public preschool per 1,000 children increases women’s work participation by 6.5 
percentage points per preschool-aged eligible child. 
 It may also be of interest in comparing our point estimates to other studies where the 
preschool ages are between age 3 and 5. Appendix Table D.4 is an analogue to Table 2.2 but 
changes the age eligibility to be between 3 and 5. Our findings are consistent with this incremental 
change. In Column 5, suggesting that an additional public preschool per 1,000 children increases 
women’s work participation by 6.6 percentage points per preschool-aged eligible child. 
 Appendix Table D.7 explores whether our findings on sectoral changes hold, conditional 
on employment. We do not find evidence that women switch occupations as a result of having 
better access to public or private preschools, conditional on being employed. Reconciling this with 
Table 2.7 suggests that women with eligible children are more likely to work and, if they work, 
they work in occupations that do not require full-time commitment. However, once they work, 
they are not more likely to switch to any other occupation. Appendix Table D.8 does the same 
thing for industry choice. 
 The estimated preschool availability effects on maternal employment are also robust to 
dropping large population districts. Population is defined based on the population in 1996 to 
minimize possible sorting to better preschool access districts84. Appendix Table D.11 summarizes 
our findings with DDD (column 1-3) and DDD-FE (column 4-6) strategies. Columns 1 and 4 are 
the most restrictive, examining districts with less than 0.5 million population in 1996. Columns 2 
and 5 include districts with a population of up to 1 million in 1996, while columns 3 and 6 include 
a population of up to 1.5 million. Coefficients should be compared to columns 5 and 6 in Table 
2.3. While the positive effect of public preschools and null effect of private preschools generally 
                                                 
84 1996 is the earliest round of SUSENAS, with complete coverage of the 290 districts. 
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remains, it is worth noting that effect sizes do get smaller in smaller districts. The interaction 
coefficient of public preschools is no longer statistically significant in districts with a population 
of less than 0.5 million with DDD strategy and only statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
with DDD-FE strategy. This potentially suggests that preschools may be more beneficial to 
mothers living in highly populated districts with better economic opportunities. 
 
2.6.7 Sorting to better preschool access 
To check if mothers with preschool-aged children sort into districts with high preschool 
access, we aggregate our constructed panel of individuals over the years to a panel of district-
year85. We investigate whether districts with higher preschool access induce a net migration of 
preschool-aged eligible mothers. Specifically, we regress the change in net migration of eligible 
mothers on either the change, or the lagged change, of private/public preschool density in the 




Prior studies have documented the mixed evidence of preschool access on maternal 
employment. We find that an additional public preschool per 1,000 young children in Indonesia 
increases eligible mothers’ work participation by 7.4 percentage points. Mothers take up unpaid 
family work and jobs as agricultural workers. Improved private preschool density does not lend 
the same effect at the extensive margin, but it does increase the likelihood of working as artisanal 
                                                 
85 By construction, one PODES year is matched to several years in the panel of mothers. For instance, PODES 1993 
is assigned to year 1991-1993 in the panel of mothers. If the time unit is defined annually, we obtain, mechanically, 
zero change in (public/private) preschool density in district j between 1993 and 1992. For the purpose of this test, we 
restrict our analysis to PODES years and collapse our individual-level panel of mothers to the district-level. 
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production worker. The tendency to work in informal sectors is in conjunction with the fact that 
preschools operate daily for less than half a day. We also document some evidence that improved 
preschools may particularly help mitigate the negative fertility effect of the first two children on 
maternal employment. The Indonesian experience with preschools may lend some guidance to 
other countries with low preschool enrollment and female work participation rates. 
 The benefits of expanding public preschool access are not limited to short-run gains in 
increased female employment. The World Bank (2016) argues that increasing FLFP is a more 
effective policy than attracting in-migrants or increasing elderly work participation to offset the 
shrinking workforce due to the rapidly aging economy. In this paper, we also elude to the well-
documented long-term benefits of early-childhood education that tend to favor children born in 
poor households (Berlinski et al. 2009, Havnes and Mogstad 2015, Garcia et al. 2016; Brinkman 
et. al. 2017). A study in Indonesia suggests that the benefits from early-childhood education 
intervention on children’s outcomes alone exceed the costs by an average of 6.01: the benefit-cost 
ratio is even higher for the poorest quintile (Chang et al. 2006). 
 Access alone, however, may not be sufficient. Preschools’ hours of operation seemingly 
affect the type of employment in which women can partake. Increasing the hours of preschool 
operation may also be instrumental in women’s work participation (Berthelon et al. 2015, 
Contreras and Sepulveda 2017, Padilla-Romo and Cabrera-Hernandez 2018). Similarly, mothers 
may also benefit from childcare for children in other age categories (Goux and Maurin 2012, Barua 
2014, Bettendorf et al. 2015, Felfe et al. 2016). We also document that preschools are largely 
utilized by parents within walking-distance. Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez (2004), in fact, use 
distance to childcare centers as an instrument for participation in the childcare program. Location 
choice then becomes another important variable for policymakers. Chang et al. (2006) show that 
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publicly-provided preschools in Indonesia are mostly located in urban areas, but long-term benefits 
are highest for poor households in rural areas. While it is likely difficult to incentivize private 
provisions in rural areas with sparse populations, an expansion of public preschools may be 






Figure 2.1. Spatial distribution of public preschools per 1,000 children in 2014 
Notes: Number of public preschools is obtained from Podes 2014 and the population of children aged 3-6 is obtained from Susenas 
2014. The legend indicates the range and distribution of public preschool densities across the Indonesian archipelago. The numbers in 
parentheses refer to the number of districts that fall in that range. The total number of districts, 290, reflects their existence in 1993. 
Districts often split over time; by March 2016, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, we maintain the 1993 district boundaries to 




Figure 2.2. Spatial distribution of private preschools per 1,000 children in 2014 
Notes: Number of private preschools is obtained from Podes 2014 and the population of children aged 3-6 is obtained from Susenas 
2014. The legend indicates the range and distribution of private preschool densities across the Indonesian archipelago. The numbers in 
parentheses refer to the number of districts that fall in that range. The total number of districts, 290, reflects their existence in 1993. 
Districts often split over time; by 2014, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, we maintain the 1993 district boundaries to allow 




Figure 2.3. Density of public and private preschools across districts over time 
Note: Density is defined as the number of preschools obtained from Podes divided by the 
population of children aged 3-6 obtained from Susenas, in respective years. Panel A and B indicate 
density of public and private preschools, respectively. Scatterplot of preschool densities across 290 
districts, as they existed in 1993, over time are shown in blue hollow circles. Red triangles indicate 
the average density of preschools across 290 districts per year. Districts often split over time; by 
2014, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, we maintain the 1993 district boundaries to allow 





Figure 2.4. Average work participation of mothers with preschool-aged children in high and low preschool growth districts 
Note: Sample is restricted to mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6) in PODES years. High preschool growth districts are 
defined as districts that at least double the density of preschools between 2003 and 2014. Median public and private preschool density 
growth between 2003 and 2004 are 85 and 92 percent, respectively. Panel A shows average employment across high and low public 
preschool density growth districts; Panel B shows the parallel for private preschools. Pre-trends and post-trends denote employment 




Figure 2.5. Average work participation of mothers with and without preschool-aged children in high and low preschool 
growth districts 
Note: Sample includes eligible mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6) and non-eligible women without any preschool-aged 
children in PODES years. Non-eligible women include non-mothers and mothers with children outside of preschool ages. High 
preschool growth districts are defined as districts that at least double the density of preschools between 2003 and 2014. Median public 
and private preschool density growth between 2003 and 2004 are 85 and 92 percent, respectively. Panel A shows average employment 
across high and low public preschool density growth districts; Panel B shows the parallel for private preschools. Pre-trends and post-
trends denote employment trends before and after National System Education Act was passed in 2003, respectively. Solid lines indicate 
eligible mothers and dashed lines indicate non-eligible mothers. Solid symbols indicate high-growth districts and hollow symbols 




Figure 2.6. Average work participation of mothers whose first child is preschool-aged (ages 3-6) and mothers whose first child 
is too young for preschools (ages 0-2) in high and low preschool growth districts 
Note: Sample includes eligible mothers whose first child is preschool-aged (age 3-6) and non-eligible mothers whose first child is too 
young for preschools (ages 0-2) in PODES years. High preschool growth districts are defined as districts that at least double the density 
of preschools between 2003 and 2014. Median public and private preschool density growth between 2003 and 2004 are 85 and 92 
percent, respectively. Panel A shows average employment across high and low public preschool density growth districts; Panel B shows 
the parallel for private preschools. Pre-trends and post-trends denote employment trends before and after National System Education 
Act was passed in 2003, respectively. Solid lines indicate eligible mothers and dashed lines indicate non-eligible mothers. Solid symbols 






Figure 2.7. Effect of preschools on mothers’ choice of occupation 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of public/private 
preschool density in one’s district of residence and a dummy for having a preschool-eligible child 
on the probability of being employed in a certain occupation, standardized in z-scores to allow 
visual comparison across occupation categories. IFLS collects 2-digit occupation codes; we group 
occupations by their headings (see Table 2.8 for a list of top-3 occupations per heading). 95 percent 
confidence intervals are represented by horizontal lines. See Table 2.7 for non-standardized effect 













Figure 2.8. Effect of preschools on mothers’ choice of industry 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of public/private 
preschool density in one’s district of residence and a dummy for having a preschool-eligible child 
on the probability of being employed in a certain industry, standardized in z-scores to allow visual 
comparison across industry categories. IFLS collects 1-digit industry codes (see Table 2.10 for a 
list of top-3 occupations per industry code). 95 percent confidence intervals are represented by 
















Figure 2.9. Effect of public preschools on mothers’ work participation by child’s age 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of public preschool 
density in one’s district of residence and child’s age. Children aged 18 and older are lumped in 18-
year-old child group. Treatment effects are interpreted relative to the omitted group: non-mothers. 
Blue spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Green line shows average work participation 




Figure 2.10. Effect of private preschools on mothers’ work participation by child’s age 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of private preschool 
density in one’s district of residence and child’s age. Children aged 18 and older are lumped in 18-
year-old child group. Treatment effects are interpreted relative to the omitted group: non-mothers. 
Blue spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Green line shows average work participation 




Figure 2.11. Event study on the effect of public preschools on mothers’ work participation 
by first child’s age relative to pre-preschool-age level 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of public preschool 
density in one’s district of residence and first child’s age. Mother’s work participations are 
averaged at the tails; 6 and more years prior to the first childbirth and when the first child was 18 
and older. Treatment effects are interpreted relative to the omitted year prior to the first child’s age 




Figure 2.12. Event study on the effect of private preschools on mothers’ work participation 
by first child’s age relative to pre-preschool-age level 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of private preschool 
density in one’s district of residence and first child’s age. Mother’s work participations are 
averaged at the tails; 6 and more years prior to the first childbirth and when the first child was 18 
and older. Treatment effects are interpreted relative to the omitted year prior to the first child’s age 





Table 2.1. Summary statistics  
 Obs Mean SD 
Panel A: Individual-year means    
Age 227,579 31.57 11.20 
Have preschool-aged child 227,579 0.30 0.46 
Work participation 227,559 0.52 0.50 
Public preschool density (Inferred in-between) 226,420 0.16 0.22 
Private preschool density (Inferred in-between) 226,420 4.60 3.25 
Public preschool density (Linear projection) 227,579 0.15 0.21 
Private preschool density (Linear projection) 227,579 4.45 3.16 
Urban 227,579 0.51 0.50 
Panel B: Individual-year means (PODES years only)    
Age 77,318 31.98 11.22 
Have preschool-aged child 77,318 0.30 0.46 
Work participation 77,312 0.53 0.50 
Public preschool density 76,957 0.16 0.22 
Private preschool density 76,957 4.52 3.22 
Urban 77,318 0.51 0.50 
Panel C: Individual means    
Number of surveys 10,340 3.54 1.13 
Number of years 10,340 22.01 5.00 
Number of PODES years 10,340 7.48 1.46 
Age of first marriage 10,329 20.23 4.59 
Age of first birth 10,337 22.13 4.52 
Number of children 10,340 2.74 1.59 
Years of education 10,140 7.75 4.39 
Panel D: District-year means (PODES years only)    
Number of districts 290   
Public preschool density 2,559 0.24 0.35 
Private preschool density 2,559 4.18 3.24 
Public preschool count 2,592 10.27 14.11 
Private preschool count 2,592 227.48 243.76 
Child age 3-6 population 2,566 61,206 56,815 
Notes: We constructed individual-year panel of mothers aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. Panel 
A describes the pooled observations of mothers across all the observed years. Panel B describes the 
pooled observations of mothers in PODES years only. Panel C describes unique observations of 
individual mothers. Panel A, B, and C are constructed from IFLS 1-5. Panel D is constructed from 
multiple rounds of PODES and Susenas from 1990-2014, as described in Section 2.3. Panel D describes 
pooled observations of districts across PODES and Susenas years. Preschool counts are obtained from 
PODES and child age 3-6 population from Susenas; densities are defined as preschool count divided 
by 1,000 children in the district. Districts often split over time; by 2014, there were 511 districts. In 
our analyses, we maintain the 1993 district boundaries to allow comparisons over time. 
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Table 2.2. Comparison of effects of preschool availability on maternal employment across econometric strategies 
 Work participation 
Econometric strategy: DD  DDD  DDD-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public         




























         
Panel B: Private         




























         
Observations 22,737 22,737  76,951 76,951  76,951 76,951 
Mean 0.538 0.538  0.534 0.534  0.534 0.534 
District Trend  X   X   X 
Note: Sample in column 1-2 is restricted to mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample in column 3-6 includes mothers 
with and without preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Column 1-2 regress work participation on preschool density in a difference-in-
differences (DD) strategy (Section 2.4.1). Column 3-4 regress work participation on preschool density, a dummy for having a preschool-
aged child, and the interaction between the two in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy (Section 2.4.2). Column 5-
6 builds on the DDD strategy and adds individual fixed effect (DDD-FE) to allow comparison within-mothers (Section 2.4.3). Column 
2, 4, 6 add district-specific trends. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an urban residence dummy. Panel 
A and B look at the effect of public and private preschool densities separately. Standard errors clustered at the district-level is shown in 
parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Observations, work participation means, 




Table 2.3. Effect of preschool availability on maternal employment with various preschool data 
 Work participation 
Preschool data: PODES years only  Infer in-between  Linear projection 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Public 























































Panel B: Private 

























































Method DD DDD DDD-FE  DD DDD DDD-FE  DD DDD DDD-FE 
Observations 22,737 76,951 76,951  67,431 226,400 226,400  67,788 227,559 227,559 
Mean 0.538 0.534 0.534  0.529 0.520 0.520  0.530 0.521 0.521 
Note: Column 1-3 are restricted to PODES years only. Column 4-6 infer preschool data in-between PODES years using the closest upper year 
available, e.g. year 1992 sandwiched between PODES 1990 and 1993 will use 1993 round. Column 7-9 predict preschool density using linear 
projection with the closest two data points available, e.g. year 1992 fits a linear projection using preschool density data in PODES 1990 and 
1993. Column 1, 4, 7 regress work participation on preschool density in DD method. Column 2, 5, 8 regress work participation on the interaction 
of preschool density and preschool eligibility dummy in DDD method. Column 3, 6, 9 add individual fixed effect to the DDD method. All 
regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an urban residence dummy; and do not include district-specific trends. Panel A 
and B look at the effect of public and private preschool densities separately. Standard errors clustered at the district-level is shown in parentheses; 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  Observations and dependent variable means are indicated in 
the last two rows. 
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Table 2.4. Effect of preschool availability on maternal employment depending on which child is preschool-aged eligible 
 Work participation 
Eligible Child Any  Oldest  Youngest 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public        




































Panel B: Private        




































Method DDD DDD-FE  DDD DDD-FE  DDD DDD-FE 
Note: Sample includes all mothers with and without a preschool-aged eligible child (age 3-6). Comparison group includes non-
mothers and mothers of children with the wrong ages. Definition of eligibility varies across columns. Column 1-2 define 
eligibility pertaining to any child, column 3-4 to the oldest child, and column 5-6 to the youngest child. All columns regress 
work participation on preschool density, preschool eligibility dummy, and their interaction. All regressions include district, year, 
and an urban residence dummy. Odd-numbered columns are estimated using DDD method. Even-numbered columns add 
individual fixed effects in DDD-FE method. Standard errors clustered at the district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. There are 226,400 observations in all columns. 
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Table 2.5. Effect of preschool availability on maternal employment with different comparison groups 
 Work participation 
Eligible Child Oldest  Youngest 
Comparison Cohort 0-2 7-12 All  0-2 7-12 All 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 


















































Observations 49,067 69,329 226,400  54,661 58,653 226,400 
Mean 0.445 0.520 0.520  0.548 0.640 0.520 
Note: Sample includes eligible mothers whose first/last child are aged 3-6 (preschool-aged) and comparison mothers whose first/last child 
are aged as indicated in the column heading. Ages 0-2 are too young for preschools and ages 7-12 are primary school ages. The ‘All’ 
columns include mothers of children aged 0-2, 7-12, 13+, and non-mothers in the comparison group. Column 1-3 define eligibility 
pertaining to the oldest child only and column 4-6 to the youngest child only. All columns regress work participation on preschool density, 
preschool eligibility dummy, and their interaction; only interacted coefficients are reported. All regressions include district and year fixed 
effects, and an urban residence dummy. Estimation strategy used is indicated at each row. Standard errors clustered at the district-level is 
shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Number of observations and 
means of work participation for each column are indicated in the last two rows. 
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Table 2.6. Effect of preschool availability on female’s work status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











Panel A: Public      






























FDR q-value 0.435 0.299 0.299 0.435 0.002 
Panel B: Private      
































FDR q-value 0.204 0.204 0.992 0.992 0.992 
Observations 225,985 226,400 226,400 226,400 226,400 
Mean 0.077 0.172 0.037 0.185 0.125 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each column regresses the dependent variable indicated in column 
heading on the density of public (Panel A) or private (Panel B) preschools, defined as the number 
of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 in each district, a dummy for having 
a preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. Comparison group includes all mothers of 
children of the wrong ages and non-mothers. All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, 
urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at 
district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on 
unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values for the interaction coefficient of preschool density and eligible 
child are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in the last row of each panel. FDR q-values 
indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Number of female-year 




Table 2.7. Effect of preschool availability on female’s occupation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Professional Manager Clerk Sales Service Agricultural Production 
Panel A: Public        












































FDR q-value 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.821 0.108 0.884 
Panel B: Private        












































FDR q-value 0.860 0.399 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.055 
Observations 226,400 226,400 226,400 226,400 226,400 226,400 226,400 
Mean 0.046 0.001 0.030 0.143 0.104 0.177 0.073 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool data in-between PODES years. Each column 
regresses the dummy for being employed in a certain occupation category indicated in column heading on the density of public (Panel A) or 
private (Panel B) preschools, defined as the number of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 in each district, a dummy 
for having a preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. Comparison group includes all mothers of children of the wrong ages and 
non-mothers. All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered at district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values 
for the interaction coefficient of preschool density and eligible child are computed over all 7 outcomes and are shown in the last row of each 
panel. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Number of female-year observations and means of 
dependent variables are indicated in the last two rows. See Table 2.8 for a list of top-3 occupations per category. 
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Table 2.8. List of top-3 occupations within each occupation category 
Occupation categories N  Percent  
(within 
category) 
Professionals   
Teachers 7,073 67.43 
Nurses, midwives, x-ray technicians, traditional medicine 1,500 14.30 
Workers in religion 591 5.63 
Managers   
Managers 236 69.62 
Administrator unknown 44 12.98 
Legislative officials and government administrators 31 9.14 
Clerical workers   
Bookkeepers, cashiers, and related workers 2,965 43.53 
Clerical and related workers not elsewhere classified 1,983 29.11 
Government executive of officials 935 13.73 
Sales workers   
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 26,727 82.50 
Working proprietors (wholesale and retail trade) 4,298 13.27 
Insurance, real estate, securities and business services 
salesman and auctioneers 
507 1.57 
Service workers   
Maids and related housekeeping service workers NEC 10,027 42.48 
Working proprietors (catering and lodging services) 7,068 29.94 
Cooks, waiters, bartenders and related workers 4,002 16.95 
Agricultural workers   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 37,450 92.52 
Planters and farmers 1,110 2.74 
Forestry workers 1,004 2.48 
Production workers   
Tailors, dressmakers, sewer, upholsterers and related 
workers 
6,466 39.21 
Food and beverage processors 5,299 32.14 
Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers, and related workers 2,201 13.35 
Notes: Occupation categories are indicated in bold. Top-3 labeled 2-digit occupation codes within 
each category are listed. Number of female-year observations and percentage share within each 
category are indicated on the second and third columns. 
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Table 2.9. Effect of preschool availability on female’s industry 







Trade Logistic Finance Social 
Panel A: Public          






















































FDR q-value 0.754 0.323 0.754 0.149 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.323 
Panel B: Private          
























































FDR q-value 0.872 0.872 0.747 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 
Observations 224,925 224,925 224,925 224,925 224,925 224,925 224,925 224,925 224,925 
Mean 0.098 0.001 0.049 0.000 0.002 0.098 0.001 0.003 0.064 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool data in-between PODES years. Each column 
regresses the dummy for being employed in a certain industry category indicated in column heading on the density of public (Panel A) or private 
(Panel B) preschools, defined as the number of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 in each district, a dummy for having 
a preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. Comparison group includes all mothers of children of the wrong ages and non-mothers. 
All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at 
district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values for the interaction 
coefficient of preschool density and eligible child are computed over all 9 outcomes and are shown in the last row of each panel. FDR q-values 
indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Number of female-year observations and means of dependent variables are 
indicated in the last two rows. See Table 2.10 for a list of top-3 occupations per category. 
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Table 2.10. List of top-3 occupations within each industry category 
Industry categories N  Percent  
(within 
category) 
Agriculture   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 19,882 87.16 
Planters and farmers 525 2.30 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 380 1.67 
Mining   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 207 30.94 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 101 15.10 
Miners, quarrymen, well drillers and related workers 81 12.11 
Manufacturing   
Tailors, dressmakers, sewer, upholsterers and related workers 2,354 20.19 
Food and beverage processors 1,812 15.54 
Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers, and related workers 1,078 9.25 
Utility   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 191 32.05 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 94 15.77 
Bookkeepers, cashiers, and related workers 44 7.38 
Construction   
Bricklayers, carpenters and other construction workers 241 25.56 
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 192 20.36 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 92 9.76 
Trade   
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 12,766 56.33 
Working proprietors (catering and lodging services) 3,168 13.98 
Working proprietors (wholesale and retail trade) 2,080 9.18 
Logistics   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 196 26.52 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 98 13.26 
Bookkeepers, cashiers, and related workers 48 6.50 
Finance   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 206 17.88 
Insurance, real estate, securities and business services salesman 
and auctioneers 
143 12.41 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 107 9.29 
Social   
Teachers 4,201 27.80 
Maids and related housekeeping service workers NEC 3,499 23.16 
Nurses, midwives, x-ray technicians, traditional medicine 693 4.59 
Notes: Industry categories are indicated in bold. Top-3 labeled 2-digit occupation codes within 
each category are listed. Number of female-year observations and percentage share within each 




Table 2.11. Complementarity, substitutability, and equality of public and private 
preschools 
 Work Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
























































Public = Private (p-value)   0.000 0.000 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each column regresses work participation on the density of public 
and private (Panel B) preschools, defined as the number of preschools divided by the population 
of children aged 3-6 in each district, a dummy for having a preschool-aged eligible child, and 
the respective double and triple interactions. Comparison group includes all mothers of children 
of the wrong ages and non-mothers. All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, urban 
dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at district 
level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted p-
values. The last row tests the equality of ‘Public * Eligible’ and ‘Private * Eligible’ coefficients 




Table 2.12. Effect of preschool availability on female’s work participation by birth order 
 
Work Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Child’s birth order: First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth 
Panel A: Public       




































FDR q-value 0.001 0.001 0.095 0.587 0.587 0.587 
Panel B: Private       




































FDR q-value 0.548 0.135 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.581 
Observations 226,400 187,376 110,371 57,258 28,857 15,460 
Mean 0.520 0.526 0.538 0.550 0.555 0.558 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool data 
in-between PODES years. Each column regresses the work participation on a dummy that first child (or 
second, third, and so on) is preschool-aged eligible, the density of public (Panel A) or private (Panel B) 
preschools, defined as the number of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 in each 
district, and their interaction. Comparison group includes all mothers of children of the wrong ages and 
non-mothers. All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, urban dummy, district, year, and 
individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at district level. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values for the interaction 
coefficient of preschool density and eligible child are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in 
the last row of each panel. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant 
tests. Number of female-year observations and means of dependent variables are indicated in the last 
two rows. Number of observations fall with higher child’s birth order because sample is further 




Table 2.13. Heterogeneous effects of preschool availability on female’s work participation 
by average preschool enrollment in district of residence 
 Work participation 
 DDD  DDD-FE 












 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 


















































































Observations 23,076 11,982 2,489  23,076 11,982 2,489 
Mean 0.583 0.639 0.583  0.583 0.639 0.583 
Note: Sample includes all mothers with and without any preschool-aged eligible child (age 3-6). 
Comparison group includes non-mothers and mothers of children with the wrong ages. Sample is 
restricted to PODES years with preschool enrollment data (2003, 2005, 2011, 2014). Preschool 
enrollment is defined among children aged 3-6. Median preschool enrollment rate at the district-level is 
15.6 percent and the 99th percentile at 49.8 percent. Median preschool enrollment rate at the individual-
level is 17.2 percent. All columns regress work participation on preschool density, preschool eligibility 
dummy, and their interaction. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an 
urban residence dummy. DDD excludes while DDD-FE includes individual fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered at the district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Number of observations and work participation means 




Table 2.14. Heterogeneous effects of preschool availability on female’s work participation by educational attainment 
 Work participation 
 DDD  DDD-FE 








 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Public          
Num. kindergartens 

















































Panel B: Private          
Num. kindergartens 

















































Observations 58,976 61,541 35,362 67,034  58,976 61,541 35,362 67,034 
Mean 0.613 0.514 0.441 0.494  0.613 0.514 0.441 0.494 
Note: Sample includes all mothers with and without any preschool-aged eligible child (age 3-6). Comparison group includes non-mothers 
and mothers of children with the wrong ages. Each column is restricted to individuals with lifetime educational attainment as indicated in 
the column heading. All columns regress work participation on preschool density, preschool eligibility dummy, and their interaction. All 
regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an urban residence dummy. DDD excludes while DDD-FE includes 
individual fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
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CHAPTER 3: MINIMUM WAGE AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT:  
EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
According to International Labour Organization (ILO), 94 percent of countries in the world 
have some form of minimum wage laws.86 Nonetheless, minimum wage remains a divisive policy 
in politics and academic discussions. Neumark and Wascher (1995c) argue that while the primary 
attention on net employment effects is attractive in its simplicity, it does not adequately capture 
the overall welfare consequences of minimum wage policies. It is equally important to address, for 
example, how minimum wages affect skill formation,87 which in turn could have long-term labor 
market consequences (Neumark and Nizalova 2007).  
The effect of minimum wage policies on school enrollment (Ragan 1977; Chaplin, Turner, 
and Pape 2003; Neumark and Wascher 2003; Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson 2005; Smith 2014) 
is closely related to labor market outcomes: equilibrium wages and employment. Minimum wages 
can affect educational choice directly by raising opportunity costs to school enrollment, which in 
turn could induce an earlier exit from schooling (Morissette, Chan, and Lu 2015; Cascio and 
Narayan 2017; Shah and Steinberg 2017). Particularly, if the effect on employment is minimal 
(Card and Krueger 1994; Alatas and Cameron 2008; Hohberg and Lay 2015), workers can earn 
higher wages with a similar probability of getting hired. If minimum wage increases are coupled 
with a fall in employment, households that can afford the opportunity costs of schooling will delay 
                                                 
86 Slate Magazine (http://goo.gl/bdtoV1) illustrates availability of minimum wage policies across the globe. 
87 While this paper focuses on pre-employment training, minimum wages could also affect on-the-job training. See 
for example, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) and Neumark and Wascher (2001) for discussions on the effects of 
minimum wages on on-the-job training. 
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exit from school, acquire skills, and enter a less-crowded high-skilled labor market in the future 
(Ehrenberg and Marcus 1982).  
On the other hand, minimum wages could raise the returns to schooling, thereby increasing 
the incentives to stay enrolled. Moreover, if we consider schooling as a household decision, then 
minimum wage hikes may increase parental wages, which leads to increased demand for schooling 
for their children. Finally, raising the wage floor may increase productivity requirements (Agell 
and Lommerud 1997), thereby inducing a substitution of high- for low-skilled youth into the labor 
force (Neumark and Wascher 1995a; Pacheco and Cruickshank 2007). High-skilled youth that 
were in school drop out to earn minimum wage jobs, while low-skilled youth that do not meet 
minimum productivity requirements are laid off but will not attend schooling regardless (Neumark 
and Wascher 1995b). 
In this paper, I complement studies of the effects of minimum wages on enrollment in a 
developing country context, where minimum wage compliance is questionable and the informal 
sector is sizable.88 Leveraging annual variations in minimum wages across provinces in Indonesia, 
I study the effect of minimum wages on school enrollment of individuals under 30 in a difference-
in-differences framework. I use repeated cross-sections of Indonesia’s Labor Force Survey 
(SAKERNAS) from 1994 to 2009, totaling more than 2.7 million observations of individuals aged 
10–30. Despite growing more than nine-fold in nominal terms throughout the 16-year window, I 
find that minimum wages do not have any statistically significant effects on school enrollment. 
The null effects are precisely estimated. I could rule out enrollment elasticities smaller than -0.0073 
and larger than 0.027 for ages 10–30. For upper secondary education ages (16–18), which are, 
                                                 
88 Empirical studies of minimum wage in developing countries still primarily focus on employment effects. See for 
example, Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012); Magruder (2013). 
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arguably, most vulnerable to minimum wage hikes since the legal age to work is 15,89 I could rule 
out enrollment elasticities smaller than -0.0036 and larger than 0.095. In real terms, I could rule 
out enrollment elasticities smaller than -0.024 and larger than 0.015 for ages 10–30 and enrollment 
elasticities smaller than -0.025 and larger than 0.073 for upper secondary education ages. I could 
similarly rule out very small employment effects on youths. The effects did not seem to differ by 
parents’ educational attainment and work status. 
In the next section, I discuss minimum wage policies in Indonesia in more detail. In 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I discuss the data and the empirical strategy, respectively. I discuss the 
findings in Section 3.5 and heterogeneity and robustness checks in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 
concludes this paper. 
 
3.2. Minimum wages in Indonesia 
Minimum wage policies in Indonesia had their beginning as early as 1973, when a 
minimum daily wages were mandated. A total of 50 to 60 percent of minimum wage levels were 
accounted by the measure of minimum physical needs (KFM), a basket of consumption goods 
deemed essential for an unmarried worker (Rama 2001). The rest factored in existing wage 
structures, firms’ capacity to pay, labor market conditions, and economic growth (Suryahadi et. al. 
2003). Minimum wages varied spatially but they were not updated regularly, such that it began to 
lose its value over time (Manning 1998). In the early 1990s, global media highlighted the 
‘sweatshop’ activities of garment and apparel industries in developing countries, including 
Indonesia, which led to the United States government threatening to withdraw Indonesia's 
                                                 
89 Chaplin, Turner, and Paper (2003) suggest that mandatory schooling laws mitigate the negative enrollment effects 
caused by minimum wage hikes. 
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Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that provided preferential trade status in terms of lower 
export duties (Harrison and Scorse 2006). Manning (1998) noted that the potential cost of GSP 
withdrawal was small, but the Indonesian government responded positively and revamped their 
minimum wage laws. 
 Following the appointment of a new Minister of Manpower in 1993, minimum wage levels 
increased substantially in all provinces, and starting from 1994, the law regulated minimum 
monthly wages (Rama 2001). Implementation was enforced on firms with larger than 25 
employees with the help of the military (Manning 1998). Since the monetary fine was trivial, 
compliance was driven mainly by public shaming in newspapers and opportunity cost of going to 
courts to answer for violations. Minimum wage levels were proposed by provincial governments—
taking into account recommendations from tripartite councils in each province, representing 
employers, employees, and the government—but had to be ratified by the Ministry of Manpower 
in the capital, Jakarta. Later in 1996, the underlying measure of minimum physical needs was 
replaced by minimum subsistence needs (KHM), which covered a broader set of consumption 
goods and resulted in a baseline 15–20 percent higher than the previous definition (Rama 2001). 
For instance, KHM targeted a minimum daily intake of 3,000 calories per day compared to 2,600 
calories per day under its predecessor, the KFM (Suryahadi et. al. 2003). 
The East Asian Crisis of 1997 ensnared Indonesia into devastating political and economic 
turmoil, which eventually led to the fall of President Suharto's centralized regime in 1998. A new 
democratic government was elected in 1999 and after decades of top-down governance, there were 
pressures to decentralize power, including minimum wage legislation. Effective from 2001, the 
authority to set minimum wage levels was transferred to provincial governments (Suryahadi et. al. 
2003). Provincial governments, still taking advice from provincial tripartite councils, could set 
137 
 
minimum wage levels without needing ratification from the Ministry of Manpower. Two years 
later, the Indonesian government revised the determinant of minimum wage levels and introduced 
the more generous minimum decency living (KHL) measure broader than its predecessor, KHM.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates geographical variations in minimum wages over time. Provinces in 
the top minimum wage quartile in 1994 did not always stay in the top quartile in subsequent years; 
provinces transition across minimum wage quartiles over time. Nominal minimum wages also 
increased substantially over time. Between 1994 and 2001, the top minimum wage quartile 
increased by 318–333 percent, while the bottom quartile increased 302–333 percent. Massive 
increases in nominal minimum wages barely slowed down between 2001 and 2009: the top quartile 
increased by 281–291 percent and the bottom quartile by 259–294 percent.  
Figure 3.2 shows the average nominal and real minimum wages over the years 1990–2014. 
Average nominal minimum wages exhibited a non-linear increase over time, while average real 
minimum wages grew linearly apart from the dip during East Asian crisis years (1997–1999), 
which substantially increased prices of consumption goods and eroded purchasing power. In recent 
years, minimum wages had become a salient public policy, often drawing large-scale strikes from 
labor unions to exert an upward pressure on minimum wages, resulting in a steeper increase 
between 2011 and 2014. 
Figure 3.3 shows that annual growth in nominal minimum wages was sufficiently higher 
than growth in prices. Real annual growth was near zero only in 2005 and negative only during 
the crisis years. Nominal minimum wages grew at an average of 16.8 percent per year between 
1990 and 2014, much higher than the 4.9 and 3.4 percent annual growth in GDP and GDP per 
capita, respectively.90 Figure 3.4, however, shows that minimum wages remain aspirational for 
                                                 
90 National GDP and GDP per capita growth are obtained from FRED (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/), accessed on 
September 14, 2018.  
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many workers, with many still earning below the stipulated minimum wage levels. Compliance 
seemed to improve between 1994 and 2004, with an increasing portion of the density distribution 
falling to the right of the minimum wage line, but compliance seemed to significantly regress in 
2009, worse than in 1994. Appendix Figure E.1 shows compliance over time by age group.  
Prior empirical studies on minimum wages in Indonesia have focused on employment 
effects. Beginning with Rama (2001), who finds that minimum wage hikes led to an increase in 
average wages and a small decrease in urban wage employment. These findings were challenged 
by Islam and Nazara (2000), who suggest that if Indonesia could maintain a 4 percent annual 
growth, real minimum wages could be increased by 24 percent annually without incurring net job 
losses. Subsequent studies, however, suggest that minimum wages have heterogenous impacts on 
employment. Suryahadi et. al. (2003) find a disemployment effect on the urban formal sector, 
particularly among women, young, and low-educated workers. Similarly, del Carpio et al. (2015) 
find disemployment effects within firms, especially among small firms and for non-production, 
less-educated, and female workers. 
Alatas and Cameron (2008), comparing two contiguous provinces in a difference-in-
differences setup à la Card and Krueger (1994), find no disemployment effect among large firms 
but a negative employment effect on small domestic firms. Combining difference-in-differences 
and spatial discontinuity methods, Magruder (2013) finds that minimum wages act as a “big push,” 
by increasing formal sector employment and decreasing informal sector employment. This finding 
is in contrast to Comola and de Mello (2011), who use a fixed effects method and find that 
minimum wages, in fact, led to a net increase in employment because the increase in informal 
sector employment more than compensated for job losses in the formal sector. Chun and Khor 
(2010) find that minimum wages significantly increase wages of formal workers earning below 
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the minimum wage but reduce formal sector employment throughout the wage distribution. 
Hohberg and Lay (2015) confirm that minimum wages increase formal sector wages but find no 
statistically significant negative effects on formal employment. Increase in average wages and 
variations in employment effects depending on labor market segmentation suggest that minimum 
wages could plausibly affect the school enrollment calculus. 
 
3.3. Data 
To study the contemporaneous effects of minimum wage on school enrollment, I pool 
annual cross sections of Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) in Indonesia between 1994 and 2009. 
Between 1994 and 2004, SAKERNAS was conducted annually. Between 2005 and 2009, 
SAKERNAS was conducted biannually/tri-annually. In those cases, I only use the August round 
to maintain consistency with previous years. SAKERNAS provides accounts of employment 
status, type, wage, school participation, and basic demographic characteristics, such as age and 
gender. For any given year, SAKERNAS has between 90,000 and 860,000 observations of 
individuals aged 10 or older, totaling 5.3 million observations across the sampled timeframe. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the average school enrollment and work participation rate by age. I restrict 
the analysis to individuals under 30, because school enrollment is virtually zero by that age. 
 Table 3.1 describes the SAKERNAS data used. Column 1 restricts the analysis to 
individuals aged 10–30. Column 2 restricts the analysis to ages 12–15, which coincides with the 
recommended lower secondary education ages. Column 3 to ages 16–18, coinciding with 
recommended upper secondary education ages, and Column 4 to ages 19–24, coinciding with 
tertiary education ages. There are 2,769,800 observations in Column 1, 597,633 observations in 
Column 2, 427,334 in Column 3, and 715,152 in Column 4. Gender is nearly equally balanced in 
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all groups, while urban residence increases with age. Likelihood of school enrollment decreases 
with age, while years of schooling naturally increases with age. A total of 87 percent of individuals 
aged 12–15 are still enrolled in school, while only 55 and 14 percent are still enrolled in school 
among ages 16–18 and 19–24, respectively. The average enrollment among ages 10–30 is 41 
percent. Note that ages 12–15 coincide with lower secondary education ages, hence, most 
individuals in that age range have only completed primary education. Similarly, individuals aged 
16–18 are more likely to have completed lower secondary education and individuals aged 19–24 
upper secondary education. Tertiary education includes two-year colleges; hence, it is possible for 
individuals aged 19–24 to hold a tertiary education diploma. Nevertheless, only 4 percent of the 
individuals have completed tertiary education. Age-for-grade is a dummy defined as 1 for 
individuals aged 22 and under that have completed the recommended levels of education by the 
individual’s age. It decreases with age because enrollment decreases and grade retention increases 
with education levels. 
Labor market outcomes generally improve with age. Only 10 percent of individuals aged 
12–15 work, but work participation increases to 29 and 52 percent for ages 16–18 and 19–24, 
respectively. Wages are reported per month in 1,000 IDR increments. Wages are adjusted for 
inflation using provincial consumer price index (CPI) with 2012 base year from BPS to allow 
comparison across provinces with different costs of living and purchasing power. In 2012, 1 USD 
was equivalent to 9,670 IDR. Average real wage for ages 12–15 is 135,380 IDR, or $14, per month. 
Real wages more than double for ages 16-18 to 300,750 IDR ($31.10) per month, and almost 
double again for ages 19–24 to 580,540 IDR ($60.03). The last four rows in Table 3.1 look at the 
four quadrants of enrollment and employment dummies. Being both enrolled and employed is 
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quite unlikely, with less than 5 percent of the sample in that quadrant. Exclusive employment and 
idleness increase with age, while exclusive enrollment decreases with age. 
Minimum wage levels across time and provinces from 1997–2009 are obtained from 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). Minimum wage data from 1994–1996 are graciously provided 
by Dr. Asep Suryahadi at the SMERU Research Institute. Nominal minimum wage levels are 
normalized with the provincial consumer price index (CPI) in 2012 Rupiah from BPS to allow 
comparisons across provinces with different costs of living and purchasing power. Figure 3.2 
depicts average monthly minimum wage levels across time in real and nominal terms. Note that 
the real minimum wage increases linearly from 1994–2009 with dip points during the 1997–1999 
crisis, which is likely caused by higher prices. 
 
3.4. Empirical Strategy 
Empirical studies of minimum wage are usually characterized by two different approaches: 
(1) national-level studies utilizing all cross-state variations in minimum wages over time (Neumark 
and Wascher 1992, 2007) and (2) quasi-experiment type studies comparing few contiguous states 
around a policy change (Card and Krueger 1994, 2000; Powers 2009).91 The first approach benefits 
from having a wider external validity because it leverages all variations across all states. The latter 
offers a more focused approach: comparing proximate and, arguably, more comparable states, 
hence, minimizing unobserved spatial heterogeneity. Recent advances attempt to combine the best 
of both worlds by generalizing a proximate areas comparison approach whist still leveraging all 
variations across all states (e.g., Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010; Allegretto, Dube, and Reich 2011; 
                                                 
91 See Card and Krueger (1995) and Neumark and Wascher (1992, 2007) for more comprehensive reviews of the 
vast studies on minimum wage. 
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Magruder 2013; Belman and Wolfson 2014). Nevertheless, Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014) 
still suggest caution in using proximity studies, because they may inadvertently discard “good” 
identifying variations and maintain “bad” contaminates. 
In this section, I explain how I estimate the effect of minimum wages on school enrollment 
in Indonesia by leveraging all cross-province and year variations in minimum wage levels in a 
difference-in-differences setup. Identification by difference-in-differences assumes that school 
enrollment trends are not systematically different across regions with different minimum wage 
levels absent the difference in minimum wages. Potential reverse causality, in the sense that 
representatives of the government, employers, and employees deciding minimum wage laws with 
school enrollment in mind, may be less concerning. However, school enrollment and human 
capital stocks in a given province are intricately linked with local labor market conditions. 
Provinces with higher enrollment rates may need to set a higher minimum wage laws to pay 
workers according to their higher level of productivity.  
The common trends assumption is more likely to hold if minimum wages are affected by 
external pressures. Section 3.2 above suggests that there are several unanticipated changes to 
minimum wage laws in Indonesia, such as in 1994 when the U.S. threatened to withdraw 
Indonesia’s preferential trade agreement, which prompted a major revamping of minimum wage 
policies. In 2001, decentralization reform transferred the authority to set minimum wage laws from 
the federal to provincial governments. In the 1994 and 2001 episodes, the average annual growth 
of minimum wages was more than 30 percent in nominal and 20 percent in real terms, respectively 
(Figure 3.3). While the government is responsible for conducting annual survey of prices of basket 
of goods to meet minimum needs, the composition of the basket also changed in 1996 and 2003. 
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Moreover, the correlation between basket prices and actual minimum wage levels is not perfect, 
which suggests that external pressures also play a role in determining minimum wages.  
Figure 3.6 illustrates the plausibility of this assumption. It shows four panels of enrollment 
rates between 1994 and 2009: for ages 10–30, lower secondary education ages (12–15), upper 
secondary education ages (16–18), and tertiary education ages (19–24). Enrollment rates are 
shown for aggregated provinces with higher or lower than median growth in minimum wages 
within this sample period. Despite the diverging trend of average minimum wages across the high 
and low areas since year 2000 (Appendix Figure E.2), enrollment rates for all four age groups in 
the two regions are quite similar across the entire window of observation. Indeed, there is no 
distinguishable difference in the pre-trends before year 2000 and no distinguishable difference in 
the post-trends, suggesting that minimum wages may have no effect on enrollment rates. 
To formalize that finding, I estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾 𝑀𝑊𝑝𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜓 𝑿𝒊 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is enrollment outcome of individual i in province p in district j in year t, and 𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 is 
log minimum wage in province p in year t. The district fixed effect 𝜇𝑗 accounts for pre-existing 
regional disparities and local labor market conditions that do not vary over time. While district 
fixed effects control for level differences in school enrollment rates, districts may still grow at 
spuriously differential rates. In the subsequent results section, I show that district-specific trends 
are important explanatory variables that need to be included in the model. The year fixed effect, 
𝜙𝑡, accounts for nationwide economic characteristics, such as the economic crisis in 1997–1998 
and other biases pertaining to the survey data. For instance, in 2006, I note that the raw average 
enrollment rate is only 9 percent, which is far lower than the average enrollment rates in the years 
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immediately preceding and proceeding it at 22 percent.92 The vector 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 includes individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, and urban residence. Standard errors are clustered at the policy 
group level, namely the province. Instead of clustering at the policy group, it may be pertinent to 
cluster at the more local labor market: district-level. In Section 3.6.4, I discuss how the results 
change with different level of clustering.  
 One potential caveat to this empirical strategy is systematic sorting of individuals to 
provinces with higher minimum wages. For instance, provinces with higher minimum wages may 
attract in-migrants seeking work who are longer enrolled in school. As such, I may falsely infer 
that increase in minimum wages cause a reduction in the propensity of enrollment when minimum 
wages simply increase the population of the non-enrolled. While average cross-district migration 
is relatively high at 18 percent among individuals aged 10–30, average cross-province migration 
is much more manageable at less than 10 percent among individuals in the same age range.93 Since 
minimum wages vary at the province level, cross-province sorting is less of an issue in this context. 
 
3.5. Results 
It is posited that minimum wages affect school enrollment by: (1) increasing the 
opportunity costs of schooling, thereby reducing the probability of enrollment, (2) increasing the 
long-run returns to schooling, thereby increasing the probability of enrollment, and/or (3) 
increasing parental wages, thereby increasing the probability of enrollment. It is not clear, ex ante, 
                                                 
92 I drop year 2006 from Figure 3.6 that plots average enrollment rates over time. However, I include year 2006 in 
the regression because if the bias is equally shared among all provinces, then the year fixed effect which allows 
comparison within-year would mitigate the measurement error. In Section 3.6.4, I also present results excluding year 
2006. 
93 Average cross-district and cross-province migration rates are obtained from the Intercensal Survey (SUPAS) 2005 
by comparing individuals’ district of birth and current district of residence. Cross-province migration rates for ages 
12–15, 16–18, and 19–24 are 5.1, 6.6, and 11.1 percent, respectively. 
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which of these effects will dominate. Section 3.5.1 describes the net effect of minimum wages in 
Indonesia on school enrollment. In Section 3.5.2, I explore the effect of minimum wages on 
youth’s labor market outcomes to explain the plausibility and mechanisms, or lack thereof, of the 
school enrollment findings. 
 
3.5.1 School enrollment 
Table 3.2 reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of minimum wages 
on school enrollment for different age groups. Columns 1 and 2 restrict the analysis to individuals 
aged 10–30. Age 10 is the youngest available age in our data set and age 30 is a reasonable upper 
bound for when virtually all individuals have completed their education (see Figure 3.5 for average 
enrollment rates by age). Panel A uses log nominal minimum wages and Panel B uses log real 
minimum wages. Minimum wages are adjusted for inflation using provincial CPI with 2012 base 
year, as defined by BPS. All regressions include district, year, and individual’s age fixed effects, 
as well as dummy variables for urban/rural residence and gender. Column 1 suggests that nominal 
minimum wages may have a positive and marginally statistically significant effect, at the 10 
percent level, on school enrollment among 10–30 year olds. A 10-percent increase in nominal 
minimum wages led to a 0.31 percentage points increase in school enrollment. Adjusting for price 
differences, in Panel B, real minimum wages no longer have a statistically significant effect on 
school enrollment, albeit the effect is still positive and effect size is in the same order of magnitude: 
a 10-percent increase in real minimum wages led to a 0.23 percentage points increase in school 
enrollment.  
These effects may be driven by spurious differential trends across districts with different 
minimum wage levels. Including district-specific linear trends in Column 2 suggests that spurious 
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trends may indeed be driving the findings. A 10-percent increase in nominal and real minimum 
wages only led to a 0.04 percentage points increase and 0.02 percentage points decrease in 
enrollment, respectively, that are no longer statistically significant. I can interpret these in terms 
of enrollment elasticities by dividing the reported coefficients with mean enrollments in Table 3.1 
(for respective age ranges). Therefore, I can rule out enrollment elasticities smaller than -0.0073 
[= (0.004 - 0.007) / 0.41] and larger than 0.027 [= (0.004 + 0.007) / 0.41].  
 Restricting the analysis to individuals aged 12–15 (Columns 3–4), coinciding with lower 
secondary education ages, I note that nominal and real minimum wages do not have any 
statistically significant and sizable effects on school enrollment. A 10-percent increase in nominal 
minimum wages is associated with a 0.02–0.03 percentage points increase in enrollment and a 
similar sized increase in real minimum wages is associated with a 0.04–0.08 percentage points 
decrease in enrollment. Individuals in upper secondary education ages, aged 16–18 (Columns 5–
6), are more sensitive to changes in minimum wage. While spurious trends drive 59–73 percent of 
the estimated effects, a 10-percent increase in nominal and real minimum wages led to a 0.25 and 
0.13 percentage points increase in enrollment probability, respectively, despite being not 
statistically significant. Spurious trends in enrollment may even lead to the conclusion that nominal 
minimum wages have a positive and statistically significant effect on enrollment (Panel A, Column 
7). Accounting for differential trends, I find that the effects of minimum wages on individuals aged 
19–24, coinciding with tertiary education ages, do not have economically meaningful and 
statistically significant effects on enrollment. 
 Table 3.3 explores other measures of educational outcomes. I still look at effects of 
minimum wages on the four age groups, which are organized vertically with each column looking 
at different outcomes. All regressions include district linear trends to control for spurious trends. 
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Column 1 regresses the continuous measure of years of schooling on log minimum wages. Years 
of schooling converts highest educational attainment to equivalent grade levels completed. 
Nominal minimum wages led to positive increases in years of schooling, albeit being statistically 
significant only for individuals aged 19–24. Notably, a 10-percent increase in nominal minimum 
wages led to 0.274 extra years of schooling, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
This positive effect is also evident for real minimum wages, although it is not statistically 
significant. 
 Columns 2–5 show the effects of the minimum wage on the probability of having a certain 
level of education. Across the board, I note that individuals are less likely to hold a primary 
education diploma. Individuals aged 12–15 seem to be positively affected by minimum wages, 
pushing them upward from primary education to lower secondary education. A 10-percent increase 
in nominal and real minimum wages are associated with an 0.29 and 0.31 percentage points 
increase in the probability of having a lower secondary diploma. I do not find a parallel finding for 
individuals in upper secondary education ages (ages 16–18) and tertiary education ages (19–24). 
They are not more likely to have an upper secondary education diploma and tertiary diploma, 
respectively. Upper secondary and tertiary education dummy variables are defined only for 
individuals who could reasonably complete those education levels.94 Age-for-grade is defined as 
1 for individuals aged 22 and under for having completed the recommended levels of education. 
For instance, individuals aged 13 and older should have completed primary education; thus, a 13 
years old individual without a primary education diploma is said to not meet the age-for-grade 
                                                 
94 A 15-year-old individual is three years shy from the normal age of completion for upper secondary education. 
Very few individuals aged 12–15 would have completed upper secondary education. Estimates would therefore be 
driven by a few outliers and would not have been sensible to include in the analysis. 
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recommendation. Minimum wages have all positive effects on age-for-grade but for real minimum 
wages on individuals aged 12–15. Nevertheless, the effects are not statistically significant. 
 
3.5.2 Labor market outcomes 
Minimum wages do not seem to distort the incentive for school enrollment. Presumably, 
the effects of minimum wage on labor market opportunities and outcomes for youths would 
subsequently affect the incentives for schooling. An increase in the expected value of wages 
following a minimum wage hike increases youth’s opportunity cost of schooling, which may 
induce youths to exit school and enter the workforce. The expected value of wages could increase 
with increased probability of employment and/or average wage. The null findings in the previous 
section may naturally follow had there not been any impacts on youth’s labor market outcomes. 
 Table 3.4 describes the effects of minimum wages on youth work participation 
probabilities. Work participation is defined as working for at least one hour or being temporarily 
off work in the past week. Across age restrictions and econometric specifications, nominal and 
real minimum wages do not have any statistically significant effects on the likelihood of 
participating in any work. District linear trends still importantly affect the estimates. Column 8 
suggests that minimum wages may have positive effects on work participation rates: a 10-percent 
increase in nominal (or real) minimum wage led to a 0.21 percentage points increase in work 
participation, although the effect is not statistically significant. 
 Table 3.5 looks at the effect of minimum wages on other labor market outcomes. Minimum 
wages do not induce youths to work as their main activity or to look for work. However, 
individuals aged 19–24, coinciding with tertiary education ages, are more likely to work as paid 
workers. A 10-percent increase in nominal and real minimum wages led to a 0.64 and 0.54 
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percentage points increase in the probability of working as paid workers, respectively, which are 
both statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Increase in nominal or real minimum wages do 
not necessarily translate to higher average nominal and real wages. Panel B, Column 4 suggests 
that an increase in real minimum wages leads to a decrease in nominal wages. 
 Minimum wages do not seem to affect the propensity of attending school, working, and the 
cross between the two. Table 3.6 looks at the four possible cross-states à la Neumark and Wascher 
(1995a, b, c): (1) enrolled in school and employed, (2) not enrolled and employed, (3) enrolled and 
not employed, and (4) not enrolled and not employed. Across the two panels, minimum wages do 
not seem to have any statistically significant and economically meaningful effects on any of the 
four states.95 If any, real minimum wages slightly positively increase the probability of working 
while still in school for individuals aged 19–24, but the effect is only marginally statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
3.6. Heterogeneous effects and robustness checks 
3.6.1 Heterogenous effects by parent education level 
In this section, I explore if minimum wages could have different impacts on different sub-
populations. I first analyze the effects of minimum wages on school enrollment by father’s highest 
education level attained in Table 3.7. Going from left to right, I first note that average school 
enrollment increases with increased father’s education level regardless of the individual’s age and 
that there are always fewer individuals with more highly educated fathers. However, minimum 
wages do not seem to have heterogeneous effects on school enrollment depending on father’s 
education level. If any, there is only one statistically significant finding among the 16 hypothesis 
                                                 
95 Multinomial logit regression suggests that minimum wages do not statistically significantly increase the 
propensity of the first three outcomes relative to not enrolled and not employed. 
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tests: nominal minimum wages have a slightly positive effect on the probability of individuals 
aged 12–15 being enrolled in school if the father is a primary school graduate. 
 Appendix Table E.1 shows the parallel table for mother’s educational attainment. Similar 
to Table 3.7, minimum wages do not exhibit systematic heterogeneous effects on enrollment by 
mother’s education level. Nominal minimum wages seemingly have a negative effect on the 
probability of individuals aged 16–18 being enrolled in school if the mother is a college graduate. 
Real minimum wages, on the other hand, do not have a similar effect on the same set of individuals. 
If any, real minimum wages have a smaller negative effect on the probability of individuals aged 
19–24 being enrolled in school if the mother is a lower secondary education graduate. These two 
findings are puzzling, and they do not tell a systematic story about how minimum wages affect 
individuals differently depending on their parent’s education. 
 
3.6.2 Heterogenous effects by parent’s work status 
Alternatively, I looked at how minimum wages affect enrollment differently depending on 
parent’s work status. Table 3.8 suggests that fathers are mostly self-employed, followed by paid 
workers, non-workers, and finally unpaid family workers. Children of paid workers generally have 
higher likelihood of enrollment. For ages 12–15, 16–18, and 19–24, children of non-working 
fathers have the second highest likelihood of enrollment, followed by unpaid family workers, and 
self-employed. This suggests that self-employed fathers may employ their children in their 
business and induce them away from attending school. 
 Surprisingly, minimum wages do not seem to affect the probability of enrollment of 
individuals whose father is a paid worker. Children of paid workers, presumably, are more likely 
to be affected by minimum wages. If the father earns a higher minimum wage, he could send his 
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children for more schooling. Otherwise, if the father earns a lower wage for being low-educated 
and pushed away from “good” minimum wage jobs, his children might be less likely to be enrolled. 
The null finding may be explained by these two opposing effects canceling each other out. 
Minimum wages do not seem to have any statistically significant effects on children of unpaid 
family workers and self-employed fathers. However, minimum wages seem to positively affect 
the enrollment of individuals aged 12–15 whose fathers are not working. The effect is statistically 
significant for nominal minimum wages but not for real minimum wages. Real minimum wages, 
on the other hand, have a negative effect on the likelihood of enrollment of individuals aged 19–
24 whose fathers are not working. These two effects combined may suggest that children of non-
working fathers may be inclined to be enrolled in lower education levels but are less inclined to 
pursue higher education with increasing minimum wages. 
 Appendix Table E.2 shows the parallel for mother’s work status. Female labor force 
participation rate in Indonesia is relatively low at 50.9 percent in 2016 (Halim, Johnson, and Perova 
2019). Indeed, I note that most individuals fall under Column 1 with non-working mothers. 
Children of paid worker mothers have the highest likelihood of enrollment, followed by non-
working mothers, self-employed, and unpaid family workers for ages 12–15, 16–18, and 19–24. 
Minimum wages seemingly have a positive effect on enrollment of individuals aged 12–15 whose 
mothers are paid workers. However, the effect turns negative for older individuals. This may be 
consistent with the fact that minimum wage jobs in manufacturing sectors can be attained without 
tertiary education.  
Minimum wages seem to negatively affect the enrollment of children of self-employed 
mothers in all age groupings. Minimum wages may increase the costs of hired help, hence, self-
employed mothers turn to their children for help in their business, which induce them away from 
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school enrollment. The negative effect of real minimum wage on enrollment is marginally 
statistically significant for individuals aged 12-15 whose mothers are self-employed. Minimum 
wages tend to have positive effects on enrollment of individuals aged 18 and younger whose 
mothers are unpaid family workers, presumably, by increasing their educational aspirations that 
they may get “good” minimum wage jobs. 
 
3.6.3 Heterogeneous effects by gender 
Table 3.9 explores if minimum wage policies have gendered effects. I repeat and restrict 
the analysis in Table 3.2 and 3.4 for each gender. Nominal minimum wages do not have any 
statistically and economically significant effects on male enrollment. Real increase in minimum 
wages is associated with negative enrollment effects for men, especially on older age groups 16–
24, but the effects are not statistically and/or economically significant. Women in upper secondary 
education ages seem to benefit from nominal minimum wage increases, with an enrollment 
elasticity of 0.095 that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The magnitude for real 
minimum wage increases is lower and is no longer statistically significant. The effects are not 
statistically significant for women in other age groups. 
 Column 3 suggests that nominal and real increases in minimum wage are associated with 
positive and statistically significant effect on the work participation of men aged 19–24. 
Enrollment elasticities for nominal and real minimum wages are 0.079 and 0.061, respectively, 
which are both statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A similar effect is not observed for 
women at all age groups. Nominal minimum wages seem to be negatively correlated with work 
participation of women in older age groups 16–24, but real minimum wages seem to be associated 
with positive increase in women’s work participation rates in all ages. 
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3.6.4 Robustness checks 
 In all previous analyses, I clustered standard errors at the provinces policy-group level. It 
may also be reasonable to consider that individuals living in the same district, and thus, local labor 
market, are correlated in their responses to minimum wage changes. In Appendix Table E.3, I 
cluster standard errors at the district level instead. Minimum wages seem to have positive and 
statistically significant effects on enrollment of individuals ages 10–30, 12–15, and 19–24, when 
district linear trends are not controlled for. Once district trends are accounted for, the results are 
consistently not statistically significant, as was the case in province-level clustering. 
 Average enrollment rate in 2006 is half that in the previous and subsequent years. If the 
measurement bias is equally shared by all provinces, then the year fixed effects should account for 
this difference. To check if the results are driven by this data aberration, I drop observations from 
year 2006 in Appendix Table E.4. Magnitudes and statistical significance of estimates in Appendix 
Table E.4 are comparable to those in Table 3.2. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
The primary attention of the effect of minimum wage on employment potentially misses 
out on another important welfare impact of minimum wage policies on human capital formation. 
Minimum wage could affect the incentives for schooling, which would have long-term labor 
market consequences on affected individuals (Neumark and Nizalova 2007). In this paper, I 
leverage annual variations in minimum wages across provinces in Indonesia in a difference-in-
differences framework and pool repeated cross-sections of Labor Force Surveys from 1994 to 
2009. Despite massive increases in nominal and real minimum wages in Indonesia in the 16-year 
window, I do not find statistically significant effects on school enrollment and work participation 
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for various age ranges—even for the critical upper secondary education ages (16–18) who can 
legally join the workforce. I can rule out very small enrollment and work participation elasticities. 
 While this paper takes a first stride in assessing school enrollment effects of minimum 
wage policies in a developing countries context with imperfect compliance and a sizable informal 
sector, it may also be pertinent to study other dimensions that minimum wage could influence. 
This paper focuses on pre-employment human capital, but standard theory of human capital also 
suggests that minimum wage could reduce on-the-job training, as workers usually finance this 
training by accepting a lower wage (Neumark and Wascher 2001). As evidenced by the school 
enrollment findings, the case for developing countries may differ from developed countries. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) outline a competing model where minimum wages could instead 
increase on-the-job training in a non-competitive labor markets where employees are not paid 
according to their productivity and firms derive rents in the difference between workers’ 
productivity and compensation. 
 As minimum wage policies are hailed as an instrument to mitigate poverty, it is also 
important to directly address whether minimum wages succeed in that aspect. Neumark and 
Wascher (2002), for instance, do not find that minimum wages are as effective in reducing poverty 
in the United States. However, Chun and Khor (2010) find that minimum wages play an important 
role in closing wage inequality in Indonesia. As minimum wage legislation in Indonesia is coming 
more and more into the spotlight, more studies need to be conducted to help policymakers 






Figure 3.1. Geographical variations in nominal minimum wages across Indonesian 
provinces. provinces in 1994, 2001, and 2009 
Note: Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) did not report minimum wage levels in 
Papua and Papua Barat provinces in 2004 and 2009. In each year, provinces are categorized into 
4 minimum wage quartiles; ranges for each quartile are indicated in parentheses. Nominal 




Figure 3.2. Average nominal and real minimum wages in Indonesia over time 
Note: Solid blue line indicates average nominal minimum wages across provinces in Indonesia, 
dashed lines indicate the relevant 95% confidence intervals. Connected red lines indicate average 
real minimum wages across provinces in Indonesia, the shaded area above and below the red line 
indicates the associated 95% confidence intervals. The shaded period between 1997 and 1999 
indicates the East Asian Crisis and marks a dramatic reduction in purchasing power. Real 
minimum wages are obtained by adjusting the nominal minimum wages with provincial CPI 
with 2012 base year. In 2012, 1 USD was equivalent to 9,670 IDR. All minimum wage values 




Figure 3.3. Average annual nominal and real minimum wage growth in Indonesia over 
time 
Note: Annual growth measures the year-to-year difference in minimum wages relative to the 
previous year. Minimum wage policies in Indonesia received a global spotlight following 
coverage of “sweatshop” activities in U.S. manufacturing companies based in Indonesia, which 
resulted in a major revamping of minimum wage policies in Indonesia in 1994. In 2001, 
Indonesia decentralized legislative power from the federal government to provincial 
governments, including the power to set minimum wage levels at each province. Indonesia 
endured a devastating financial crisis in 1998–1999 along with other East Asian countries, which 
caused a massive reduction in purchasing power. Real minimum wages are obtained by adjusting 
the nominal minimum wages with provincial CPI with 2012 base year. In 2012, 1 USD was 
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Figure 3.4. Distribution of wages relative to stipulated minimum wages 
Note: Ratio of monthly wage to minimum wage is defined for all wages larger than zero to 
exclude unpaid family workers earning and reporting zero wages. Monthly and minimum wages 
are not adjusted for inflation. Ratios are winsorized at 1% level at the tails. A ratio of 1 indicates 
a monthly wage equivalent to the provincial minimum wage. A ratio larger (smaller) than 1 
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Figure 3.5. Average enrollment and work participation rates across ages 
Note: Enrollment is defined as attending school at the time of the survey. Any work is defined as 
working for at least one hour or being temporarily off-work in the past week. Primary education 
coincides with ages 7–12. The graph is shown from age 10 because SAKERNAS only surveys 

























Figure 3.6. Average enrollment rates across provinces with high and low minimum wage 
growth between 1994 and 2009 
Note: Enrollment rates are defined for any individuals aged 10 and above. High minimum wage 
growth provinces are defined as provinces with higher than median nominal growth between 1994 
and 2009. The median nominal growth between 1994 and 2009 was an 850% increase in nominal 
minimum wages. Ages 12–15 correspond to lower secondary education ages, ages 16–18 to upper 




Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics of pooled labor force surveys 
Age ranges: 10–30 12–15 16–18 19–24 
Age 19.58 13.47 16.99 21.44 
 (6.10) (1.13) (0.81) (1.70) 
Male 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.48 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Urban 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.46 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) 
School enrollment 0.41 0.87 0.55 0.14 
 (0.49) (0.34) (0.50) (0.35) 
Years of schooling 7.25 5.39 8.22 9.12 
 (4.10) (3.09) (2.58) (3.46) 
Primary 0.30 0.55 0.21 0.21 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.40) (0.41) 
Lower Secondary 0.31 0.23 0.63 0.33 
 (0.46) (0.42) (0.48) (0.47) 
Upper Secondary 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.34 
 (0.38) (0.04) (0.30) (0.47) 
Tertiary 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 
 (0.15) (0.00) (0.07) (0.20) 
Age-for-grade 0.74 0.91 0.74 0.40 
 (0.44) (0.29) (0.44) (0.49) 
Work participation 0.39 0.10 0.29 0.52 
 (0.49) (0.31) (0.45) (0.50) 
Work as main activity 0.33 0.05 0.23 0.46 
 (0.47) (0.23) (0.42) (0.50) 
Looking for work 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.18 
 (0.29) (0.13) (0.30) (0.39) 
Paid worker 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.24 
 (0.37) (0.14) (0.31) (0.43) 
Nominal wage 327.47 61.91 149.41 312.61 
 (590.20) (224.42) (292.56) (504.49) 
Real wage 612.30 135.38 300.75 580.54 
 (967.20) (353.45) (470.42) (857.96) 
Enrolled & employed 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.20) (0.12) 
Not enrolled & employed 0.36 0.06 0.25 0.51 
 (0.48) (0.23) (0.43) (0.50) 
Enrolled & not employed 0.39 0.82 0.51 0.12 
 (0.49) (0.38) (0.50) (0.33) 
Not enrolled & not employed 0.23 0.07 0.20 0.35 
 (0.42) (0.26) (0.40) (0.48) 
Observations 2,769,800 597,633 427,334 715,152 
Note: Means are reported for each column and the indicated age ranges. Dependent variables 
are defined in subsequent tables. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
162 
 
Table 3.2. Effect of minimum wages on school enrollment 
 Enrollment 
Age Range: 10–30  12–15  16–18  19–24 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Panel A 






































Observations 2,769,799 2,769,799  597,633 597,633  427,334 427,334  715,152 715,152 
District Trend  X   X   X   X 
Note: Each column regresses individual current school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage in the individual’s 
province of residence. Enrollment is a dummy variable defined as 1 for participating in school at the time of the survey. All 
regressions include district, year, and individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummies. District-specific trends are included in 
column 2, 4, 6, and 8. Standard errors clustered at the policy group: province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are used 
to indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Columns 3-4 are restricted to individuals ages 12–15 
(lower secondary education ages), Columns 5–6 to ages 16–18 (upper secondary education ages), and Column 7–8 to ages 19–24 
(tertiary education ages). Number of observations in each regression are indicated in the second to last row. Real minimum wages 
are obtained by adjusting the nominal minimum wages with provincial CPI with 2012 base year. In 2012, 1 USD is equivalent to 
9,670 IDR. Minimum wages reflect minimum monthly salaries. Minimum wages are logged; hence, the coefficients can be 




Table 3.3.  Effect of minimum wages on educational attainment 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage    
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(0.016) 
       










       












       
Panel B: Log Real Minimum Wage     












       






  -0.007 
(0.016) 
       










       












       
Note: Each column regresses the outcome indicated at column heading on log nominal or real 
minimum wage in the individual’s province of residence. Years of schooling is defined by 
converting highest educational attainment by the standard duration of completion, e.g., 
primary education equals 6 years of education. Primary, Lower Secondary, Upper Secondary, 
and Tertiary are dummy variables for completing those levels of education. Age-for-grade is 
defined as 1 for individuals aged 22 and under for having completed the recommended levels 
of education by the individual’s age. See Table 3.2 for more details on log nominal or real 
minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, and individual age fixed 
effects, urban and male dummy variables, and district-specific trends. Standard errors 
clustered at the province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are used to indicate 10, 5, 
and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Age restrictions are indicated for 
each row. There are 2,769,799 observations for ages 10–30, 597,633 for ages 12–15, 427,334 
for ages 16–18, and 715,152 for ages 19–24. Age-for-grade is missing for individuals older 
than 22. Hence, there are only 1,789,372 observations for the ages 10–30 row and 485,357 for 
the ages 19–24 row. 
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Table 3.4. Effect of minimum wages on school on work participation 
 Work participation 
Age Range: 10–30  12–15  16–18  19–24 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Panel A 






































Observations 2,769,799 2,769,799  597,633 597,633  427,334 427,334  715,152 715,152 
District Trend  X   X   X   X 
Note: Each column regresses individual current school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage in the individual’s 
province of residence. Work participation is defined for participating in work for at least an hour or being temporarily off work in 
the past week. See Table 3.2 for more details on log nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, 
year, and individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummy variables. District-specific trends are included in Columns 2, 4, 6, 
and 8 (marked with an X). Standard errors clustered at the policy group: province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are 




Table 3.5. Effect of minimum wages on labor market outcomes 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage    









      









      









      









      
Panel B: Log Real Minimum Wage    








      








      








      








      
Note: Each column regresses the outcome indicated at column heading on log nominal or real 
minimum wage in the individual’s province of residence. See Table 3.2 for more details on log 
nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, and individual 
age fixed effects, urban and male dummy variables, and district-specific trends. Standard errors 
clustered at the province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are used to indicate 10, 5, 
and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Age restrictions are indicated for each 
row. Work as main activity, looking for work, and paid worker are dummy variables. There are 
2,769,799 observations in ages 10–30, 597,633 in ages 12–15, 427,334 in ages 16–18, and 
715,152 in ages 19–24. Log wages are defined for non-zero wages. Hence, there are 386,751 





Table 3.6. Effect of minimum wages on enrollment and employment 
 Enrolled & 
Employed 
Not enrolled & 
Employed 
Enrolled &  
Not employed 
Not enrolled & 
Not employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage   








     








     








     








     
Panel B: Log Real Minimum Wage   








     








     








     








     
Note: Each column regresses the outcome indicated at column heading on log nominal 
or real minimum wage in the individual’s province of residence. All outcomes are 
dummy variables. Enrolled is a dummy variable for participating in school at the time of 
the survey. Employed is a dummy variable for working at least an hour or being 
temporarily off in the past week. See Table 3.2 for more details on log nominal or real 
minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, and individual age fixed 
effects, urban and male dummy variables, and district-specific trends. Standard errors 
clustered at the province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are used to indicate 
10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Age restrictions are 
indicated for each row. There are 2,769,799 observations for all ages, 597,633 for ages 
12–15, 427,334 for ages 16–18, and 715,152 for ages 19–24. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage   
































Panel B: Log Real Minimum Wage   
































Means / Observations in Panel A and B   
Ages 10–30 0.394 0.412 0.475 0.525 
Observations [752,321] [569,885] [415,063] [74,103] 
Ages 12–15 0.861 0.920 0.973 0.972 
Observations [170,195] [118,551] [82,641] [15,313] 
Ages 16–18 0.484 0.618 0.784 0.821 
Observations [117,242] [82,075] [55,964] [11,598] 
Ages 19–24 0.072 0.115 0.263 0.336 
Observations [189,639] [141,886] [100,293] [18,421] 
Note: Each column regresses school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage 
in the individual’s province of residence restricted to individuals whose father’s 
educational attainment is as indicated in the column heading. See Table 3.2 for more 
details on log nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include 
district, year, and individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummies, and district-
specific trends. Standard errors clustered at the province level are shown in parentheses. 
*, **, *** are used to indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, 
respectively. Means and number of observations (in square brackets) in each of the 4 × 
4 cells are the same for both Panel A and B, and are shown in the bottom panel. 
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Table 3.8. Effect of minimum wage on school enrollment by father’s work status 
 Enrollment 
Work status: Not working Unpaid family 
worker 
Self-employed Paid worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage   
































Panel B: Log Real Minimum Wage   
































Means / Observations in Panel A and B   
Ages 10–30 0.386 0.395 0.407 0.444 
Observations [179,625] [19,274] [1,402,296] [777,900] 
Ages 12–15 0.880 0.870 0.861 0.912 
Observations [27,738] [4,127] [320,234] [168,009] 
Ages 16–18 0.612 0.510 0.505 0.649 
Observations [26,833] [2,999] [218,352] [114,580] 
Ages 19–24 0.247 0.108 0.094 0.172 
Observations [57,346] [4,988] [345,201] [188,620] 
Note: Each column regresses school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage 
in the individual’s province of residence restricted to individuals whose father’s work 
status is as indicated in the column heading. See Table 3.2 for more details on log 
nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, and 
individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummies, and district-specific trends. 
Standard errors clustered at the province level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are 
used to indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Means 
and number of observations (in square brackets) in each of the 4 × 4 cells are the same 








Enrollment  Work participation 
 Male Female  Male Female 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage    
































Panel B: Log Real Minimum Wage    
































Means / Observations in Panel A and B    
Ages 10–30 0.429 0.396  0.482 0.290 
Observations [1,375,280] [1,394,519]  [1,375,280] [1,394,519] 
Ages 12–15 0.870 0.871  0.123 0.084 
Observations [307,636] [289,997]  [307,636] [289,997] 
Ages 16–18 0.552 0.547  0.347 0.230 
Observations [219,739] [207,595]  [219,739] [207,595] 
Ages 19–24 0.147 0.130  0.660 0.395 
Observations [345,774] [369,378]  [345,774] [369,378] 
Note: Each column regresses school enrollment (or work participation) on log nominal 
or real minimum wage in the individual’s province of residence restricted to male and 
female, respectively, as indicated in the column heading. See Table 3.2 for more details 
on log nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, 
and individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummies, and district-specific trends. 
Standard errors clustered at the province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are 
used to indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Means 
and number of observations (in square brackets) in each of the 4 × 4 cells are the same 
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APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES FOR LONG-TERM AND INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF 




Appendix Figure A.1. Spatial distribution of schools constructed per 1,000 children between 1973 and 1979 
Notes: Number of schools constructed between 1973 and 1979 and children’s population in 1971 are obtained from Duflo (2001) and 
the Indonesian 1971 Census. The legend indicates the range and distribution of schools constructed across the Indonesian archipelago. 
The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of districts that fall in that range. The total number of districts, 290, reflects their 
existence in 1993. Districts often split over time; by March 2016, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, we maintain the 1993 district 




Appendix Figure A.2. Effect of school construction on first generation individual's years of 
schooling by age in 1974 
Notes: Sample is restricted to individuals aged 2-24 in 1974 (born between 1950 and 1972). Each 
dot represents the interaction coefficient of the number of INPERS primary schools constructed in 
one’s birth district and an age in 1974 dummy. The age group 19-24 is omitted from the regression. 













































Appendix Figure A.3. Effect of school construction on second-generation’s years of 
schooling, using alternative upper-bound age restrictions 
Notes: In the top panel, treatment effects indicate the effect of one additional school constructed 
per 1,000 children in the mother’s or father’s birth district on the years of schooling for second-
generation individuals. Each dot represents a coefficient in a separate regression. We show 
estimated regression coefficients and their respective 95% confidence intervals. Sample is 
restricted to children from age 5 up to the value on the x-axis. Bottom panel shows the number of 




Appendix Figure A.4. Distribution of estimated treatment effects on second-generation’s 
years of schooling from simulated exposure assignment 
Note: To address the selection issue about co-resident second-generation children observed in the 
Susenas data, we use the IFLS to obtain the fraction of children at each age who are born to old 
and young cohort parents among all children no longer living with their parents. We then use these 
IFLS-based fractions to randomly assign non-co-resident children at each age in the Susenas data 
to either old or young cohort parents and to exclude the others from the regression. We then 
simulate this randomization assignment procedure 1,000 times and estimate the second-generation 
years of schooling regression. This figure plots the density distribution of estimated coefficients 
from these 1,000 repetitions for father’s and mother’s exposure to the school construction. Solid 
lines indicate the distribution of father’s effects and dashed lines indicate the distribution of 
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Appendix Figure A.5. Effect of school construction on household expenditures by age in 
1974 
Notes: Sample is restricted to individuals aged 2-24 in 1974 (born between 1950 and 1972). Each 
dot represents the interaction coefficient of the number of INPERS primary schools constructed in 
one’s birth district and an age in 1974 dummy. The age group 19-24 is omitted from the regression. 














































Appendix Figure A.6. Placebo effect of school construction on indexes of long-run outcomes for individuals too old to benefit 
from primary school construction 
Notes: Similar to Figure 1.1, where we compare individuals born between 1957-1962 (old cohort) and 1968-1972 (young cohort), we 
now estimate a placebo regression by restricting the sample to individuals born between 1950-1956 (an older cohort) and 1957-1962 
(old cohort). Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of the number of INPRES schools built between 1973 and 1979 in one’s 
birth district and a dummy for being born between 1957 and 1962. The solid lines represent 95% confidence bands. This figure serves 
as a placebo test since the old cohort was too old to be enrolled in primary school when the schools were constructed, and thus could 
not benefit from the school construction. The individual outcomes making up the index for each family are listed in Tables 1.1-1.7 and 
















































Appendix Figure A.7. Effect of school construction on indexes of long-run outcomes extending the sample to all individuals 
born between 1950 and 1980 
Notes: Similar to Figure 1.1, but regressions now include all individuals born between 1950 and 1980. Each dot represents the 
interaction coefficient of the number of INPRES schools built between 1973 and 1979 in one’s birth district and a dummy for being 
born between 1968 and 1980. The solid lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The individual outcomes making up the index for 
















































Appendix Figure A.8. Effect of school construction on indexes of long-run outcomes using alternative control variables 
Notes: Similar to Figure 1.1, but regressions now exclude the interaction of birth year dummies and water and sanitation programs 
from the control variables. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of the number of INPRES schools built between 1973 and 
1979 in one’s birth district and a dummy for being born between 1968 and 1972. The solid lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
















































Appendix Figure A.9. Discounted net benefits of school construction in Indonesia 
Note: We plot net benefits (the difference in discounted total benefits and total costs) over time. 
Benefits are either tax receipts collected by the government or improved living standards of the 
citizens. Net benefits are reported in billions of 2016 USD. We present two scenarios using the 
parameters from the cost-benefit model in column (5) and column (10) of Table 1.11. Solid lines 
indicate net benefits—in taxes and living standards—under Scenario 5. Dashed lines indicate net 
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Appendix Table A.1. Effect of school construction on first generation’s housing and assets   
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
       
Urban Indicator for residing in an urban area 0.425 0.438 
 









Actual monthly rent if house is rented, or estimated 













House’s floor area in square meters 79.894 81.355 
 









Expenditure on electricity, water, gas, and kerosene 15.714 15.729 
 







Asset index PCA index on binary ownerships of motorcycle, car, 
home phone, computer, TV, jewelry, refrigerator, 












Aggregates all 5 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. 
Effects are interpreted as standard deviation changes 




   (0.009) (0.009) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population 
and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 
5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in square 
brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 68,687 and 66,249 
observations in the men’s and women’s regressions, respectively. We apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to all 
monetary values. Estimates can be interpreted as percentage changes. 
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Appendix Table A.2. Effect of school construction on first generation’s nutrition 
  
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
       
Calories Household's accounts of units of food consumed in 
the past week (e.g. 5 kg of rice) are converted into 
nutritional intake by the Central Statistics Agency. 
Following their procedure, we convert the weekly 
intake to monthly intake. In the regressions, we 
apply an inverse hyperbolic transformation for 
reasons discussed above. The mean of calories 
intake is reported in 1 kcal increments. The means 
of protein, fat, and carbohydrate intakes are reported 
in 1 kg increments. 
260.915 249.699 
 
0.005 0.018***  






      
Protein 7.116 6.831 
 
0.006 0.018***  






      
Fat 6.074 5.810 
 
0.011** 0.023*** 






      
Carbohydrates 40.869 39.040 
 
0.005 0.017***  






       
Nutrition index Aggregates all 4 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. 
Effects are interpreted as standard deviation changes 
from the mean. 
   0.014 0.039*** 
   (0.009) (0.010) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population 
and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 
5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in square 
brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 68,687 and 66,249 
observations in the men’s and women’s regressions, respectively. We apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in the 
regressions. Estimates can be interpreted as percentage changes. 
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Appendix Table A.3. Effect of school construction on first generation’s health investment 
  
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 




Total monthly household health expenditures, which 
aggregates curative, medicine, and preventive health 
expenditures 












Consist of pregnancy checks, immunizations, medical 
check-ups, family planning, and other expenditures, e.g., 
vitamins, massage, gym memberships 











A sub-category under preventive health expenditures, 
which includes costs of contraceptives and consultations 











A sub-category under curative health expenditures and is 
distinct from expenditures on public hospitals, clinics, 
and traditional healers 











Health insurance is distinct from life, accidental, vehicle, 












Aggregates all 5 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects 





   (0.015) (0.016) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population and 
enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year dummies. 
Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% 
levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in square brackets. FDR q-
values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 68,687 and 66,249 observations in the men’s and 
women’s regressions, respectively. We apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to all monetary values. Estimates can be 
interpreted as percentage changes. 
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Appendix Table A.4. Effect of school construction on first generation’s welfare program participation   
Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description Men Women 
 
Men Women 
       
Cash Transfer Unconditional cash transfer to compensate for the removal 
of gas price subsidy for poor households 
0.041 0.039 
 







       
Rice for Poor Monthly rice allowance for poor households 0.392 0.406 
 







       
Poor Student's 
Assistance 









       
Social Protection 
Card 
Card provided to poor households, which entitles them to 















Aggregates all 4 outcomes and standardizes it to the mean 
of the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects are 
interpreted as standard deviation changes from the mean. 
For the index, we reverse the sign for the 4 welfare 
programs to indicate a positive outcome. 
   0.006 0.010 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
Notes: Means indicate the fraction of program recipients. Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort 
dummy interacted with the number of schools constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort 
of birth fixed effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district 
of birth interacted with birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote 
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 4 outcomes and are 
shown in square brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. There are 68,687 and 




Appendix Table A.5. Effect of school construction on second-generation’s child wellbeing 
    Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure by: 






       
Non-work days Number of days not worked in the past week by the 











Non-work hours Number of hours not worked in the past week by the 













Self-reported indicator defined as 1 if child did not 












Self-reported number of days in the past month 
(maximum of 30 days) that a health complaint did not 










No severe health 
complaint 
Self-reported indicator defined as 1 if child did not 














Aggregates all 5 outcomes and standardizes it to the 
mean of the old cohort in low-program districts. Effects 
are interpreted as standard deviation changes from the 
mean. 
   -0.005 0.014** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of father or mother’s young cohort dummy interacted with the number of 
schools constructed in father or mother’s district of birth. All regressions control for parent’s district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, 
child age fixed effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth 
interacted with birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at parent’s district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 5 outcomes and are shown in square 
brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. The survey restricts questions on labor market outcomes 
to individuals aged 10 and older; questions on health outcomes are asked to all individuals. There are 100,293 and 94,067 observations in the 




Appendix Table A.6. Spouse’s characteristics as mediators of the effect of school construction on first generation’s living 
standards 
 Dependent Variable: Living standards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 









Migrant No health 
complaint 
All 




0.021*** 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.020*** 0.019** 0.017** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.008 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Mediator  0.062*** 0.337*** 0.374*** 0.002 0.371*** 0.480*** 0.273*** -0.009  
  (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006)  
Observations 68,687 64,416 64,416 64,416 64,416 39,545 39,545 64,416 64,416 39,545 
Mean 8.011 8.068 8.068 8.068 8.068 8.007 8.007 8.068 8.068 8.007 




0.032*** 0.016** 0.015** 0.017** 0.023*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.012 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Mediator  0.063*** 0.351*** 0.380*** -0.057*** 0.319*** 0.412*** 0.293*** 0.030***  
  (0.001) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007)  
Observations 66,249 55,449 55,449 55,449 55,449 50,884 50,884 55,449 55,449 50,884 
Mean 7.152 7.313 7.313 7.313 7.313 7.323 7.323 7.313 7.313 7.323 
Notes: Each column shows a regression of the first generation’s living standards on exposure to the school construction program and includes 
a potential mediator variable. These mediator variables (as indicated by the column heading) are spouse’s characteristics in Table 1.9. 
Regressions are as in row 1 of Table 1.3. Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of father or mother’s young cohort dummy 
interacted with the number of schools constructed in father or mother’s district of birth. All regressions control for parent’s district of birth 
and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by 
district of birth interacted with birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at parent’s district of birth are shown in parentheses. 




Appendix Table A.7. Effect of school construction on spouse’s education 
     Mean / SD 
 
Effect of Program 
Exposure on: 
Outcome Description  Men Women 
 
Men Women 
        
Spouse’s years of 
schooling 
Based on highest education level and grade 
attended. Standard durations of study are 











        
Spouse’s years of 
schooling 
percentile 
Spouse’s years of schooling percentile 












        
Education gap Husband’s years of schooling minus wife’s 











        
Education 
percentile gap 












        
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of 
schools constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s 
population and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with 
birth year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values are computed over all 4 outcomes and are 
shown in square brackets. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Spouse’s 
characteristics and education gaps are defined for household heads and spouses in the sample. There are 64,422 and 55,468 
observations for men and women, respectively, because it is set to missing if the spouse does not currently live in the 




Appendix Table A.8. Effect of school construction on second-generation’s years of schooling on various samples 
 
Susenas  
Susenas with Extreme 
Assumptions  IFLS 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 




 All Stayers Movers 
Panel A: Father         














Observations 120,838  644,675 644,675  6,186 4,048 2,138 
Mean 7.967  7.731 7.731  7.807 6.434 10.396 
Panel B: Mother         














Observations 105,523  644,675 644,675  7,227 3,756 3,471 
Mean 8.854  7.731 7.731  9.038 8.097 10.034 
Note: Column (1) is from Table 1.11. Column (2) and (3) estimate extreme bounds in which all non-co-resident 
children aged 0-40 are assumed to have parents who are either exposed or not exposed (Manski, 1990). Columns 
(4)-(6) use the IFLS 2014 Round 5 data. We match parents to their co-resident children (“Stayers”) found in the 




Appendix Table A.9. Effect of school construction on first generation's years of schooling 
(extended cohort definitions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cohorts Included: 1957-1962 
and  
1968-1972 
… +  
1950-1956 
… +  
1963-1967 




Panel A: Male      
Schools constructed 











Observations 72,367 98,895 98,781 138,617 197,951 
Mean 8.022 7.500 7.938 8.478 8.047 
Panel B: Female      
Schools constructed 











Observations 71,423 97,268 99,843 140,142 200,644 
Mean 7.105 6.496 6.901 7.790 7.194 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars 
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. Column 
(1) sample is restricted to individuals born in the sample period 1957-1962 (old cohort) and 
1968-1972 (younger cohort) and is the sample used in the analysis in the rest of the paper. 
Columns (2) to (5) extend the sample as indicated in the column headings. Panel A looks only 
at males and Panel B only at females. School constructed denotes the number of INPRES 
schools constructed per 1,000 children in one’s birth district. Young cohort is an indicator 






Appendix Table A.10. Effect of school construction on first generation's household expenditures (various transformations) 
  Total expenditure   Education expenditure 




Log Nominal  IHS Per-
capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Father          


















Observations 68,687 68,687 68,687 68,687  68,687 48,123 68,687 68,687 
Mean 391.649 391.649 391.649 391.649  13.971 13.971 13.971 13.971 
Panel B: Mother          


















Observations 66,249 66,249 66,249 66,249  66,249 39,492 66,249 66,249 
Mean 375.616 375.616 375.616 375.616  12.202 12.202 12.202 12.202 
Notes: Effect of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. All regressions control for district of birth and cohort of birth fixed effects, children’s population 
and enrollment in 1971, and water and sanitation program intensities that vary by district of birth interacted with birth year 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 
5, and 10% levels based on unadjusted p-values. All expenditure values are defined at the household level and refer to the 
household’s average monthly expenditure. Nominal values are reported in 10,000 Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) increments. In 2016, 
the average daily exchange rates was 1 USD=13,308 IDR. Columns (1)-(4) examine total household expenditure; columns (5)-
(8) examine education expenditure. Inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformations are applied to total and per capita household 
expenditures (columns 1 and 4) and to total and per-capita education expenditures (columns 5 and 8). Log transformations are 




APPENDIX B: DATA APPENDIX FOR LONG-TERM AND INTERGENERATIONAL 
EFFECTS OF EDUCATION: EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION IN 
INDONESIA 
 
Two critical data issues about the Susenas 2016 survey are relevant for our analysis. First, 
to estimate the difference-in-differences specification described in Section 1.3.1, it is necessary 
to have information about an individual’s residence at birth. Current residence could be 
endogenous to the school construction program as households might move to provide access to 
schools to their children. Location of birth and location where the individual obtains their 
education are highly correlated.96 However, birth location is not endogenous with respect to the 
school construction since all of the individuals in the analysis were born before the program 
started. Given the importance of knowing where the individual was born, it is unfortunate that 
most household surveys in Indonesia only provide information about the individual’s current 
location of residence. This lack of information about an individual’s birth location is the case for 
the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (Sakernas), the Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS), and many other rounds of the Susenas data, making them unavailable to use to analyze 
the impacts of the school construction program. However, the Susenas 2016 is one exception to 
this, as there is information on every individual’s district of birth. 
Second, it is important that the data include a sufficiently large sample of individuals 
from these specific birth cohorts (1957-1962 and 1968-1972). The Indonesia Family Life Survey 
(IFLS) does contain information on each individual’s district of residence at birth, thus satisfying 
                                                 
96 Based on the IFLS data, almost 92 percent of children at age 12 still live in the same district where they were born 




the first criteria we outline above. We use the IFLS data to estimate our main difference-in-
differences specification exploiting variation across birth cohorts and districts in the number of 
schools built. The IFLS is a longitudinal survey, and the first round was collected in 1993/1994. 
Subsequent rounds were collected in 1997, 2000, 2007/2008, and most recently in 2014/2015. 
Tracking across rounds has been extremely successful, with rates between 92 to 95 percent for 
each IFLS round (Thomas et. al., 2012). Almost 88 percent of households in survey round one 
were subsequently interviewed in all of the five survey rounds. In columns 1-3 of Appendix 
Table B.1 and B.2, we use the most recent survey round collected in 2014/2015 (IFLS 5) and 
include all individuals interviewed in that round in the regressions. In columns 4-6 of these 
tables, we begin with the IFLS 5 and then add in any other individuals from the other four rounds 
who might no longer be present in the final round of the panel survey. We estimate regressions 
with different control variables to see if that has any influence on the results. Appendix Table 
B.1 examines years of schooling as the dependent variable, while Appendix Table B.2 examines 
completed primary. Column 3 (IFLS 5 only) and column 6 (IFLS 5 plus last observed round) in 
each table correspond with our main results for men and women in Table 1.1 row 1 (years of 
schooling) and row 2 (completed primary). We do not observe any statistically significant 
relationship for men or women between exposure to school construction and increased years of 
schooling. Similarly, when examining whether women exposed to school construction completed 
primary school we do not observe any statistically significant relationship. However, for men, 
that relationship is negative indicating school construction exposure lowers the likelihood of 




The IFLS and Susenas data have two key differences that might be relevant to explain 
this situation. First, the Susenas data is nationally representative covering all 34 provinces and all 
511 districts in the country. IFLS is representative of only 83 percent of the Indonesian 
population and covers individuals living in 13 out of 27 provinces in the country. Appendix 
Figure B.1 shows a map of Indonesian districts with the districts shaded in gray indicating which 
ones the IFLS survey covers. Comparing Appendix Figure A.1 (map of Indonesia indicating the 
spatial distribution of school constructed per 1,000 children) and Appendix Figure B.1 highlights 
that many of the districts that had large numbers of schools constructed are not included in the 
IFLS survey. In column 7 of Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2, we present results using the Susenas 
2016 data but restricting the analysis to only those districts covered in the IFLS survey. The 
coefficients from the regression with this restricted sample with years of schooling as the 
dependent variable are somewhat smaller (0.194 for men and 0.159 for women) compared to the 
full sample from Table 1.1, row 1 (0.268 for men and 0.234 for women), but the results are still 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. Likewise, the regressions in column 7 of 
Appendix Table B.1 using completed primary as the dependent variable also show smaller effect 
sizes compared to the full sample. This is evidence that the different geographic coverage of the 
IFLS and the Susenas is unlikely to explain the lack of relationship between school construction 
and years of schooling in the IFLS data (columns 1-6). Second, note that the number of 
observations in the IFLS regressions for women is only 2,473 if using only IFLS 5 or 2,659 if 
using IFLS 5 plus the last observed round for any individual.97 This compares with 71,423 
observations for women in the regression using the Susenas data. While the point estimates for 
                                                 
97 Using the extended cohort of individuals born between 1950 and 1980 roughly triples the sample size (for men to 
6,586 and 7,050 and for women to 7,138 and 7,640 in the IFLS 5 and IFLS 5 plus last observed round, respectively), 
but the results are still not statistically significant. 
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women are similar across the two datasets, this difference in sample size could explain the much 




Appendix Table B.1. Effect of school construction on first generation's education using IFLS data 
 
Data source: IFLS 5 (2014/2015)  IFLS 5 + last observed round  Susenas 2016 
restricted to IFLS 
districts 
Dependent variable: Years of schooling (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Panel A: Male          














Observations 2,230 2,230 2,230  2,408 2,408 2,408  52,461 
Children population in 1971 X X X  X X X  X 
Enrollment in 1971  X X   X X  X 
Water and sanitation program   X    X  X 
Panel B: Female          














Observations 2,473 2,473 2,473  2,659 2,659 2,659  52,208 
Children population in 1971 X X X  X X X  X 
Enrollment in 1971  X X   X X  X 
Water and sanitation program   X    X  X 
Notes: Effects of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. Standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on regular p-values. Columns 1-3 uses Indonesia Family Life Survey data, Round 5 
(2014/2015). Columns 4-6 uses IFLS round 5 data plus the observation from the last observed round for any individual not in round 




Appendix Table B.2. Effect of school construction on first generation's completed primary using IFLS data 
Data source: IFLS 5 (2014/2015)  IFLS 5 + last observed round  Susenas 2016 
restricted to 
IFLS districts 
Dependent variable: Completed primary (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Panel A: Male          














Observations 2,230 2,230 2,230  2,408 2,408 2,408  52,461 
Children population in 1971 X X X  X X X  X 
Enrollment in 1971  X X   X X  X 
Water and sanitation program   X    X  X 
Panel B: Female          














Observations 2,473 2,473 2,473  2,659 2,659 2,659  52,208 
Children population in 1971 X X X  X X X  X 
Enrollment in 1971  X X   X X  X 
Water and sanitation program   X    X  X 
Notes: Effects of program exposure are the regression coefficients of young cohort dummy interacted with the number of schools 
constructed in district of birth. Standard errors clustered at district of birth are shown in parentheses. Stars denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels based on regular p-values. Columns 1-3 uses Indonesia Family Life Survey data, Round 5 
(2014/2015). Columns 4-6 uses IFLS round 5 data plus the observation from the last observed round for any individual not in round 




Appendix Figure B.1. Map of Indonesia with districts shaded in gray indicating coverage in Indonesia Family Life Survey 
(IFLS) 
Notes: IFLS survey is representative of 83% of the Indonesian population and covers individuals living in 13 of the 27 provinces in the 
country. The districts shaded in gray are included in the IFLS household survey, while the Susenas 2016 used in the main analysis in 
the paper is nationally representative and includes all districts in the country. 
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APPENDIX C: COST AND BENEFIT CALCULATION APPENDIX FOR LONG-TERM 
AND INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF EDUCATION: EVIDENCE FROM 
SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION IN INDONESIA 
 
Discount rate 
World Development Indicators collects real interest rates in Indonesia between 1987 and 2017. It 
averages 5.77 percent per year. Since it does not extend as far as our sample period in 1973, we 
assume a constant annual discount rate of 5 percent. 
 
Teachers’ salary growth 
We first assume there is no real salary growth over the years and use Duflo (2001)’s reported 
teacher’s salary in 1973. Subsequently, we allow for linear growth using teacher’s salary 
observations in 1970 by Daroesman (1972), 1973 by Duflo (2001), Intercensal Surveys 1976 and 




Individuals’ tax payments and living standards generally follow an inverted-U shape, where they 
peak at around age 40-50. In our Susenas data, we observe individuals at their peak. To model 
the lifetime curvature of tax payments and living standards, we assume the same average effect 
on taxes and living standards across ages but different means at different ages. A 20-year old 
                                                 
98 We drop Duflo (2001)’s reported salary in 1995 because it implies a 9 percent real growth per year and it is much 
higher than the linear fit would have predicted. It is also higher than observations in 2000, 2005, and 2010.  
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male, for instance, only spends $2,373 annually, compared to the mean in of our observed 
sample, $3,531, as implied in Table 1.3. 
 
GDP/capita growth 
GDP per-capita growth is obtained from World Development Indicators. We took the average 
between 1961 and 2017: 3.25 percent per year. 
 
Number of students and teachers per school and recurrent costs/salaries multiplier 
We follow Duflo (2001) in assuming 120 students/school, 3 teachers/school, and 25 percent 
recurrent administrative costs in addition to teachers’ salaries. These imply a class size of 20 
students across six grades of primary education and one teacher per grade. The latter is 
reasonable given that schools often run two sessions per day: morning and afternoon classes. 
 
Individuals start paying taxes after age 18 
We first assume that individuals start paying taxes after finishing Upper Secondary education at 




Daroesman (1971) and Duflo (2001) report that schools were expected to last for 20 years. We 
first use this assumption. We subsequently relax this assumption to 40 years because many 





World Development Indicators suggest an average of 56.6 years of life expectancy at birth for 
individuals born between 1968 and 1980. Conditional on making it to primary school age, the 
life expectancy is likely higher. We assume a life expectancy of 60 years throughout and then 
relax this assumption in the final column. 
 
Share of men and women in affected cohorts 
We construct a weighted average of the treatment effects on men and women. The share of 




APPENDIX D: APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES FOR PRESCHOOL AVAILABILITY AND FEMALE LABOR 
FORCE PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 
 
 
Appendix Figure D.1. Spatial distribution of public preschool counts in 2014 
Notes: Number of public preschools is obtained from Podes. The legend indicates the range and distribution of public preschool counts 
across the Indonesian archipelago. The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of districts that fall in that range. The total number 
of districts, 290, reflects their existence in 1993. Districts often split over time; by March 2016, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, 




Appendix Figure D.2. Spatial distribution of private preschool counts in 2014 
Notes: Number of private preschools is obtained from Podes. The legend indicates the range and distribution of private preschool counts 
across the Indonesian archipelago. The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of districts that fall in that range. The total number 
of districts, 290, reflects their existence in 1993. Districts often split over time; by March 2016, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, 




Appendix Figure D.3. Count of public and private preschools across districts over time 
Note: Number of preschools is obtained from Podes in respective years. Panel A and B indicate 
count of public and private preschools, respectively. Scatterplot of preschool densities across 290 
districts, as they existed in 1993, over time are shown in blue hollow circles. Red triangles indicate 
the average density of preschools across 290 districts per year. Districts often split over time; by 
2014, there were 511 districts. In our analyses, we maintain the 1993 district boundaries to allow 




Appendix Figure D.4. Event study on the effect of public preschools on mothers’ work 
participation by first child’s age relative to pre-birth level 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of public preschool 
density in one’s district of residence and first child’s age. Mother’s work participations are 
averaged at the tails; 6 and more years prior to the first childbirth and when the first child was 18 
and older. Treatment effects are interpreted relative to the omitted year prior to the mother’s first 




Appendix Figure D.5. Event study on the effect of private preschools on mothers’ work 
participation by first child’s age relative to pre-birth level 
Note: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each dot represents the interaction coefficient of private preschool 
density in one’s district of residence and first child’s age. Mother’s work participations are 
averaged at the tails; 6 and more years prior to the first childbirth and when the first child was 18 
and older. Treatment effects are interpreted relative to the omitted year prior to the mother’s first 




Appendix Figure D.6. Distribution of age of entry into preschool 
Notes: The graph plots the distribution of first age of entry into preschool obtained from child’s 
education module in IFLS 4 (2007/08) and 5 (2014/15). The same information is not collected in 
previous IFLS rounds. Blue solid bar and patterned orange bar indicate the percent distribution for 
round 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
 
Appendix Figure D.7. Distribution of one-way travel time to preschool 
Notes: The graph plots kernel density of one-way travel time to public/private preschools 
conditional on preschool enrollment. Dashed vertical line indicates median travel time, 10 minutes, 
in both public and private preschools. Solid blue line and short-dashed red line indicates the 
























Appendix Figure D.8. Distribution of mother’s age at childbirth or when miscarriage 
occurs 
Note: Data is taken from IFLS 1 (1993). It shows the distribution of mother’s ages at childbirth 
or when miscarriage occurs. Pregnancies pertain to any child order. Dashed lines indicate 1st and 
99th percentiles at age 14 and 39, respectively. To avoid complications in teen pregnancies we 
limit our sample to mothers who were at least 19 in at least two rounds of IFLS. The upper 
boundary, age 45, was selected such that if the age-eligible kid is 6, then the woman has to be 39 
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Appendix Figure D.9. Distribution of gap years between childbirths 
Note: The graph plots histogram distributions of gap years between childbirths by birth orders. 
Second birth order, in black, indicates the gap years between the first and second childbirths. 
Subsequent birth orders are defined similarly. Y-axis shows the percent of mothers with the 
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Appendix Table D.1. List of top-3 occupations within each work status 
Work status N  Percent  
(within 
category) 
Self-employed   
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 14,056 35.97 
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 6,674 17.08 
Working proprietors (catering and lodging services) 3,640 9.32 
Government workers   
Teachers 4,180 48.91 
Nurses, midwives, x-ray technicians, traditional medicine 712 8.33 
Government executive of officials 679 7.95 
Private workers   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 8,162 19.40 
Maids and related housekeeping service workers NEC 5,116 12.16 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 4,085 9.71 
Unpaid family workers   
Agricultural and animal husbandry workers 19,247 67.28 
Salesmen, shop assistants and related workers 3,690 12.90 
Food and beverage processors 885 3.09 
Notes: Work status are indicated in bold. Top-3 labeled 2-digit occupation codes within each 
category are listed. Number of female-year observations and percentage share within each category 
are indicated on the second and third columns. 
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Appendix Table D.2. Effect of preschool availability on female’s work participation with inferred in-between preschool data 
 Work participation 
Econometric strategy: DD  DDD  DDD-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public         




































         
Panel B: Private         
































         
Observations 67,431 67,431  226,400 226,400  226,400 226,400 
Mean 0.529 0.529  0.520 0.520  0.520 0.520 
District Trend  X   X   X 
Note: Sample in column 1-2 is restricted to mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample in column 3-6 includes mothers with 
and without preschool-aged children (age 3-6). We infer preschool data in-between PODES years. Column 1-2 regress work participation 
on preschool density in a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy (Section 2.4.1). Column 3-4 regress work participation on preschool 
density, a dummy for having a preschool-aged child, and the interaction between the two in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
strategy (Section 2.4.2). Column 5-6 builds on the DDD strategy and adds individual fixed effect (DDD-FE) to allow comparison within-
mothers (Section 2.4.3). Column 2, 4, 6 add district-specific trends. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an 
urban residence dummy. Panel A and B look at the effect of public and private preschool densities separately. Standard errors clustered at 
the district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Observations, 




Appendix Table D.3. Effect of preschool availability on female’s work participation with continuous number of eligible 
children 
 Work participation 
Econometric strategy: DD  DDD  DDD-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public         




































         
Panel B: Private         




































         
Observations 22,737 22,737  76,951 76,951  76,951 76,951 
Mean 0.538 0.538  0.534 0.534  0.534 0.534 
District Trend  X   X   X 
Note: Sample in column 1-2 is restricted to mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample in column 3-6 includes mothers with 
and without preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample is further restricted to PODES years. Column 1-2 regress work participation on 
preschool density in a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy (Section 2.4.1). Column 3-4 regress work participation on preschool density, 
a dummy for having a preschool-aged child, and the interaction between the two in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy 
(Section 2.4.2). Column 5-6 builds on the DDD strategy and adds individual fixed effect (DDD-FE) to allow comparison within-mothers 
(Section 2.4.3). Column 2, 4, 6 add district-specific trends. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an urban 
residence dummy. Panel A and B look at the effect of public and private preschool densities separately. Standard errors clustered at the 
district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Observations, 
work participation means, and inclusion of district trends are indicated in the last three rows. 
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Appendix Table D.4. Effect of preschool availability on female’s work participation with preschool ages defined as 3-5 
 Work participation 
Econometric strategy: DD  DDD  DDD-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public         




































         
Panel B: Private         




































         
Observations 22,737 22,737  76,951 76,951  76,951 76,951 
Mean 0.538 0.538  0.534 0.534  0.534 0.534 
District Trend  X   X   X 
Note: Sample in column 1-2 is restricted to mothers with preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample in column 3-6 includes mothers with 
and without preschool-aged children (age 3-6). Sample is further restricted to PODES years. Column 1-2 regress work participation on 
preschool density in a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy (Section 2.4.1). Column 3-4 regress work participation on preschool density, 
a dummy for having a preschool-aged child, and the interaction between the two in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy 
(Section 2.4.2). Column 5-6 builds on the DDD strategy and adds individual fixed effect (DDD-FE) to allow comparison within-mothers 
(Section 2.4.3). Column 2, 4, 6 add district-specific trends. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects and an urban 
residence dummy. Panel A and B look at the effect of public and private preschool densities separately. Standard errors clustered at the 
district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Observations, 
work participation means, and inclusion of district trends are indicated in the last three rows. 
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Appendix Table D.5. Effect of preschool availability on female’s earnings and work hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Salary Net profit Income Work hours 
Panel A: Public     
























FDR q-value 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 
Panel B: Private     
























FDR q-value 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.434 
Observations 20,193 17,804 37,523 48,537 
Mean 442.201 467.009 457.837 37.890 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each column regresses the dependent variable indicated in column 
heading on the density of public (Panel A) or private (Panel B) preschools, defined as the number 
of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 in each district, a dummy for having a 
preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. All regressions include mother’s age fixed 
effect, urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. Salary, net profit, income are per 
month and adjusted for inflation using national consumer price index (CPI) with 2010 base year 
obtained from FRED. Income is defined as the sum of salary and net profit. Work hours are per 
week. We apply log transformation to all dependent variables so that estimates can be interpreted 
as percentage changes; zero values are imputed with log(0.1). Robust standard errors clustered at 
district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted 
p-values. FDR q-values for the interaction coefficient of preschool density and eligible child are 
computed over all 4 outcomes and are shown in the last row of each panel. FDR q-values indicate 
the probability of false positives among significant tests. Number of female-year observations and 
means of dependent variables are indicated in the last two rows. Means are reported in nominal 
terms. Salary, net profit, and income are reported in IDR 10,000 increments and are adjusted for 
inflation using national CPI with 2010 base year (FRED). The exchange rate in 2010 was 1 USD 
for 9,090 IDR (FRED). Earnings and work hours are asked pertaining to survey years and historical 




Appendix Table D.6. Effect of preschool availability on female’s main activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Working Job searching Attending 
school 
Housekeeping 
Panel A: Public     
























FDR q-value 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 
Panel B: Private     
























FDR q-value 0.693 0.693 0.002 0.693 
Observations 36,287 37,223 37,223 37,223 
Mean 0.446 0.008 0.038 0.491 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool 
data in-between PODES years. Each column regresses the dummy for having main activity as 
indicated in column heading on the density of public (Panel A) or private (Panel B) preschools, 
defined as the number of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 in each district, 
a dummy for having a preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. All regressions include 
mother’s age fixed effect, urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered at district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels based on unadjusted p-values. FDR q-values for the interaction coefficient of 
preschool density and eligible child are computed over all 4 outcomes and are shown in the last 
row of each panel. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant 
tests. Number of female-year observations and means of dependent variables are indicated in the 




Appendix Table D.7. Effect of preschool availability on female’s occupation conditional on employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Professional Manager Clerk Sales Service Agricultural Production 
Panel A: Public        










































FDR q-value 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.141 0.600 0.600 0.600 
Panel B: Private        










































FDR q-value 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.298 
Observations 125,047 125,047 125,047 125,047 125,047 125,047 125,047 
Mean 0.075 0.003 0.044 0.223 0.150 0.319 0.113 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool data in-between PODES years. Each column 
regresses the dummy for being employed in a certain occupation category indicated in column heading, conditional on being employed, on the 
density of public (Panel A) or private (Panel B) preschools, defined as the number of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-
6 in each district, a dummy for having a preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. Comparison group includes all mothers of children 
of the wrong ages and non-mothers. All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted p-values. 
FDR q-values for the interaction coefficient of preschool density and eligible child are computed over all 7 outcomes and are shown in the last 
row of each panel. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Number of female-year observations and 
means of dependent variables are indicated in the last two rows. See Table 2.8 for a list of top-3 occupations per category. 
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Appendix Table D.8. Effect of preschool availability on female’s industry conditional on employment 







Trade Logistic Finance Social 
Panel A: Public          






















































FDR q-value 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.311 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 
Panel B: Private          






















































FDR q-value 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738 
Observations 121,718 121,718 121,718 121,718 121,718 121,718 121,718 121,718 121,718 
Mean 0.194 0.001 0.095 0.001 0.004 0.188 0.002 0.005 0.124 
Notes: Sample is restricted to females aged 19-45 in at least two IFLS rounds. We infer preschool data in-between PODES years. Each column 
regresses the dummy for being employed in a certain industry category indicated in column heading, conditional on being employed, on the 
density of public (Panel A) or private (Panel B) preschools, defined as the number of preschools divided by the population of children aged 3-6 
in each district, a dummy for having a preschool-aged eligible child, and their interaction. Comparison group includes all mothers of children of 
the wrong ages and non-mothers. All regressions include mother’s age fixed effect, urban dummy, district, year, and individual fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level. Stars denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels based on unadjusted p-values. 
FDR q-values for the interaction coefficient of preschool density and eligible child are computed over all 9 outcomes and are shown in the last 
row of each panel. FDR q-values indicate the probability of false positives among significant tests. Number of female-year observations and 
means of dependent variables are indicated in the last two rows. See Table 2.10 for a list of top-3 occupations per category. 
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Appendix Table D.9. Evidence for mothers sorting to high preschool access districts 
 
Net migration of mothers with preschool-
aged kids 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Net change in private preschool density 0.087    
 (0.055)    
Net change in public preschool density  -0.688   
  (0.476)   
(Lagged) Net change in private preschool 
density 
  -0.067  
  (0.055)  
(Lagged) Net change in public preschool 
density 
   0.102 
   (0.474) 
     
Observations 1,733 1,733 1,732 1,732 
Notes: Sample is composed of a panel of districts over PODES survey years. We aggregate the 
number of preschool-aged eligible mothers in our constructed panel and regress the net migration 
of eligible mothers between PODES survey years on the net and/or lagged net change in 
private/public preschool densities. Number of observations indicate the number of district-year 
observations in the panel of districts. 
 
Appendix Table D.10. Annual cost of attending private and public preschools 
 
Private  Public 
 
Private-
Public  Mean SD  Mean SD  
Registration fee 15.47 (38.58)  6.19 (13.53)  9.27*** 
Other scheduled fees 12.92 (33.79)  4.80 (8.86)  8.12*** 
Exam fees 0.23 (1.66)  0.01 (0.05)  0.22** 
Books/writing supplies 5.57 (11.16)  2.61 (5.24)  2.95*** 
Uniform and sports 
supplies 
5.54 (10.35)  5.16 (8.35)  0.38 
Transportation costs 3.87 (18.50)  0.25 (1.57)  3.63*** 
Food/housing costs 13.96 (29.43)  9.40 (15.98)  4.57 
Special courses 0.93 (13.70)  0.00 (0.00)  0.93 
Other school expenses 1.22 (7.14)  0.00 (0.00)  1.22*** 
Observations 430  76  506 
Notes: Sample is obtained from IFLS 3 (2000) conditional on enrollment in indicated public or 
private preschools. Means are reported in IDR 10,000 increments and are adjusted for inflation using 





Appendix Table D.11. Heterogeneous effect of preschool availability on maternal employment by district’s population 
 Work participation 
 DDD  DDD-FE 
Population: < 0.5 mil < 1 mil < 1.5 mil  < 0.5 mil < 1 mil < 1.5 mil 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Public       




































Panel B: Private       




































Observations 61,811 134,751 168,739  61,811 134,751 168,739 
Number of districts 149 233 263  149 233 263 
Mean 0.552 0.548 0.539  0.552 0.548 0.539 
Note: Sample includes all mothers with and without any preschool-aged eligible child (age 3-6). Comparison group 
includes non-mothers and mothers of children with the wrong ages. Sample is restricted to individuals living in 
districts with population as indicated in the column headings. Population count was based in 1996 because it was 
the earliest Susenas data covering all 290 districts. All columns regress work participation on preschool density, 
preschool eligibility dummy, and their interaction. All regressions include district, year, mother’s age fixed effects 
and an urban residence dummy. DDD excludes while DDD-FE includes individual fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the district-level is shown in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. Number of observations, number of districts, and work participation means for each column 
are indicated at the last three rows. 
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APPENDIX E: APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES FOR MINIMUM WAGE AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 
 
Appendix Figure E.1. Distribution of wages relative to stipulated minimum wages by age groups 
Note: Ratio of monthly wage to minimum wage is defined for all wages larger than zero to exclude unpaid family workers earning and reporting 
zero wages. Monthly and minimum wages are not adjusted for inflation. Ratios are winsorized at 1% level at the tails. A ratio of 1 indicates a monthly 
wage equivalent to the provincial minimum wage. A ratio larger (smaller) than 1 indicates an individual earning higher (lower) than the stipulated 
provincial minimum wage. Ages 12–15 correspond to lower secondary education ages, ages 16–18 to upper secondary education ages, 19–24 to 
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Appendix Figure E.2. Average nominal minimum wages across provinces with high and low 
minimum wage growth between 1994 and 2009 
Note: High minimum wage growth provinces are defined as provinces with higher than median 
nominal growth between 1994 and 2009. The median nominal growth between 1994 and 2009 was 






































 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage   
































Panel B: Log Real Minimum 
Wage 
   
































Means / Observations in Panel A and B   
Ages 10–30 0.405 0.422 0.492 0.540 
Observations [861,626] [581,433] [321,417] [67,127] 
Ages 12–15 0.875 0.932 0.977 0.972 
Observations [194,059] [118,423] [63,758] [13,975] 
Ages 16–18 0.514 0.660 0.808 0.832 
Observations [134,586] [83,632] [42,820] [10,326] 
Ages 19–24 0.085 0.140 0.315 0.393 
Observations [218,618] [146,173] [77,043] [15,649] 
Note: Each column regresses school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage in 
the individual’s province of residence restricted to individuals whose mother’s educational 
attainment is as indicated in the column heading. See Table 3.2 for more details on log 
nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, and 
individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummy variables, and district-specific trends. 
Standard errors clustered at the province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are 
used to indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Means and 
number of observations (in square brackets) in each of the 4 × 4 cells are the same for both 




Appendix Table E.2. Effect of minimum wage on school enrollment by mother’s work 
status 
 Enrollment 
Work status: Not working Unpaid family 
worker 
Self-employed Paid worker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Log Nominal Minimum Wage   
































Panel B: Log Real Minimum 
Wage 
   
































Means / Observations in Panel A and B   
Ages 10–30 0.393 0.418 0.444 0.468 
Observations [1,242,433] [484,357] [498,275] [276,768] 
Ages 12–15 0.887 0.852 0.868 0.889 
Observations [244,835] [118,178] [120,168] [63,715] 
Ages 16–18 0.578 0.476 0.547 0.616 
Observations [175,256] [77,791] [87,186] [45,800] 
Ages 19–24 0.141 0.079 0.121 0.206 
Observations [325,260] [114,612] [126,521] [67,788] 
Note: Each column regresses school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage in 
the individual’s province of residence restricted to individuals whose mother’s work status 
is as indicated in the column heading. See Table 3.2 for more details on log nominal or real 
minimum wage definitions. All regressions include district, year, and individual age fixed 
effects, urban and male dummy variables, and district-specific trends. Standard errors 
clustered at the province level, are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** are used to indicate 10, 
5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Means and number of 
observations (in square brackets) in each of the 4 × 4 cells are the same for both Panel A 
and B and are shown in the bottom panel. 
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Appendix Table E.3. Effect of minimum wages on school enrollment with standard errors clustered at district-level 
 Enrolled 
Age Range: 10-30  12-15  16-18  19-24 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Panel A 






































Observations 2,769,799 2,769,799  597,633 597,633  427,334 427,334  715,152 715,152 
District Trend  X   X   X   X 
Note: Each column regresses individual current school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage in the individual’s 
province of residence. See Table 3.2 for more details on log nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions include 
district, year, and individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummy variables. District-specific trends are included in Columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *, **, *** are used to indicate 10, 5, and 1 percent statistical 
significance levels, respectively. Columns 3–4 are restricted to individuals ages 12–15 (lower secondary education ages), Columns 
5–6 to ages 16–18 (upper secondary education ages), and Columns 7–8 to 19–24 (tertiary education ages). The number of 




Appendix Table E.4. Effect of minimum wages on school enrollment dropping observations from year 2006 
 Enrolled 
Age Range: 10–30  12–15  16–18  19–24 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Panel A 






































Observations 2,694,748 2,694,748  592,317 592,317  412,190 412,190  688,609 688,609 
District Trend  X   X   X   X 
Note: Observations from year 2006 are dropped because the average enrollment rate in 2006 is lower than the preceding and 
subsequent years. Each column regresses individual current school enrollment on log nominal or real minimum wage in the 
individual’s province of residence. See Table 3.2 for more details on log nominal or real minimum wage definitions. All regressions 
include district, year, and individual age fixed effects, urban and male dummy variables. District-specific trends are included in 
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 (indicated with an X). Standard errors are clustered at the province level. *, **, *** are used to indicate 10, 
5, and 1 percent statistical significance levels, respectively. Columns 3–4 are restricted to individuals ages 12–15 (lower secondary 
education ages), Columns 5–6 to ages 16–18 (upper secondary education ages), and Columns 7–8 to ages 19–24 (tertiary education 
ages). The number of observations in each regression are indicated in the second to last row. 
 
